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Abstract 
International Transfer Pricing in a Developing Economy Context: 
Perspectives from the Taxpayers and the Tax Authorities 
by 
Lo Wai Yee Agnes 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Since the 1979 economic reforms, China has been characterized by a rapid 
increase in international trade and an inflow of foreign direct investment.  Foreign 
investment enterprises (FIEs) play an increasing important role in the Chinese 
economy and are substantially engaged in transactions with affiliates outside China.  
Therefore, international transfer pricing in China has become a significant issue. 
 
Empirical research on international transfer pricing has focused on 
multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in developed countries.  However, it is 
difficult to generalize their findings to MNCs operating in developing countries as 
the business environment of developing countries is quite different from that of 
developed countries.  Existing literature identifies that due to differences in the 
business environment between developed and developing countries, the tax factors 
which are important in developed countries should not be over-emphasized in 
developing countries.  Some nontax factors such as foreign exchange control and 
restrictions on profit repatriation which may not be important in developed countries 
are nevertheless important in developing countries.  However, empirical studies on 
international transfer pricing in developing countries are relatively scare.  
Furthermore, there have been no empirical studies that examine the relationships 
between management’s perception of the importance of environmental variables and 
management’s choice of international transfer pricing methods in developing 
countries, or which analyze the tax and nontax cost trade-off for tax evasion via 
international transfer pricing in developed or developing countries. 
 
The objective of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive empirical study on 
international transfer pricing in China from the perspectives of both taxpayer and the 
tax authority.  The results of this thesis indicate that the more important the 
management perceives the interest of local partners and the maintenance of a good 
relationship with host government to be, the more likely it is that the FIE will adopt a 
 ii 
market-based transfer pricing method.  On the other hand, the more important the 
management perceives foreign exchange controls in transfer pricing decisions to be, 
the more likely it is that the FIE will choose a cost-based transfer pricing method.   
The research results also reveal that based on a tax and non-tax cost trade-off 
analysis, wholly foreign-owned enterprises, cooperative joint ventures and export-
oriented FIEs are more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits in China than 
equity joint ventures and domestic -market oriented enterprises.  Some explanations 
for this result are the lack of monitoring by Chinese local partners in certain FIEs and 
the opportunity for transfer pricing manipulations. 
 
The results of this thesis have important policy implications for foreign investors 
carrying on business in China, the Chinese tax authorities as well as academic 
researchers.  My research results should help foreign investors to have a better 
understanding of the tax and the nontax factors in formulating transfer pricing 
policies in China.  The results should also help tax authorities tackle tax audit 
problems more effectively and in setting tax audit guidelines on related party 
transactions.  Further, this thesis should contribute to the establishment of a more 
comprehensive theoretical framework of international transfer pricing in developing 
countries.  It also empirically demonstrates the applicability of the tax and nontax 
cost theory in the context of international transfer pricing.  
I declare  that this is an original work based primarily on my own 
research, and I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or 
unpublished, have been duly acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agnes Wai Yee LO       
11 June 2004            
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
As the world economy becomes more globalized, transfer pricing has become 
increasingly challenging to multinational corporations in planning and implementing 
their global operations.  The growth of the Chinese economy is characterized by 
rapid increases in inflows of foreign investment and international trade.  For many 
years, China has been the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) among 
developing countries. China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization in late 
2001 has further accelerated the trend of inflows of foreign investment.  In 2002, 
China became the second largest recipient of FDI in the world.  This situation is 
likely to persist in 2003.  Also, in 2002, China has become the number four trading 
nation in the world, just behind the US, Japan and Germany.  Foreign investment 
enterprises (FIEs) which include Sino-foreign joint ventures and wholly foreign-
owned enterprises play an increasingly important role in the Chinese economy and 
trade. They are substantially engaged in transactions with affiliates outside China.  
Therefore, international transfer pricing in China has become a significant issue.  In 
recent years, a large number of these FIEs have reported accounting losses, which 
prompted the Chinese government to examine potential transfer pricing a buses. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1  MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
1.1.1 Importance of International Transfer Pricing  
International transfer pricing is the pricing of goods, services or intangibles 
that are transferred between members of the same group that cross national 
boundaries (Elliott and Emmanuel 2000).  Inter-affiliate trades include exports and 
imports of raw materials, products and capital equipment, transfer of proprietary 
technology, royalties for the use of trademarks or copyrights, provision of technical 
and management services, and inter-affiliate financing.  As the world economy 
becomes more globalized, transfer pricing has become increasingly challenging to 
multinational corporations (MNCs) in planning and implementing their global 
operations.  A survey of accounting educators by Sands and Pragasam (1997) finds 
that transfer pricing is ranked as one of the most important topics in international 
accounting.  Another survey conducted by Ernst & Young (2001) finds that transfer 
pricing is rated by MNCs as the most important international tax issue.   
Under relevant laws and regulations, prices for related-party transactions 
should be set according to comparable market prices similar to other arm’s length 
transactions.  However, in practice, MNCs treat interna tional transfer pricing as a 
mechanism to manoeuvre funds internationally and to choose the countries in which 
they wish profits to be reported (Chan and Chow 1997a).  They strategically select 
transfer prices so as to maximize global tax savings, minimize operating risks and 
circumvent restrictions imposed by host governments.   
Transfer pricing manipulation has adverse effects on the jurisdictions where 
the MNCs operate (Lall 1973; Natke 1985).  Outward income shifting by MNCs 
reduces tax revenue of the governments and results in a loss of legitimate share of 
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profits to local shareholders.  It deprives local staff of higher remuneration because 
of distorted operating results.  It can also worsen the foreign exchange situation 
which may in turn trigger the government to impose stringent restrictions on imports.  
More importantly, low profitability reported by MNCs may deter market entrance of 
prospective local competitors and this results in the economy's over-dependence on 
MNCs.  Transfer pricing problems can also be a threat to the capital market.  For 
example, Enron used a loophole in transfer pricing disclosure rules to hide for many 
years transactions with a major employee-run partnership, called Chewco, whose 
eventual disclosure played a large impact in the company’s collapse (Emshwiller 
2003).  To monitor the transfer pricing practices of MNCs, a great number of fiscal 
authorities have enacted regulations and taken increasingly aggressive measures 
against tax evasion through transfer pricing manipulation. 
 
1.1.2 Significance of International Transfer Pricing in Developing Economies 
The business environment in developing countries is distinctly different from 
that in developed countries. The importance of environmental variables for transfer 
pricing in developing countries relative to developed countries is perceived 
differently by the management of MNCs. Existing literature notes that the 
inducements for MNCs to resort to transfer pricing manipulation in developing 
countries are stronger than that in developed countries and the threat of fiscal losses 
is persistent in less developed countries (Brean 1979; Plasschaert 1985; Al-Eryani 
1987). MNCs shift profits from developing countries to circumvent the adverse 
impact of relatively stringent regulations on foreign investment imposed by these 
governments and to minimize the perceived financial risks of operations in relatively 
uncertain environments. Developing countries are also more vulnerable to transfer 
pricing manipulation due to inadequacies in their institutional framework and the 
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lack of expertise and resources to monitor the intricacies of this issue.  Also, they are 
concerned that rigorous audits may drive foreign investors to other jurisdictions.  
A few studies attempt to provide empirical evidence on trading statistics to 
assess the extent of transfer pricing manipulation by MNCs operating in developing 
countries. Lall (1973) finds that, compared with world market prices, MNCs in 
Colombia over-price their imports into Colombia by 33 percent to 300 percent in the 
pharmaceutical sector, and by 24 percent to 81 percent in the rubber and electrical 
industries.  Natke's (1985) study of the import prices of MNCs operating in Brazil 
during 1979 reveals that MNCs pay higher prices on imports than local firms and the 
prices of MNCs' imports also exhibit greater variability.  Rahman and Scapens (1986) 
investigate the import prices of ten pharmaceutical items in Bangladesh, and find that 
MNCs over-price imports from affiliates by between 78 percent and 600 percent. 
They conclude that transfer pricing abuse accounts for the low profitability of MNCs' 
operations in that country.  Chan and Chow (1997a) find that MNCs in China over-
price imports and under-price exports in the audio/video equipment, garment, plastic 
and chemicals industries.  The above studies provide valuable evidence of an 
international transfer pricing problem in emerging economies. 
 
1.1.3 Significance of the Chinese Economy 
This research examines the international transfer pricing issue in China.  I 
chose  to look at transfer pricing in China  because of that country’s increasing 
importance in the world economy and the significant volume of inter-company trade 
by MNCs with their affiliated companies there.   
Since the 1979 economic reforms, China has outperformed major industrial 
countries in terms of growth in real GDP.  Table 1.1 summarizes GDP growth rates 
in China and other major industrial countries.  The average annual growth of China's 
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GDP for 1993-2002 was 9.3 percent, more than four times the average growth of the 
G-7 countries.  The situation is similar in 2003.  China's economy, in terms of total 
GDP (purchasing power parity base), is already the second largest in the world, 
behind the USA, but ahead of Japan and Germany.  
[Insert Table 1.1 here] 
 
China's influence on the world economy can also be seen in the rapid growth 
in China's foreign trade.  As a result of  an average annual growth rate of 19.5 percent 
in foreign trade from 1993 to 2002, China was ranked among the world's top 4 
trading nations in 2002, representing 5.0 percent of  total world trade, as opposed to 
15.4 percent for the US, 9.0 percent for  Germany and 6.1 percent for Japan (United 
Nations 2003).  China’s foreign trade is expected to continue to increase rapidly due 
to the economic momentum generated from its entry into the World Trade  
Organisation (WTO) in November 2001.  In 2003, China’s foreign trade amounted to 
US$851.21 billion, a 37.1 percent growth from 2002.  Table 1.2 shows the volume of 
China’s foreign trade from 1993 to 2003. 
[Insert Table 1.2 here] 
 
Since its entry into the WTO, China lowered the tariff barriers on a broad 
range of imports, ranging from agricultural goods to industrial products.  The 
average import tariff for industrial products was reduced from 16 percent in 2000 to 
12 percent in 2002 and will be further reduced to 10 percent by 2005.  The average 
import tariff for agriculture products was reduced from 21.3 percent in 2000 to 18.9 
percent in 2002 and will be reduced to 15.6 percent by 2005.  Import tariffs for 
vehicles will be reduced from 80-100 percent in 2001 to 25 percent by mid -2006.  In 
addition, import quotas and license grants applicable to over 400 categories of import 
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products will be phased out by 2005 at the latest.  
Apart from the reduction of import barriers, China also provides trading 
rights to foreign investors due to its accession to the WTO.  Before entering the 
WTO, China restricted the trading rights (the right to import and export) of foreign 
firms and prohibited them from distributing products by themselves.  Under the 
WTO agreement, trading rights and distribution services of foreign companies will 
be progressively phased in over three years.  Thus, all foreign enterprises in China 
will be granted the right to trade most products by 2005.  They can also import and 
distribute products without going through a state -owned enterprise or a middleman 
(Panitchpakdi and Clifford 2002).  Attributable partly to the reductions in import 
tariffs and the gradual provision of trading rights, China’s imports increased by 21.2 
percent in 2002 and by 39.9 percent in 2003 while the total imports for the world 
only increased by 3.4 percent in 2002.  Furthermore, as explained later, foreign 
investment in China increased rapidly.  Many investors aim to take advantage of low 
operating costs in China which enable them to export goods at a more competitive 
price to other countries.  As a result, China’s exports also increased dramatically in 
2002 and 2003 due to the growth of the export of labor -intensive products.  Such 
upward trends in imports and exports are expected to continue due to the opening of 
markets in China under the WTO agreement.  
China has recently entered into a free trade agreement with a number of 
jurisdictions.  In order to facilitate trading between Hong Kong and mainland China, 
on 29 June 2003, China and Hong Kong signed the Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement (CEPA).  Under the CEPA, no import tariff will be imposed on 273 
categories of goods from 1 January 2004 if the goods are of Hong Kong origin.  
These 273 categories of goods include electrical and electronic products, plastics, 
paper, textiles and clothing, chemical and pharmaceutical products, clocks and 
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watches, jewelry, cosmetics, metal products, and miscellaneous appliances and 
accessories.  This agreement provides significant cost savings for importing certain 
products such as jewelry and cosmetics whose current tariffs range from 18.3 to 35 
percent.  Therefore, CEPA will further accelerate the increase of imports into China.  
Other goods of Hong Kong origin not included in these 273 categories will also 
enjoy zero import tariff by 2006.  CEPA will benefit not only Hong Kong companies, 
but also other foreign investors as they can arrange to carry out certain production 
procedures in Hong Kong to enjoy the zero tariff arrangement.  Transfer pricing 
plays an important role in determining whether there is sufficient local (i.e. Hong 
Kong) content to qualify for tariff exemption.  China also signed a similar CEPA 
with Macau in 2003.  For the Asia Pacific region, China and the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a framework agreement in late 2002 which 
commits them to establish an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area by 2010 (ASEAN 
2002).  The establishment of an ASEAN- China Free Trade Area would increase 
intra-regional trade and investment. 
China has also experienced a sharp rise in the inflow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) since 1990, a trend that has been accelerated by China’s entrance 
into the WTO.  Despite a global decline of FDI inflows by 21 percent in 2002, FDI 
inflows to China increased by 13 percent and China became the second largest 
recipient of FDI in the world in 2002 (Table 1.3).  FDI inflows to China reached 
US$52.7 billion in 2002, a new record reinforcing its position as the largest recipient 
of FDI inflows in the developing world (UNCTC 2003).  It was reported that FDI in 
China reached US$57 billion in 2003, just behind Luxembourg and the United States 
(UNCTAD 2004). 
[Insert Table 1.3 here] 
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Foreign investment enterprises (FIEs), which include Sino-foreign joint 
ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises in China, play an increasingly 
important role in China’s foreign trade.  Table 1.4 shows that in 2003 total imports 
and exports by FIEs were US$231.9 billion and US$240.3 billion respectively, which 
represents 56 percent and 55 percent of China’s total imports and exports.  Among 
these imports and exports, a large proportion of transactions was related-party 
transactions where the FIEs in China traded with their overseas affiliated companies.   
Chan and Chow (1998) find that 88 percent of the export-oriented FIEs in China 
purchased and sold 70 percent or more of their total imports and exports to their 
affiliated companies.  This means that many MNCs operating in China engage in 
substantial related-party transactions.  Due to the rapidly increasing investment by 
MNCs in China and the significant amount of related-party transactions involved, 
transfer pricing is an important issue for the Chinese tax authorities, for MNCs 
investing in China and indeed for the world economy. 
[Insert Table 1.4 here] 
 
Given the increasing importance of foreign investment in the economy, China 
has made remarkable strides in formulating relevant policies and a legislative 
framework to attract foreign investment, some of their policies tempt foreign 
investors to engage in transfer pricing manipulation. The Chinese tax authorities 
estimate that over 80 percent of MNCs operating in China engaged in tax evasion, 
and that resulting losses in tax revenue were at least US$3.6 billion in 2002.  
Transfer pricing manipulation is the most common method used by MNCs for tax 
evasion (PRN 2003).  To protect government revenues, transfer pricing audits are 
regarded as one of the most important tasks by the State Administration of Taxation 
(SAT).  Accordingly, the SAT provides guidelines and resources for transfer pricing 
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audits.  In 2001, the Chinese tax authorities adjusted and increased FIE assessable 
profits by a total of US$49 million due to transfer pricing manipulation, which was 
more than half of the total amount adjusted for the previous five years combined 
(Chinese Tax News 2002).  Since China entered the WTO in 2001, tariff rates have 
also been rapidly reduced, resulting in a significant decline in government tariff 
revenue.  The SAT aims to increase their efforts on transfer pricing audits to collect 
more escaped tax to partly compensate for this loss of tariff revenues.  Therefore, 
transfer pricing audits have become a significant issue for both the Chinese tax 
authorities and the MNCs in China. 
 
1.2  OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS 
This thesis investigates the international transfer pricing issue from both the 
taxpayer and the tax authority perspectives.  First, I conduct a literature review and 
study the institutional framework of transfer pricing in China.  Second, I investigate  
the association between management's perception of the importance of 
environmental variables (including tax and nontax factors) and management’s  choice 
of international transfer pricing methods  in China.  This part of the research is based 
on field interviews of management of MNCs in China.  This is a significant issue 
given the large amount of investment flowing to China and other developing 
countries and the amount of foreign exchange that occurs through foreign investment 
in these countries.  Third, I evaluate how nontax factors are being considered against 
tax factors and influence MNCs’ decisions on profit shifting through transfer pricing 
manipulation.  I then proceed to investigate empirically via multivariate statistical 
analysis the relationship between firm characteristics and the probability of being 
selected for transfer pricing audits by the Chinese tax authorities.   Based on an 
analysis of tax and nontax costs for firms with different characteristics, I hypothesize 
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that certain types of enterprise are more likely to be audited given China’s 
institutional framework, regulations, and business environment.  To test the 
hypotheses, I examine the likelihood of an international transfer pricing audit for a 
random sample of FIEs in China.  These FIEs include those actually being audited on 
transfer pricing by Chinese tax authorities and FIEs which have significant inter-
affiliate transfers but have not been audited. 
The results of this paper should have significant implications for tax 
authorities as well as for foreign investors operating in China and other developing 
economies.  By examining the environmental characteristics pertaining to China, this 
study sheds empirical light on how the management perception of these 
characteristics influences the choice of transfer pricing methods. The findings of this 
study are of particular relevance to public policy makers and investors in developing 
countries in enhancing their understanding of environmental influences on transfer 
pricing decisions , and thus contribute to the building of a more comprehensive 
theoretical framework of transfer pricing in developing economies.   
The analysis of tax audit cases should he lp tax authorities tackle the tax audit 
problems more effectively and set transfer pricing auditing guidelines for related-
party transactions.  For example, given low nontax costs of shifting profits out of 
China by export-oriented FIEs, tax authorities could prioritize investigation of this 
type of FIE.  My research results should also help foreign investors gain a better 
understanding of tax and nontax costs for transfer pricing manipulation in China.  
Empirical studies on tax compliance are rare due to difficulty in data collection.  As 
this is the first empirical study of tax and nontax cost trade-offs in an international 
transfer pricing and tax audit context, the results provide academic researchers with 
an interesting perspective in studying the effect of nontax costs on transfer pricing 
manipulation and tax audits.  Finally, although China is unique in terms of its size 
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and history, it is in essence a developing economy according to the IMF (2003).  
Thus, the research results should provide a useful reference for other developing 
countries.  For example, countries that have similar forms of investment as China can 
make reference to how different types of investment affect transfer pricing 
compliance. 
 
1.3  ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
In the next chapter, I review the relevant literature.  Aspects of the business 
environment in China which relate to international transfer pricing and current 
transfer pricing regulations are explained and discussed in Chapter 3.  Chapter 4 
examines the relationship between management perceptions of the importance of 
various environmental variables and the transfer pricing methods used by analyzing 
the results of an interview survey with management of MNCs in China.  Chapter 5 
discusses the tax and nontax cost trade -off theory and examines how Chinese tax 
authorities implement international transfer pricing legislation.  Relationships 
between firm characteristics and the probability of being selected for transfer pricing 
audits by Chinese tax authorities are also analyzed in depth in that chapter.  Finally, 
Chapter 6 provides a summary of the research findings as well as an analysis of the 
limitations and future research implications. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Empirical research on international transfer pricing has focused on MNCs operating 
in developed countries.  However, it is difficult to generalize their findings to MNCs 
operating in developing countries as the business environment of developing 
countries is quite different from that of developed countries.  Existing literature 
reveals that due to differences in the business environment between developed and 
developing countries, tax factors which are important for developed countries should 
not be over-emphasized for developing countries.  Some nontax factor s such as 
foreign exchange controls and restrictions on profit repatriation which may not be 
important in developed countries are nevertheless important in developing countries.  
Therefore, empirical studies in developing countries that examine the effect of the 
perceived importance of environmental variables on transfer pricing decisions, and 
the trade-off between tax and nontax factors on transfer pricing decisions can 
enhance our understanding of MNC’s transfer pricing behavior in developing 
economies. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
Empirical research on international transfer pricing focus on multinational 
corporations (MNCs) operating in US, Japan and other developed countries.  Much 
of the research investigates the effects of environmental variables on transfer pricing 
decisions.  However, the business environment in developing countries is distinctly 
different from that in developed countries.  Thus, the importance of environmental 
variables for transfer pricing in developing countries relative to developed countries 
is perceived differently by the management of MNCs.  I will first discuss prior 
international transfer pricing research on the importance of environmental variables 
in developed and developing countries.  Then, I will discuss prior empirical research 
on tax compliance.  Finally, I will summarize prior studies on the tax and nontax cost 
trade-off theory. 
 
2.2  PRIOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSFER PRICING IN DEVELOPED ECONOMIES 
Empirical studies on transfer pricing mainly f ocus on developed countries and 
much of these prior studies examined the relative importance of environmental 
variables that constitute market imperfections to the choice of transfer pricing 
methods.  Most of these studies surveyed MNCs operating in the US (Tang and Chan 
1979; Burns 1980; Borkowski 1992, 1997a, 1997b; Tang 1993, 2002).  A few studies 
surveyed MNCs in other developed countries including Japan (Tang and Chan 1979; 
Borkowski 1997a), UK (Tang 1981; Mostafa et al. 1984) and Canada (Tang 1981; 
Borkowski 1997b).  Other studies deal with MNCs’ income shifting behavior 
through international transfer pricing (Klassen et al. 1993; Jacob 1996; Oyelere and 
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Emmanuel 1998; Conover and Nichols 2000), transfer pricing objectives (Cravens 
and Shearon 1996), and transfer pricing methods (Kachelmeier and Towry 2002). 
 
Tang and Chan (1979), Tang (1981, 1993, 2002) 
Tang and Chan (1979) determine the important environmental variables 
considered by large US and Japanese MNCs in formulating their transfer pricing 
policies.  They also identify the environmental variables which discriminate between 
US and Japanese MNCs on international transfer pricing practices.  By analyzing the 
results of their questionnaire survey provided by 76 and 50 large industrial 
corporations in the United States and Japan, they find that overall profit to the 
company, restrictions on profit remittances imposed by host countries, competitive 
position of foreign subsidiaries, differentials in income tax rates and income tax 
legislation among countries, and performance evaluation of foreign subsidiaries are 
the five most important variables rated by US firms.  On the other hand, overall 
profit to the company, competitive position of foreign subsidiaries, devaluation and 
revaluation of foreign currencies, restrictions on repatriation of profits imposed by 
foreign countries and performance evaluation of foreign subsidiaries are rated as 
most important variables by Japanese firms.  They find that interest of local partners, 
devaluation and revaluation of foreign currencies, anti-dumping legislation, import 
restrictions imposed by foreign countries, and differentials in income tax rates and 
income tax legislation among countries contribute most to the different perceptions 
between the rating of US and Japanese firms. 
Tang (1981) discusses the similarities and differences among four national 
groups of MNCs (the US, Japan, Canada, and the UK) in their consideration of 
environmental variables for transfer pricing decisions.  Their results show that 
overall profits to the company and the competitive position of subsidiaries in foreign 
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countries are considered the most important variables by all four national groups.  
The interest of local partners in foreign subsidiaries is ranked substantially higher by 
UK and Japanese companies than by Canadian and US companies.  Compared with 
the other national groups, Japanese companies place significantly greater importance 
on the devaluation and revaluation of foreign currencies. 
Tang (1993) finds that overall profit to the company is still the most 
important environmental variable for US MNCs’ transfer pricing decisions.  
Compared with Tang (1979), management ranked differentials in income tax rates 
and income tax legislation among countries, maintaining good relationships with host 
governments, the need of subsidiaries in foreign countries to seek local funds, and 
antitrust legislation of foreign countries as more important to transfer pricing 
decisions.   
Tang (2002) updates Tang (1993).  Some environmental variables used in 
Tang (1993) are replaced by new environmental variables in Tang’s (2002) study.  
For example, the old variable “differentials in income tax rates and income tax 
legislation among countries” is not used, and new variables including “transfer 
pricing and other tax regulations in the United States”, “transfer pricing and other tax 
regulations of foreign countries”, and “differentials in income tax rates among 
countries” are added.  The results of the study show that transfer pricing and other 
tax regulations in the United States is the most important variable for transfer pricing 
decisions, followed by overall profit to the company.  
 
Burns (1980) 
Burns (1980) aims to find the extent to which firms’ transfer pricing 
decisions are influenced by various environmental factors.  He analyses the 
responses from financial executives of 62 US-based MNCs.  The financial executives 
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were asked to rate the importance of each environmental variable on their firms’ 
transfer pricing decisions and to select five environmental variables which are most 
important to their firms’ transfer pricing decisions.  The results show that market 
conditions in foreign countries, competition in foreign countries, reasonable profit 
for foreign affiliates, US federal income taxes, and economic conditions in foreign 
countries are rated as the five most important variables among the others.     
 
Mostafa et al. (1984) 
Mostafa et al. (1984) use discriminant analysis to test whether the 
environmental variables including overall profit of the company, divisional 
autonomy, and compliance with foreign tax and tariff regulations would affect the 
choice of transfer pricing methods by MNCs.  The paper collects data from 46 UK 
companies using a questionnaire survey.  The results show that the perceived 
importance of the variables, including overall profit of the company, divisional 
autonomy, compliance with foreign tax and tariff regulations, and performance 
evaluation of divisions, are significantly related to the international transfer pricing 
methods used.  However, the study does not rank the importance of each variable on 
the transfer pricing decision, nor does it test the relationship between the transfer 
pricing methods used and the environmental variables individually.  
 
Borkowski (1992, 1997a, 1997b)     
Borkowski (1992) studies the organizational and environmental variables that 
affect transfer pricing decisions through a questionnaire survey for 247 US-based 
MNCs.  Findings suggest that the choice of a transfer pricing method is affected by 
specific organizational and environmental characteristics, including ease and cost of 
implementation, use of subsidiary profit as the primary performance evaluation 
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measure, degree of decentralization in the MNC, tax and tariff regulations, and the 
economic sta bility of the parent MNC country.  The results also show that stability 
and favourableness of the parent company’s economic circumstances are significant 
environmental factors affecting transfer pricing decisions. 
Borkowski (1997a) attempts to determine whether organizational factors, 
environmental factors, and financial factors affect the choice of transfer pricing 
methods using univariate tests.  A questionnaire survey collected data from 39 
Japanese MNCs and 28 US MNCs.  Findings suggest that Japanese and US MNCs 
utilize different transfer pricing methods, where Japanese MNCs are more likely to 
use non-cost-based methods than the US MNCs.  Findings also suggest that the 
choice of transfer pricing methods is affected by differences in environmental 
(including the risk of audits by tax authorities and the market conditions in subsidiary 
countries) and financial factors (including return on equity and return on assets), but 
not by organizational factors (including industry and performance evaluation criteria).   
Environmental variables have a significant impact on the choice of transfer pricing 
methods. 
Borkowski (1997b) analyzes the importance of environmental factors on 
transfer pricing decisions using similar statistical methods as Borkowski (1997a).  
Her sample includes 28 Canadian MNCs with US subsidiaries and 62 US MNCs 
with Canadian subsidiaries.  The findings suggest that Canadian and US MNCs have 
similar views on the importance of different environmental variables on transfer 
pricing decisions, and “economic conditions of Canada” and “risk of audits by US 
tax authorities” are significant factors affecting the choice of transfer pricing 
methods. 
 
Klassen et al (1993) 
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Klassen et al. (1993) evaluate changes in the reporting of taxable income by 
US MNCs in response to the changes in income tax rates.  They analyze accounting 
data of 191 US MNCs and find evidence of income shifting by MNCs in response to 
tax rate changes in Canada, Europe and the US.  They find that with increasing 
Canadian tax rates, MNCs shift income to the United States from Canada, whereas 
with decreasing rates in Europe, they shift income to Europe from the United States. 
 
Cravens and Shearon (1996) 
Cravens and Shearon (1996) examine whether transfer pricing policies affect 
financial consequences by using 82 responses to a questionnaire survey of US MNCs.  
They find that the number of countries of operation and the dollar value of transfers 
are significant factors that explain the total tax burden of MNCs.  They also find that 
the value of transfers and the foreign sales percentage have an effect on the financial 
outcomes of the firm as measured by return of assets.   
 
Jacob (1996) 
Jacob (1996) investigates the relationships between the volume of intrafirm 
sales, differential tax rates and tax payments.  He collects data from annual reports of 
260 US firms from 1982 to 1984 and 289 firms from 1988 to 1990.  He finds that 
firms with substantial intrafirm transfers paid lower global taxes, lower US taxes in 
the period of 1982-1984 (i.e. when foreign tax rates were lower than US tax rates) 
and higher US taxes in the period of 1988-1990 (i.e. when US tax rates were lower 
than foreign tax rates).  These results are consistent with his hypotheses. 
 
Oyelere and Emmanuel (1998) 
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Oyelere and Emmanuel (1998) examine the possible use of international 
transfer pricing as an income shifting mechanism by foreign-controlled enterprises 
operating in the UK.  They compare the profitability and dividend distributions of a 
sample of 36 foreign-controlled enterprises and 36 UK-controlled enterprises over a 
two-year period.  They find that foreign-controlled enterprises have lower 
profitability and higher dividend distribution than UK-controlled enterprises.  This 
provides evidence that foreign-controlled enterprises in the UK shift income through 
international transfer pricing. 
 
Conover and Nichols (2000) 
Conover and Nichols (2000) evaluate the effect of firm size on income 
shifting between tax jurisdictions through the use of transfer prices both before and 
after the passage of the US Tax Reform Act of 1986.  They expand the sample of 
Jacob (1996) by including 127 additional observations in the pre -1986 period and 
136 additional observations in the post-1986 period.  By doing so, their study extends 
prior studies by including smaller and financially distressed firms in the sample.  
They find that smaller and financially distressed firms are less likely to shift income 
through transfer pricing than larger firms. 
 
Kachelmeier and Towry (2002) 
Prior study reveals that transfer price negotiators expect fairness -based price 
concessions that moderate the influence of an outside market price when the outside 
market price strongly favors one of the parties.  Based on an experimental study, 
Kachelmeier and Towry (2002) examine whether the expectations of fairness-based 
price concessions extend to the actual prices that result from real-cash negotiation.  
They find that expectations of fairness-based price concessions do not survive actual 
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negotiations when participants negotiate over a computer network with no 
communication other than bids, asks, and acceptances.  Conversely, both 
expectations and actual negotiated outcomes reflect fairness-based price concessions 
when participants negotiate in a face-to-face setting with unrestricted communication.  
 
In conclusion, prior studies in developed countries find that environmental 
variables have a significant impact on the choice of transfer pricing methods.  
Differentials in income tax rates, income tax and transfer pricing regulations among 
countries, and competition in foreign countries are ranked as important 
environmental variables for transfer pricing decisions.  Other studies detect 
significant income shifting due to tax rate changes and other tax considerations as 
well as the volume of transfer.  Transfer pricing may also be affected by the nature of 
negotiations.  Key aspects of the above studies are summarized in Table 2.1.  
However, it is difficult to generalize their findings to MNCs operating in developing 
countries, as the business environment of developing countries is quite different from 
that of developed countries.  For example, more stringent rules on movement of 
capital, and higher financial and political risks of operations are typically expected in 
developing countries. 
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
 
2.3 PRIOR INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING RESEARCH IN 
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
The business environment in developing countries is distinctly different from 
that in developed countries.  Thus, the importance of environmental variable s for 
transfer pricing in developing countries relative to developed countries is perceived 
differently by the management of MNCs.  Existing literature notes that the 
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inducements for MNCs to resort to transfer pricing manipulation in developing 
countries are stronger than in developed countries and the threat of fiscal losses is 
persistent in less developed countries.  
 
Lall (1973), Natke (1985), Rahman and Scapens (1986), Chan and Chow (1997a) 
Some studies attempt to use empirical evidence on trading statistics to assess 
the extent of manipulation of transfer pricing by MNCs operating in developing 
countries.  Lall (1973) finds that, compared with world market prices, MNCs in 
Colombia over-priced their imports by 33 percent to 300 percent in the 
pharmaceutical sector, and by 24 percent to 81 percent in the rubber and electrical 
industries.  Natke's (1985) study of the import prices of MNCs operating in Brazil 
during 1979 reveals that MNCs pay higher prices on imports than local firms and the 
prices of MNCs' imports also exhibit greater variability.  Rahman and Scapens (1986) 
investigate the import prices of ten pharmaceutical items in Bangladesh, and find that 
MNCs over-priced imports from affiliates by between 78 percent and 600 percent.  
They conclude that transfer pricing abuse accounts for the low profitability of MNCs' 
operations in that country.  Chan and Chow (1997a) find that MNCs in China over-
priced imports and under-priced exports in the audio/video equipment, garment, 
plastic and chemicals industries.  The above studies provide valuable evidence of 
international transfer pricing problems in emerging economies. 
 
Kim and Miller (1979), Plasschaert (1985) 
Limited studies investigate the effect of environmental variables on transfer 
pricing decisions of  MNCs in developing countries.  Kim and Miller (1979) collect 
survey and interview data from 30 US parent firms with at least one subsidiary in 
two of the eight specified developing countries (i.e. Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
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Taiwan, Brazil, Colombia, Me xico and Peru).  Each of the firms is asked to indicate 
the degree of importance they attached to the nine factors which have potential 
influence on transfer pricing decisions.  The results show that profit repatriation 
restrictions and exchange control within the foreign subsidiary country are most 
important for transfer pricing decisions in these developing countries.  The tax 
variables, that is, income tax liability within the host country and within the US, 
which are important for MNCs in developed countries, only rank fifth and the sixth 
in the developing countries. 
Another transfer pricing study in developing countries, Plasschaert (1985), 
aims to explore whether policies and regulations in less developed countries are such 
that the temptations for the MNCs to practice transfer pricing manipulation are 
stronger than is the case in more developed countries.  Based on his analysis, less 
developed countries typically impose more restrictions on the MNCs than is the case 
in more developed countries.  Import duties and exchange controls are also important 
environmental variables to induce transfer pricing manipulation in less developed 
countries.  Moreover, less developed countries generally operate fewer measures to 
uncover and to redress transfer pricing manipulation since they are less well 
equipped for the task.  Therefore, inducements for MNCs to resort to transfer pricing 
manipulation in developing countries are stronger than in developed countries.  
MNCs would shift profits from developing countries to circumvent the adverse 
impact of relatively stringent regulations on foreign investment imposed by 
governments and to minimize the perceived financial risk of operations in relatively 
uncertain environments.  Table 2.2 summarizes prior international transfer pricing 
research in developing economies. 
[Insert Table 2.2 here] 
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Both Kim and Miller (1979) and Plasschaert (1985) find that due to 
differences in business environment between developed and developing countries, 
tax factors which are important in deve loped countries are not so important in 
developing countries.  Some nontax factors such as foreign exchange control and 
restrictions on profit repatriation which may not be important in developed countries 
are perceived as important factors in developing countries.  However, Kim and 
Miller (1979) did not test how the importance of environmental variables affects the 
choice of transfer pricing methods.  They also ignore the trade-off between 
environmental variables when making transfer pricing decisions.  Plasschaert (1985) 
provides a good analysis but does not provide empirical evidence on how the 
environmental variables affect the transfer pricing decisions in developing countries.  
Therefore, empirical studies in developing countries examining the effect of the 
perceived importance of environmental variables on transfer pricing decisions, and 
examining the trade-off between tax and nontax factors on transfer pricing decisions 
can enhance our understanding of MNC’s transfer pricing behavior in developing 
economies.    
 
2.4 PRIOR RESEARCH ON TAX COMPLIANCE 
The empirical research of tax compliance is limited due to the difficulty in 
data collection.  Compliance research mostly employs the judgment and decision-
making paradigm, but also includes some analytical and archival-empirical studies.  
The research in this area is concerned with what factors determine compliance with 
the tax code (Shevlin 1999).   
 
Mills (1998) 
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Mills (1998) uses data from tax returns and tax audit results for both private 
and public firms to test whether firms can manage tax and financial accounting 
income separately (i.e. no trade-off between tax and financial reporting).  Mills (1998) 
finds that Internal Revenue Service (IRS) proposed audit adjustments increase as the 
excess of book income over taxable income increases.  The implication here is that 
the larger the book-tax difference, the larger the tax evasion and the corresponding 
IRS audit adjustment.  The paper provides evidence that firms cannot costlessly 
maximize financial reporting benefits and tax savings independently.  This evidence 
justifies the general assumption in financial accounting research that firms face a 
trade-off between book and tax incentives for reporting income.  Thus, firms cannot 
manage tax and financial accounting income separately and cannot have an unlimited 
level of book-tax differences because the larger the book-tax difference, the higher 
the risk of audit adjustment made by IRS.  Therefore, researchers can use financial 
information to estimate tax-complia nce behavior.   
 
Chan and Mo (2000, 2002) 
Chan and Mo (2000) study the tax compliance issue in China.  Under tax 
incentives, production FIEs with operation period of more than ten years can enjoy a 
tax holiday (i.e. FIEs are exempted from tax for first two profit-making years and 
have a 50% tax reduction in the following three years).  Chan and Mo (2000) 
examine corporate noncompliance during tax holidays by analyzing 585 audit cases 
in China. They find that a company’s tax-holiday position affects noncompliance.  
Companies are least compliant before entering a tax holiday because FIEs have 
incentives to exaggerate losses during the pre -holiday period to delay the start of the 
tax holiday.  They also find that companies are most compliant while in the tax-
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exemption period because FIEs do not have an incentive to evade tax since they are 
exempted from tax. 
Chan and Mo (2002) further decompose the noncompliance into book-tax 
conforming and book-tax difference noncompliance, and analyze how company 
characteristics differentially affect the incentives and opportunities for different 
forms of tax noncompliance (i.e. book-tax-conforming or book-tax-difference).  
Based on 256 tax audit cases, they find that export-oriented and high-tech companies 
have significantly larger book-tax-conforming tax audit adjustments than domestic-
market-oriented and non-high-tech companies.  Export-oriented FIEs have special 
tax incentives and priority in obtaining loans.  Thus, they have greater tax benefits 
and lower financial reporting costs of underreporting book and tax incomes.  High-
tech FIEs have less reliance on reported profits for performance evaluation and 
obtaining loans.  Thus, they have lower financial reporting costs of underreporting 
book and tax incomes.  Domestic-market-oriented and non-high-tech companies 
have significantly larger book-tax-difference audit adjustments than their 
counterparts, because domestic -market-oriented firms incur large entertainment 
expenses for keeping a good relationship with distributors which may exceed the 
deduction limit and non-high-tech companies rely more on accounting income than 
high-tech companies.  However, Chan and Mo (2000, 2002) specifically exclude 
transfer pricing noncompliance in their studies as their data were based on China’s  
annual tax audits.   
 
Chan and Chow (1997b) 
Chan and Chow (1997b) was the first and only empirical study on transfer 
pricing noncompliance in China by using the tax audit cases in the early 1990s.  By 
comparing the firm characteristics of FIEs being selected for transfer pricing audits 
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by the Chinese tax authorities and national data, they find that a higher proportion of 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises, cooperative joint ventures and Hong Kong 
sourced FIEs are selected for transfer pricing audits than the national distribution of 
FIEs.  However, Chan and Chow (1997b) do not provide any multivariate analysis, 
nor do they specifically analyze the tax and nontax cost trade-off for the MNCs.  As 
explained later, they also do not study the effect of activity orientation on transfer 
pricing noncompliance.  My research extends the Chan and Chow (1997b) study by 
analyzing via multivariate statistical methods how firm characteristics, including 
activity orientation, affect the incentive for transfer pricing manipulation and the 
probability of being audited under the tax and nontax cost trade-off theory.  I also 
analyze the effects of two important variables (i.e. audit costs and possible tax 
amount that can be recovered by tax authorities) on audit selection.  Table  2.3 
summarizes prior research on tax compliance. 
[Insert Table 2.3 here] 
 
2.5 RESEARCH ON TAX AND NONTAX COST TRADE-OFF THEORY 
A growing body of empirical tax research examines the coordination of taxes 
and other factors in business decisions (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001).  As 
discussed, Mills (1998) and Chan and Mo (2002) study the trade-off between tax and 
financial statement income through tax audit cases.  Other studies on tax and nontax 
cost trade-off are summarized below. 
 
Cloyd (1995)  
Cloyd (1995)  examines the effects of tax and financial accounting conformity 
on tax preparers’ recommendations of tax treatment.  The author hypothesizes that 
when there is ambiguity regarding the tax treatment, conformity or nonconformity of 
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the financial accounting treatment affects expected tax benefits of the treatment 
through its effect on the subjective probabilities of (i) an IRS audit and (ii) 
successfully defending the tax position if challenged by the IRS.  
By conducting an experiment with 72 experienced tax professionals as 
subjects, Cloyd (1995) finds that (i) conformity of financial accounting and tax 
accounting treatments increases tax preparers’ subjective probabilities of 
successfully defending aggressive tax positions, and (ii) more preparers 
recommende d aggressive tax positions in the presence of book-tax conformity and 
when the client is described as aggressive with respect to tax matters.  Therefore, the 
findings suggest that book-tax conformity reduces the tax cost predicted by tax 
preparers. 
 
Cloyd et al. (1996)  
Based on a mail survey of corporate financial executives, Cloyd et al. (1996) 
examine whether management is more likely to choose conformity when expected 
tax savings increase, and is less likely to choose conformity when financial reporting 
costs relating to ownership structure increase (i.e. for public firms).  They suggest 
that if the appropriate financial accounting and tax treatments are ambiguous and the 
firm has chosen an aggressive tax treatment, it is likely that management may choose 
a financial accounting method that conforms to the tax choice (i.e. conformity) in an 
effort to increase the probability that the IRS will allow the tax treatment.  However, 
despite an expected tax saving, it is unlikely that management always chooses 
conformity because the choice results in lower reported income and incurs higher 
nontax costs due to the market reactions of the low reported income.  Therefore, 
there is a trade-off between tax and nontax costs.  They find that conformity is more 
likely as its effect on successfully defending the aggressive tax position increases, 
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and public -firm managers are less likely to conform than are private-firm managers 
because public firms have higher financial reporting costs. 
 
Guenther et al. (1997)  
Guenther et al. (1997) examine the impact of book-tax conformity on firms’ 
financial reporting and tax planning activities.  Due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
many large publicly traded firms in the US were forced to change from the cash 
method of accounting to accrual method of accounting for tax purposes.  The change 
would increase book-tax conformity because the same method is used for 
recognizing income for tax and financial reporting purposes.  They investigate the 
behavior of the “cash method” firms (i.e. the firms forced by statute to adopt accrual 
method from cash method for tax purpose) in reporting their accounting income and 
cash flows in the pre- and post-1986 period.   
They find that “cash method” firms accrued more income for financial 
reporting than “accrual” firms (i.e. the firms used the accrual method for both tax and 
financial purposes pre- and post-1986 periods) before the Tax Reform Act because 
the year-end acceleration of financial statement income imposed no tax costs if cash 
were not collected for the accrued income.  However, the “cash method” firms 
reduced accruals after the Tax Reform Act.  The results indicate that increasing 
book-tax conformity (i.e. using accrual method for both tax and financial reporting) 
causes firms to defer income recognition for financial statement reporting purposes 
(so as to defer tax payment) after considering the trade -off between tax and financial 
reporting objectives.   
 
Klassen (1997)  
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Klassen (1997) uses inside ownership concentration as a proxy for capital 
market pressure.  This study examines whether inside ownership concentration 
influences the trade-off between financial reporting and tax reporting incentives, 
since financial reporting is an important nontax consideration for many managers 
who rely on capital markets to raise investment funds.  But at the same time, these 
managers may not wish the company to appear as profitable when preparing tax 
returns.  The results show that firms with lower levels of inside ownership 
concentration realize larger financial reporting gains or smaller financial reporting 
losses than firms with higher levels of concentration.  Such a relationship is weaker 
for low tax-rate firms.  Thus, the findings support the hypotheses that lower inside 
ownership will lead to increased emphasis on financial reporting, and thus result in 
larger realized gains or smaller realized losses.  This implies lower inside ownership 
firms have lower levels of tax evasion as they are more likely to report larger income 
rather than underreport income to reduce tax payments. 
 
Mills and Newberry (2001) 
Mills and Newberry (2001) examine whether nontax financial-reporting costs 
(such as debt constraints, and bonus plan threshold) influence book-tax conformity 
decisions.  In particular, this paper conducts empirical tests on the potential influence 
of nontax financial-reporting costs for firms with different ownership types (public 
vs. private) on firms’ book-tax conformity.  They find that public firms report higher 
book earnings relative to taxable income than private firms when they are in 
profitable positions because public firms have higher financial reporting costs, and 
report larger book losses relative to tax losses when they are in loss positions in order 
to increase the probability that they can improve their financial results next year.  In 
addition, Mills and Newberry (2001) find that higher debt levels impose greater 
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nontax costs on firms that are privately held or more financially distressed.  They 
also find that bonus plan thresholds and book income patterns influence public firms’ 
book-tax reporting.  Public firms have higher nontax financial-reporting costs 
because the diffused ownership results in greater reliance on compensation plans that 
use reported book income.  Public firm managers are more likely to believe that 
reported income determines the market values of their firms.  Besides, accounting 
theory posits that firms subject to greater monitoring by lenders are more likely to 
use income-increasing accounting procedures. 
 
Hodder et al. (2003)  
After the change of US tax law in 1996, banks are permitted to become S-
corporations which can avoid the double tax burden imposed on C-corporations.  C-
corporations’ earnings are taxed at the corporate level and dividends are also taxed at 
the individual-shareholder level, whereas S-corporations’ shareholders are taxed 
individually but the S-corporations are not taxed at the corporate level and dividends 
are tax free.  Given the tax benefits, banks are expected to convert to S-corporations.  
However, in fact, only 19.2 percent of banks did so by 1999 due to nontax cost 
considerations.  Hodder et al. (2003) examine tax and nontax factors that influence 
commercial banks’ conversion decision from taxable C-corporations to nontaxable S-
corporations.  
The results show that banks are more likely to convert to S-corporations as 
the tax benefits of conversion increase (i.e. when conversion saves dividend taxes, 
avoids alternative minimum taxes, minimizes state income taxes, and when 
conversion causes loss of corporate tax-loss carry forwards and potential penalty 
taxes on unrealized gains), and are less likely to convert as the costs of conversion 
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increase (i.e. when banks have high demand of capital but conversion causes 
restricted access to equity capital).   
 
Smith (2002) 
None of the above empirical studies on tax and nontax cost trade-off deal 
with transfer pricing.  Smith (2002) provides an analytical study on transfer pricing 
dealing with the trade -off between tax minimization and managerial performance 
evaluation.  Some studies argue that firms do not face a meaningful trade-off 
between tax minimization and performance evaluation because the firms can use 
multiple transfer prices to eliminate the trade-off.  For example, different transfer 
prices can be used for tax and performance evaluation purposes, or performance 
measures which are independent of the transfer prices can be used for eliminating the 
trade-off between taxes and incentives.  Smith (2002) addresses the potential trade-
off between tax minimization and managerial performance evaluation in setting 
multinational transfer prices.  He analytically proves that the trade -off between tax 
and performance evaluation still exists because audit risk will be increased if the 
firms (i) set separate transfer prices for tax and performance evaluation or (ii) use a 
performance measure other than profit.  He finds that the possibility of discovery of a 
second price by tax authorities may lead to penalties and additional tax which would 
thus limit the value of using separate prices for transfer pricing.  Besides, 
sophisticated regulators could correctly infer that income shifting motivates a firm’s 
choice of an idiosyncratic, non-profit -based compensation scheme and thus decide to 
audit the firm more closely.  However, no empirical results are provided in his study.  
Table 2.4 summarizes prior research on tax and nontax cost trade-off analysis.   
[Insert table 2.4 here] 
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In conclusion, my thesis is different from the previous studies on tax and 
nontax cost trade-off because I study transfer pricing behavior based on actual tax 
audit cases and the “tax and nontax cost trade -off” analysis, whereas the other studies 
in this area mainly focus on the trade-off for book-tax reporting decisions with no 
specific reference to transfer pricing.  Smith (2002) is the only study that addresses 
the potential trade-off between tax minimization and managerial performance 
evaluation in setting multinational transfer prices.  However, no empirical results 
were provided in his study. 
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CHAPTER 3  
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND TRANSFER PRICING LEGISLATION 
IN CHINA  
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
China has recently experienced a sharp increase in the inflow of foreign direct 
investment.  Hong Kong, the United States, Japan and Taiwan are considered the 
four major sources of foreign investment in China.  These four jurisdictions account 
for 70.1 percent of the total foreign direct investment of China as at the end of 2002.  
The business environment in China gives rise to a mixed inducement on MNC’s 
transfer pricing decisions.  With generous tax incentives, China’s corporate income 
tax rates are generally lower than most of the developed countries.  However, import 
tariffs in China, though declining, are still generally higher compared with its major 
trading partners.  When setting transfer prices, FIEs will face a trade-off between 
minimization of corporate income tax and minimization of import tariffs.  In addition, 
the foreign exchange control risks and the political risks in China are strong 
inducements for FIEs to shift profits out from China through transfer pricing.  Other 
environmental factors such as interest of local partners and restrictions on 
repatriation of profits may also impact international transfer pricing decisions by 
MNCs in China.  MNCs should also pay attention to transfer pricing legislation in 
China.  The regulations require all related-party transactions to be at arm’s length 
price, otherwise, the tax authorities are empowered to adjust the transfer prices 
adopted using methods such as the comparable uncontrolled price method, resale-
minus method and cost-plus method. 
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CHAPTER 3  
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND TRANSFER PRICING LEGISLATION 
IN CHINA  
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
Transfer pricing is regarded as a mechanism available for MNCs to maximize 
profits by exploiting the market imperfections arising from a set of economic and 
sociopolitical factors that vary from country to country (Leitch and Barrett, 1992).  
Like most developing countries, China offers preferential policies to attract foreign 
investment, while at the same time imposing controls on outflows of capital.  As 
analyzed by Chan and Chow (1997b), the business environment in China gives rise 
to mixed inducements affecting MNC’s transfer pricing decisions.  This chapter 
reviews various aspects of the business environment in China which is relevant to 
international transfer pricing considerations including (i) sources of foreign 
investment, (ii) forms of investment, (iii) corporate income tax laws, (iv) import and 
export tariffs, (v) foreign exchange control and risks, (vi) repatriation of profits, 
royalties, interest and other inter-company charges, and (vii) political and social 
pressures.  Finally, transfer pricing regulations in China will be explained and 
discussed.  
 
3.2 ASPECTS OF THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN CHINA  
Decisions on international transfer pricing are motivated by a number of 
environmental factors.  Sources of foreign investment and forms of investment affect 
the background and structure of management and would thus affect the operations of 
FIEs including the setting of transfer pricing policies.  Other environmental factors 
including corporate income tax laws, import and export tariffs, foreign exchange 
control and risks, repatriation of profits, and political and social pressures would 
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trigger different costs and benefits for shifting profits through transfer prices.  I will 
discuss these environmental variables as follows: 
 
3.2.1 Sources of Foreign Investment in China 
As elaborated in Chapter 1, China has recently experienced a sharp rise in the 
inflow of foreign direct investment.  Foreign investment has increased from US$27.5 
billion in 1993 to US$46.8 billion in 2001.  China’s entrance to the WTO in late 
2001 has accelerated the trend of inflows of foreign investment.  Foreign direct 
investment in China reached US$52.7 billion in 2002 and China became the second 
largest recipient of foreign direct investment in the world just behind Luxembourg, 
but ahead of the United States.   
Foreign direct investment in China comes from more than 50 countries or  
regions.  Hong Kong remains the leading source of foreign direct investment in 
China, accounted for 45.7 percent of accumulated FDI during 1979-2002, followed 
by investment from the United States which accounted for 8.9 percent of total 
contracted investment in those years (SSB 2003).  Japan and Taiwan are also major 
sources of investment in China.  As shown in Table 3.1, these four jurisdictions (i.e. 
Hong Kong, the United States, Japan and Taiwan) account for 70.1 percent of the 
total foreign direct investment as at the end of 2002.  However, it is worth noting that 
many Hong Kong companies investing in China are not owned by bona fide Hong 
Kong residents (Pomfret 1989; Khan 1991).  A number of MNCs invest in China 
through their Hong Kong subsidiaries (Plummer and Montes 1995). Some small- and 
medium-sized investors from Western countries form joint ventures with Hong Kong 
companies to invest in China in order to capture the experience and expertise of these 
firms in the China market (Plummer and Montes, 1995).  This trend is expected to 
continue as China signed The Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) 
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with Hong Kong in 2003.  Under the CEPA, Hong Kong companies are allowed to 
establish operations in China for certain restricted sectors including management 
consulting, advertising, accounting, distribution, freight forwarding agency, storage 
and warehousing, logistics, tourism, audio visual, construction and real estate, legal 
services, banking services, securities services, and insurance.  Some non-Hong Kong 
companies will take advantage of opportunity from CEPA and thus invest in China 
through their Hong Kong subsidiaries or through the acquisition of Hong Kong 
companies.  Unfortunately, no official statistics are available to gauge the magnitude 
of the foreign ownership of Hong Kong companies investing in China. 
[Insert Table 3.1 here] 
 
3.2.2 Forms of Investment 
The Chinese government allows FIEs to operate in China in the form of joint 
ventures or wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Two types of joint ve nture are in 
operation, namely, equity joint ventures and cooperative joint ventures. 
Equity joint ventures (EJVs) are governed by the Law on Joint Ventures 
Using Chinese and Foreign Investment and must be formed as a limited liability 
company.  Foreign investors share profits and bear risks in proportion to their equity 
ownership.  The highest authority of an equity joint venture is the board of directors, 
which decides all major issues concerning the joint venture.  The board consists of at 
least three directors appointed by the partners according to each partner's capital 
contributions.  In handling major issues, the board of directors reaches decisions 
through consultation with the joint venture partners. EJVs are now the most common 
form of foreign investment in China as shown in Table 3.2.  An advantage of 
investing in the form of EJVs is the benefit of having a Chinese partner equipped 
with local market information.  However, the participation of local partners restricts 
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the freedom of the foreign partners in making business decisions.  For example, 
when making transfer pricing decisions, foreign partners need to ensure fair profits 
are reported by the EJVs in order to avoid conflict with the local partners. 
Cooperative joint ventures (CJVs) are governed by the Law on Chinese-
foreign Cooperative Enterprises.  They can be registered as a legal person or a non-
legal one.  Their establishment is based on a contract between the venture partners.  
Unlike in the EJVs, Chinese and foreign investors are able to contractually specify 
their profit-sharing ratios.  The management structure for CJVs is also more flexible.  
It is usually managed by a management committee comprising representatives from 
both partners.  If it is managed by a board of directors, the chairman can be 
appointed by either the Chinese or foreign partners.  It is also common to have a 
management contract granting the foreign partners exclusive authority for running 
the venture.  CJVs are also more flexible in terms of capital investment requirements 
and repayment of capital.  In most cases, foreign partners provide machinery, raise 
funds and offer management and technical expertise, while Chinese partners provide 
land, labor and a network of local contacts.  The foreign partners are allowed to 
recover their investment during the contractual period.  At the expiry of the contract, 
the production facility reverts to Chinese partnership without compensation to the 
foreign partners.  Therefore, transfer pricing is an important mechanism to accelerate  
the return of investment to foreign partners.  CJVs are popular for projects that have 
a limited duration and a specific objective, such as an infrastructure programme. 
Wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) are governed by the Law on 
Sole Foreign Investment Enterprises.  WFOEs always take the form of a limited 
liability company and they are restricted from operating in certain industries such as 
telecommunications, utilities and transportation.  WFOEs must be export oriented to 
achieve a foreign exchange balance or surplus, or they must utilize advanced 
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technology to develop new products or improve products that may serve as import 
substitutes.  However, as China enters the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
trend is to further relax the restrictions on WFOEs.  As a result, WFOEs are 
becoming popular for foreign investment in China.   
Investment options available to foreign investors have been expanding.  Since 
1995, the Chinese government has allowed large MNCs with multiple ventures in 
China to set up Chinese holding companies (CHCs) by uniting their existing projects 
and fully integrating the production, marketing, and investment functions under one 
corporate roof.  The establishment of CHCs can provide foreign investors with ease 
of financing while holding their investment interests including EJVs and WFOEs.  
CHCs are regarded as foreign entities which hold and invest in second-level FIEs and 
provide certain administrative services to their subsidiaries.  Effective from 1 
September 2001, foreign investors can also set up a new form of business vehicle 
called foreign funded venture investment enterprises (FFVIE).  FFVIEs can take the 
form of WFOE, EJV or CJV.  The business scope of FFVIEs include investing in 
high and new technology sectors, providing ve nture capital consulting services, 
providing management consulting services to their foreign invested enterprises, and 
engaging in any other business approved by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Corporation.  However, neither CHCs nor FFVIEs are commonly used in 
China. 
[Insert table 3.2 here] 
 
3.2.3 Corporate Income Tax 
The income tax laws for foreign investment were first enacted in 1980 and 
1981, respectively, for joint ventures and foreign enterprises. Under these laws, 
different forms of foreign investment were taxed at different rates with different tax 
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incentives.  In 1991, these laws were unified. All foreign investors in China are taxed 
under the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning Foreign 
Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises (Income Tax Law).  Under the 
Income Tax Law, FIEs are liable for income tax based on their income derived from 
production and business operations inside and outside China at a rate of 30 percent 
plus a local tax of 3 percent, resulting in a total effective rate of 33 percent.  However, 
a host of tax incentives is offered by the central government to attract or retain 
foreign investment, and some of the tax incentives available to FIEs in China are 
discussed as follows:  
 
(1)  FIEs can enjoy a reduced tax rate of 15 pecent if their establishments are 
located in the five Special Economic Zones (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, 
Xiamen and Hainan Island) or if they are of a production nature established in 
Economic and Technological Development Zones of the fourteen open 
coastal cities (Behai, Zhanjiang, Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Wenzhou, Ninbo, 
Shanghai, Nantong, Lianyungang, Qingdao, Yantai, Tianjin, Qinhuangdao 
and Dalian). Enterprises of a production nature generally refers to all 
manufacturing and agricultural industries and a few servicing industries.  The 
reduced rate of 15 percent also applies to FIEs engaged in other preferred 
projects in some selected areas as approved by the State Council. These 
projects are usually related to infrastructure development inc luding energy, 
transportation, and port or pier projects. 
(2)  FIEs of a production nature established in the five Coastal Open Economic 
Zones (Pearl River Deltas, Southern Fujian Province, Changjiang Deltas, 
Shangdong Peninsula and Liaodong Peninsula), open cities along the Yangtze 
River and in the so-called ‘old urban districts’ of cities where Special 
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Economic Zones and Economic and Technological Development Zones are 
located can enjoy a reduced tax rate of 24 percent.   
(3)  FIEs of a production nature which are scheduled to operate for a period of 10 
years or more can enjoy income tax exemption for the first 2 profit-making 
years and a 50 percent tax rate reduction for the subsequent 3 years.  For 
enterprises engaged in low-profit operations and projects in economically 
underdeveloped areas, a further reduction of 15 to 30 percent is available for 
10 years after the expiration of the 5-year tax holidays. 
(4)  Export-oriented FIEs can enjoy a 50 percent tax reduction (subject to a 
minimum tax rate of 10 percent) in any particular year which they export 
more than 70 percent of their total production (in value terms).  Similarly, 
technologically advanced FIEs can enjoy a 50 percent tax rate reduction for 
an additional 3-year period beyond the normal 5-year tax holiday, so long as 
they remain technologically advanced. 
(5)  FIEs located in the central western district, which consists of 19 provinces of 
inner China and FIEs engaging in businesses categorized as Encouraged 
Projects in the Foreign Investment Directive issued by the State Council are 
taxed at a reduced rate of 15 percent for the period 2001 - 2010.   
 
The policy of granting extensive tax concessions to foreign investors is 
currently under re -consideration by SAT because the WTO requires that there should 
be equal conditions for both foreign and domestic investors.  The existing policies 
governing the granting of tax holidays to FIEs may be completely revamped and may 
be replaced by granting tax holidays to companies in certain designated or 
encouraged industries, regardless of whether they are FIEs or domestic enterprises.  
Incentives previously granted to FIEs may be grandfathered during a transitional 
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period (Mo 2003).  It is also anticipated that a new type of enterprise income tax 
applicable to both FIEs and domestic  enterprises will be introduced in the future to 
unify the existing two corporate taxes.  A common tax rate of 25 percent for both 
FIEs and domestic enterprises has been discussed (Mo 2003). 
When setting transfer prices for international related-party transactions, FIEs 
will consider the tax rate and tax incentives applicable to them.  They can minimize 
corporate income tax by shifting profits from high tax jurisdictions to low tax 
jurisdictions.  For example, an FIE which is taxed at 33 percent in China can shift 
profits to its Hong Kong associates (which is taxed at 17.5 percent) through transfer 
pricing.  If so, for every US$100 transferred, the group can save corporate income 
tax of US$15.5.  On the other hand, if the FIE is exempt from tax in China, shifting 
profits to China through transfer pricing can help the group to save corporate income 
tax.  
 
3.2.4 Import and Export Tariffs  
The Chinese government has adopted adopts a tariff escalation policy 
whereby nominal tariffs vary with the degree of domestic processing.  Nominal 
tariffs are lower for raw materials and semi-processed materials than for final goods.  
Preferential policies are granted to FIEs on import and export tariffs.  Machinery and 
equipment imported as part of capital from foreign investors in selected industries 
are exempt from import tariffs.  In addition, the import of raw materials, knock-down 
components, parts, accessories and packaging materials for producing export 
products is duty free.  Goods manufactured by FIEs are also exempt from export 
duties.  In general, import duties in China are substantially higher than those in more 
developed countries.  However, since its entry to the WTO, China lowered the tariff 
barriers on a broad range of imports, ranging from agricultural goods to industrial 
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products.  The average import tariff for industrial products was reduced from 16 
percent in 2000 to 12 percent in 2002 and will be further reduced to 10 percent by 
2005.  Having said that, the average tariff rate in China is still higher than that in the 
United States, Japan and Europe.  Therefore, to reduce tariff payments, MNCs can 
under-price their goods imported to China.  However, by doing so, profits are shifted 
to the FIEs in China and this may increase the corporate income tax payment if the 
cor porate tax rate in China is higher than the tax rates in the home countries.  Thus, 
when setting transfer prices, management should consider the potential trade-off 
between corporate income tax and tariff payments. 
In recent years, China has signed certain free trade agreements with other 
jurisdictions which have great impact on China’s tariff system.  For the Asian Pacific 
region, China and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a 
framework agreement in late 2002 which commits them to establish an ASEAN-
China Free Trade Area by 2010 (ASEAN 2002).  China also signed the CEPA with 
Hong Kong and Macau in 2003.  Under the CEPA, no import tariff will be imposed 
on 273 categories of goods from 1 January 2004 provided that the goods are of Hong 
Kong or Macau origin.  These 273 categories of goods include electrical and 
electronic products, plastic articles, paper articles, textiles and clothing, chemical 
products, pharmaceutical products, clocks and watches, jewelry, cosmetics, metal 
products, and other appliances and accessories.  Other goods of Hong Kong or 
Macau origin not included in these 273 categories will also enjoy zero import tariff 
by 2006.  The Hong Kong Trade Development Council estimates that annual savings 
in tariffs for Hong Kong, as a result of CEPA and the WTO, will amount to 
approximately US$96 million.  To enjoy the tariff exemption offered by CEPA, 
MNCs may consider relocating some production facilities from other jurisdictions to 
Hong Kong or Macau.  Transfer pricing is also a major consideration in satisfying 
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the criteria of “rule of origin” (i.e. how Chinese government determines the country 
of origin for imported products).  In order to increase the amount of production in 
Hong Kong or Macau, MNCs may reduce their import transfer prices of intermediate 
goods by changing the terms of trade.  They may also increase the amount of value-
added in Hong Kong and Macau by renaming the terms of production functions.  By 
manipulating the transfer prices, a higher portion of the production profits can be 
reported in Hong Kong or Macau. 
 
3.2.5 Foreign Exchange Control and Risks 
China’s foreign exchange policy has been characterized by a high degree of 
centralization although China has undergone various reforms for its foreign exchange 
system.  On 1 January 1994, China unified the official exchange rate with the swap 
rate, determined daily by the People’s Bank of China, the central bank of China, 
through a managed float system.  In late 1996, China announced that the Renminbi 
can be freely convertible for current account items.  However, strict control is still 
imposed on capital account items.  As shown in Table 3.3, the average exchange rate 
of Renminbi to US dollars for the past 10 years remained stable within the range 
from 8.277 to 8.619.  Many economists agreed that the capital control did help 
protect the Renminbi from the currency crisis emerging in Asia during the second 
half of 1997 (EIU 1998; CCH 2003).   
[Insert Table 3.3 here] 
 
In China, items under the current account are fully convertible.  The current 
account covers trade and labor service receipts and payments as well as one -way 
transfers in foreign exchange.  Upon approval by the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE), an FIE can open a foreign exchange settlement account  w ith a 
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designated bank by presenting its Foreign Exchange Registration Certificate  and 
other supporting documents.  When receiving the foreign exchange, the FIE should 
notify SAFE by presenting the foreign exchange receipts on export verification forms, 
export declarations, invoices, and foreign exchange receipts on the export 
verification counterfoil.  FIEs are allowed to go through the verification procedures 
on a monthly basis.  For foreign exchange received under the current account, FIEs 
can retain a certain amount of the foreign exchange received within the limit 
prescribed by SAFE.  Any excess portion has to be sold to designated banks.  When 
FIEs have to make external payments within its business scope, they may draw the 
required amount from its foreign exchange settlement account and any shortage can 
be purchased at designated banks with the supporting documents specified by SAFE.  
Unlike the current account, strict control is exerted over the capital account.  
The capital account covers foreign exc hange receipts and payments in respect of 
direct investment, loans of all kinds, securities investment, etc.  In accordance with 
the Regulations for Foreign Exchange Control of the People’s Republic of China, all 
foreign exchange receipts and payments under the capital account have to be 
approved by SAFE.  For foreign exchange receipts under the capital account, FIEs 
must comply with the relevant regulations and open foreign exchange accounts at 
designated banks. For example, for investment capital in foreign exchange 
contributed to an FIE, a capital fund account must be opened.  The foreign exchange 
deposits in the account can be used to pay for current account expenditures as well as 
SAFE-approved capital account expenditures.  For external debts and foreign 
exchange loans extended by domestic financial institutions in China to an FIE, a loan 
account must be opened, and the foreign exchange deposited into this account must 
be the contracted amount registered with SAFE.  Any withdrawals from this account 
must be used for the purposes stipulated in the loan agreements, whereas an approval 
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by SAFE is not required.  For repayment of loans, SAFE will only approve the 
repayment of external debt which has been properly registered.  When applying to 
SAFE for approva l to make repayment of external debt principal and interest, an FIE 
should present proof of external debt registration, the external debt contract, and 
notice by creditor on repayment of principal and interest (the notice should state the 
respective amounts of principal and interest, interest rate, method of interest 
computation, and number of interest -bearing days, etc.).  Upon approval by SAFE, 
the FIE may make payment through its foreign exchange account or at designated 
banks.   
The non-convertibility of the Renminbi complicates the investment 
environment in China.  Foreign exchange control is always a concern for FIEs and 
their investors when dealing with China.  For example, in practice, it is difficult for 
FIEs to obtain foreign exchange to pay off service fees to an overseas company 
(CCH 2003).  The various ever-changing rules and internal policies made by SAFE 
(some of which are not made available to the investors) make foreign exchange a 
very difficult issue for foreign companies to deal with while doing business in China.  
Transfer pricing manipulation would be a good mechanism to tackle the strict control 
on foreign exchange.  By over-pricing imports and under -pricing exports, profits and 
thus the foreign currencies will be shifted to their associa te companies located 
overseas. 
 
3.2.6 Repatriation of Profits, Royalties, Interest and Other Inter-company 
Charges  
To reduce capital outflow and to improve their balance of payments, many 
developing countries have introduced measures to restrict MNCs in the repatriation 
of profits, royalties and other inter-company charges, or have imposed high 
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withholding taxes on these remittances.  China does not impose restrictions on 
foreign investors repatriating their share of profits in foreign exchange, provided that 
the FIEs have enough foreign exchange for such remittances and the remittances are 
supported by a written resolution of the board of directors.  Remittance of dividends 
is subject to a withholding tax of 10 percent for equity joint ventures and 20 percent 
for foreign enterprises.  However, dividends paid by FIEs to their foreign investors 
have been exempted from withholding tax since 1991.   
Royalties paid to foreign companies for licensing of trademarks, copyrights, 
know-how and other technical transfers are deductible for tax purposes provided that 
the amounts are reasonable, and are subject to 20 percent withholding tax.  However, 
the royalties paid by a branch to its foreign head office are not deductible and there is 
no issue of any withholding tax since both of them are treated as the same entity.  
Interest paid on loans to overseas holding companies is deductible subject to thin 
capitalization rules and an arm’s length rate test.  Interest income is also subject to 
the basic withholding tax of 20 percent.  As in the treatment of royalties, interest paid 
by a branch to its foreign head office is not tax deductible and there is no 
withholding tax charged.  The withholding tax rate for royalties and interest can be 
reduced under a tax treaty.  Under a tax treaty, the withholding rate is reduced to 10 
percent or less in most cases.  The withholding tax paid in China can be treated as tax 
credits in foreign countries under tax treaties.  Currently, China has signed tax 
treaties with the US, Canada and most European and Asia Pacific countries including 
UK, France, Germany, Japan, and Sweden.  Therefore, the withholding tax payment 
should not be an additional cost for the MNCs.  However, if the Chinese tax 
authorities are of the opinion that the transfer prices for the royalties and interest 
payments are not at arm’s length, they are empowered to adjust the prices 
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accordingly.  The withholding taxes already paid on the royalties and interest are not 
refundable.  Thus, these amounts would be double taxed in China. 
For management services fees, general management fees allocated by 
overseas associate companies are not deductible for tax purposes.  However, genuine 
charges paid to affiliates for provision of specific services relevant to production and 
business operations such as marketing and advertising service fees are deductible.  
No withholding tax is charged on the payment of such service fees.   
 
3.2.7 Political and Social Pressures 
Risk of expropriation and nationalization is a critical concern for foreign 
investors.  To reassure investors that China offers a safe and hospitable environment 
for investment, China has enacted laws for joint ventures and for wholly foreign-
owned enterprises which state that China shall protect the lawful rights and interests 
of foreign investors in China, including their rights to remit profits abroad (NPC 
1979, 1986, 1988). The State has thereby promised not to nationalize or expropriate 
FIEs except under special circumstances where such an action is in the national 
interest.  Commensurate compensation is assured under Chinese law in the event of 
nationalization.  
In relation to social pressure, labor unions are an important concern.  FIEs’ 
employees have the right to establish grassroots labor unions if more than 25 
employees are members of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.  If there are 
less than 25 labor union members, workers may select a representative on their own.  
The Ministry of Labor has made rulings to strengthen the role of labor unions in 
collective bargaining procedures.  However, in practice, labor unions in China are 
less confrontational and seldom represent employees’ interest.  In most cases, they 
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simply organize various social activities for employees.  Therefore, FIEs need not to 
be too concerned about the power of labor unions. 
 
3.3 REGULATIONS FOR TRANSFER PRICING IN CHINA 
3.3.1 General Legal Environment in China 
One of the risks for FIEs in China is the uncertain regulatory environment.  
Regulatory consistency and certainty are crucial to long term investment pla ns and 
operations by FIEs.  It was reported that an uncertain regulatory environment in 
China was a major difficulty confronting foreign investors (US-China Business 
Council 1992).  Companies have cited the lack of transparency and clarity of 
regulations, and the lack of uniformity and consistency in interpreting and 
implementing regulations as obstacles for successful business operations in China.  
However, improvements have been made over the years; for example, the Tax 
Administration and Collection Law was issued in 2001 which clarifies the powers of 
tax authorities and the rights of taxpayers. 
 
3.3.2 Transfer Pricing Legislation in 1991  
Transfer pricing provisions were first introduced in national legislation under 
Article 13 of the Income Tax Law adopted in 1991 by the National People’s 
Congress.  The Income Tax Law stipulates that the payment or receipt of charges or 
fees in business transactions between a FIE in China and its associated enterprises 
shall be made in the same manner as the payment or receipt of charges or fees in 
business transactions between independent enterprises.  Where the payment or 
receipt of charges or fees is not made in the same manner as in business transactions 
between independent enterprises and results in a reduction of taxa ble income, the tax 
authorities shall have the right to make reasonable adjustments. 
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According to the Income Tax Law, the China tax authorities are empowered 
to make adjustments of transfer prices which are not in accordance with the arm’s 
length principle.  The operational rules and regulations of Article 13 of the Income 
Tax Law are provided under Article 52-58 of the Detailed Rules and Regulations on 
Implementation of Income Tax Law for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and 
Foreign Enterprises (Detaile d Rules).  The Detailed Rules provide the definition of 
associated enterprises, categories of related-party transactions and pricing methods, 
etc.  However, the definitions and guidelines under the Detailed Rules are not 
detailed enough.  Thus, the SAT issued two other circulars as supplements in 1992. 
 
3.3.3 Transfer Pricing Legislation in 1992  
The Implementation Measures on Tax Administration of Business Dealings 
between Associated Enterprises [i.e. Guoshuifa (1992) No. 237] was issued in 1992 
for the implementation of the 1991 Income Tax Law and the Detailed Rules.  
Circular No. 237 (1992) provides a more detailed definition of associated enterprises 
as compared to the specifications in the Detailed Rules.  It states that a foreign 
enterprise and another company are associated in the following circumstances: 
(i) where an enterprise directly or indirectly owns 25 percent or more of another 
enterprise;  
(ii) where two enterprises are directly or indirectly owned by a third enterprise 
with 25 percent or more capital interest; 
(iii) where an enterprise borrows more than 50 percent of its loans from another 
enterprise, or where an enterprise guarantees 10 percent or more of another 
enterprise’s loan; 
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(iv)  where one of the managing directors or half or more of the board of directors  
or the executive managers of an enterprise is/ are appointed by another 
enterprise; 
(v)  where the raw materials and parts used by an enterprise for production are 
supplied or controlled by another enterprise; 
(vi) where the sales of the commodities of an enterprise are controlled by another 
enterprise; or  
(vii) where the production, trading activities and profits of an enterprise are 
effectively controlled by another enterprise which has a mutual interest, such 
as the existence of family relationship.  
 
Circular No. 237 (1992) also imposes information-reporting requirements on 
every FIE taxpayer.  FIEs are required to disclose their related-party transactions in a 
form called the Declaration Form for Transactions Between Related Parties 
(“Declaration Form”).  This form is an integral part of the Annual Foreign Enterprise 
Income Tax Return.  Without this form, the tax authorities will consider the annual 
tax filing incomplete and thus reject the tax return submitted. 
Apart from Circular No. 237 (1992), the Implementation Rules and 
Procedures on Tax Administration of Transfer Pricing among Associated Enterprises 
[i.e. Guoshuifa (1992) No. 242] was issued in 1992.  This publication provides a 
detailed set of implementation rules and procedures which serves as an internal 
operational manual for tax authorities.  Circular No. 242 (1992) sets out the 
procedural aspects in dealing with transfer pricing, including selection of enterprises 
for investigation, scope of investigation, audit techniques and procedures, scope of 
adjustments and selection of adjustment methods, collection and inquiry of price 
information, procedures and authority for approving adjustments, appeals, 
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compilation and report of audit cases, and audit documentation and administration.   
However, in practice, local tax authorities did not place much emphasis on enforcing 
these transfer pricing rules.  In 1998, a more detailed implementation rule was issued 
for guiding the audits for related-party transactions and for stressing the importance 
of transfer pricing compliance.  
 
3.3.4 Transfer pricing legislation in 1998 
Circular No. 59 (1998) [i.e. Guoshuifa (1998) No. 59] contains 52 articles 
aimed at setting the criteria for selecting target FIEs for tax audits, standardizing 
transfer pricing examination procedures and strengthening internal coordination 
between the local tax authorities and the State Administration of Taxation.  Thus, 
Circular No. 59 (1998) provides detailed methodologies and procedures for tax 
authorities to follow when carrying out a transfer pricing audit. 
 
3.3.4.1  Filing requirement 
Circular No.59 (1998) specified two types of declaration form to be used in 
declaring related-party transactions.  A separate form needs to be filed for each 
affiliated enterprise.  An “A” type form is used by enterprises with a single category 
of transactions with an affiliated company, and a “B” type form is used by 
enterprises with multiple categories of transactions with an affiliated company.  
Enterprises failing to file the required forms are subject to penalties of up to RMB 
10,000.  
Four types of related-party transactions are identified by Circular No. 59 
(1998), including (i) purchases, sales, transfers and use of tangible assets like 
buildings, transportation vehicles, machinery and equipment, tools, and merchandise; 
(ii) transfers and use of intangible assets like land use rights, copyrights, trademarks, 
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brands, patents, proprietary technologies, industrial property rights and the provision 
of services relating to such transfer or right to use; (iii) financing of short-term and 
long-term loans and guarantees, sales of securities, and all kinds of interest bearing 
prepayments and deferred payments; and (iv) provision of services such as provision 
of market research, marketing, management, administration, technic al services, 
repairs, design, consulting, agency, research and development, and legal and 
accounting services.   
 
3.3.4.2  Selection of FIEs for tax audit  
The Forms A and B together with the financial reports of the companies will 
serve as the initial documentation that the tax authorities use to identify transfer 
pricing audit targets.  Circular No. 59 (1998) extends Circular No. 242 (1992) to 
include ten types of potential audit targets.  They include:  
(i) enterprises that are controlled by related parties in respect of management and 
business operations; 
(ii) enterprises that have significant amounts of transactions with related parties; 
(iii) enterprises with continuing losses (i.e. reporting losses for more than two 
consecutive years);  
(iv)  enterprises that increase the ir scale of operations continuously while 
consistently reporting losses or small profits; 
(v)  enterprises with a fluctuating pattern of profits and losses (e.g. enterprises 
making profit every other year or in an irregular pattern);  
(vi) enterprises that have business dealings with related parties established in tax 
havens;  
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(vii) enterprises whose profit levels are lower than those of other enterprises in the 
same industry based on a comparison with the regular profit level obtained by 
similar enterprises in the same region; 
(viii)  enterprises whose profit margin is lower than that of other enterprises within 
the same group of enterprises based on a comparison with related parties 
within the group; 
(ix)  enterprises that pay unreasonable expenses to related parties using various 
schemes; and 
(x)  enterprises that report a sharp decrease in profits after the expiration of their 
tax holidays, and other enterprises that are suspected of tax avoidance. 
 
In practice, enterprises with continuing losses and enterprises that have low 
profits compared to their scale of operation or industry average are the more 
important selection criteria for transfer pricing audit.  Circular No. 59 (1998) requires 
an audit coverage of at least 30 percent of the identified audit targets for each year. 
However, due to a shortage of manpower, it might be difficult for the tax authorities 
to achieve this coverage.  Nevertheless, the statistics show that the number of actual 
transfer pricing audit cases is increasing (Nelson et al. 2003).  There were 1,230 
transfer pricing audits conducted in 2001, which represented a 11.6 percent increase 
from year 2000, and the tax authorities recovered US$40 million from these transfer 
pricing adjustments (Chinese Tax News 2002).  
 
3.3.4.3  Audit procedures  
Transfer pricing tax audits are generally conducted within three years 
commencing in the year following the relevant tax year and adjustments may be 
made retrospectively for a period up to ten years.  Transfer pricing audits are 
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generally divided into desk audits and field audits.  The tax authorities conduct desk 
audits at their office first.  They issue a notice to the target companies and request 
them to provide relevant documents and transfer pricing information within 60 days.  
The information requested includes business and tax certificates, investment and 
operation contracts, articles of association, feasibility studies, annual financial 
statements, audit reports, account books and vouchers, commercial contracts, and 
other relevant documents.  Based on the information provided by the target 
companies, tax authorities conduct a systematic analysis to evaluates the profit or 
loss on sales, rates of return on investments, and the reasonableness of costs, 
expenses and prices.  Subsequently, the tax authorities conduct a field audit to 
resolve any issues arising from the desk audit.  They issue notices to the target 
companies three to seven days before the field audits, and at least two auditors will 
be on site to conduct the field audit.  During the visit to the enterprise, the auditors 
will obtain further evidence of transfer pricing manipulation and the taxpayer's 
explanations of these.  The burden of proof that the transfer prices are at arm’s length 
prices is on the taxpayers being investigated.   
 
3.3.4.4  Transfer pricing adjustments 
If the tax authorities are of the opinion that the related-party transactions are 
not conducted in an arm's length manner, an adjustment to taxable income will be 
proposed.  The transfer pricing adjustments for tangible goods are based on the 
comparable uncontrolled price method, the resale -minus method, or the cost -plus 
method.  
Under the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUPM), the arm’s length 
price should be the price charged in comparable sales to unrelated third parties.  
When using the CUPM, the tax authorities consider the comparability of purchase 
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and sales procedures, comparability of logistics arrangements at each of the purchase 
and sales links, comparability of products transferred, and comparability of 
environment. 
Under the resale price method (RPM), transfer prices are determined by 
reference to the profit margin realized in transactions between two unrelated 
enterprises.  This method is only used in the situation where the reseller performs 
simple processing work or pure buy-and-sell trading activities.  This method is not 
appropriate if the reseller adds substantial value to the tangible goods by materially 
altering or processing the products such as changing the appearance, function, 
structure or trademark of the product.  
Under the cost plus method (CPM), transfer prices are determined by 
reference to the profit mark-up realized in a transaction between two unrelated 
enterprises.  The tax authorities would first consider whether the cost and expenses 
are calculated in accordance with the China tax law.  Then, they would apply a 
reasonable deemed profit margin, with reference to similar business in China, to 
arrive at an arm's-length price.    
Under Circular No. 59 (1998), the comparable profit method, profit split 
method, net profit method, and deemed profit margin method are allowed as other 
reasonable methods for adjusting transfer prices in case if the CUPM, RPM and 
CPM are not applicable.  However, Circular No. 59 (1998) does not provide any 
definitions of these other methods. 
For financing related-party transactions, adjustments to interest charges 
between associated enterprises is made based on prevailing interest rates with 
reference to the comparability of the financing transactions between the associated 
enterprise transactions and non-associated enterprise transactions (i.e. factors such as 
the loan amount, type of currency, loan terms, term of guarantee, borrower's credit, 
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repayment terms, interest calculation method, etc, would be taken into account).  If 
the funds of lender are borrowed from other parties, the prevailing interest is the 
actual interest payment made by the lender plus costs, expenses and a reasonable 
profit margin. 
For adjusting service fees or rentals, the tax authorities refer to the normal 
service fee or rental charges between unrelated parties under the same or similar 
circumstances.  They take into account the type of services provided, nature of the 
business, technology requirements, professional standards, responsibility assumed, 
payment terms and conditions, and direct and indirect expenses for determining 
arm’s length services fees.  They would take into account the function, specifications, 
structure, type, depreciation methods of the rental property, the time and place of the 
usage of the property, capital investment, and maintenance expenses that the property 
owner has spent on the property for determining arm’s length rental charges.  
For adjusting prices of intangible property, tax authorities refer to the price 
that would normally be agreeable to an unrelated party, taking into consideration the 
development and investment, conditions of transfer, level of exclusivity, extent and 
duration of legal protection, expected benefit to the transferee, investment and cost of 
the transferee, and substituta bility.  
The tax authorities present their audit findings and discuss the proposed 
adjustments with the enterprise being audited.  If there is any disagreement, the 
enterprise must provide further information within the time frame given by the tax 
authorit ies for their consideration.  Upon receiving the additional information, the tax 
authorities will rule within 30 days and issue a “Notice of Adjustment of Transfer 
Pricing, Taxable Income and Tax Payable” to the enterprise.  Taxpayers must settle 
the additional tax within the time frame given by the tax authorities.  An extension of 
not more than three months may be obtained in case of special circumstances or 
 57 
financial hardship.  In addition, the Tax Collection Law (2001) empowers the tax 
authorities to impose a penalty up to five times the tax underpaid due to transfer 
pricing manipulation.  In serious cases, criminal liability may also be pursued.  
Taxpayers need to adjust their accounting books to reflect the full amount of 
taxable income being adjusted by the tax authorities.  If they fail to adjust their books, 
the excessive amount received by the associate companies will be treated as a 
deemed dividend received.  This deemed dividend will be subject to a withholding 
tax of 20 percent, and no exemption of withholding tax for foreign investors will be 
available in this case.  If the excess income received by the foreign party is interest, 
royalty or other income which has already been subject to withholding tax, there will 
also be no recovery of such withholding tax paid.  
 
3.3.4.5  Appeal system 
Taxpayers must pay the tax according to the “Notice of Adjustment of 
Transfer Pricing, Taxable Income and Tax Payable” issued by tax authorities before 
they can appeal against the assessment.  They must file an appeal with the tax 
authorities at the next higher level within 60 days.  Upon receipt of the appeal, the 
next higher tax authorities make a decision within 60 days.  However, in practice, 
since tax authorities frequently check with the next higher level tax authorities before 
making an additional tax assessment, there is no effective appeal of an assessment 
except to the People's Court (Wong and Chong 1999).  Taxpayers need to initiate 
proceedings before the People’s Court within 15 days if they are not satis fied with 
the decisions from the higher level tax authorities.  However, as keeping a good 
relationship with local authorities is crucial for operating in China, it would be 
unwise for FIEs to sue the local tax authorities in court (CCH 2003). 
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3.3.4.6  Ad vance pricing agreements 
The most important provision in Circular No. 59 (1998) is the introduction 
for the first time of advance pricing agreement (APA), an agreement between a 
taxpayer and tax authority on how a proposed transaction will be treated for tax 
purposes.  According to the Circular, a company can submit an application for an 
APA by providing an application form together with relevant information.  After 
review of the information and documents, the tax authorities may sign an APA with 
the enterprise and supervise its implementation.  Theoretically, if the related-party 
transactions follow the APA, no transfer pricing adjustments would be made.  
However, the reference to APAs in Circular No. 59 (1998) is extremely brief.  It does 
not include the application form nor set out the details of the application procedures 
and information required for the APA application.  
 
3.3.5 Tax Dispute Resolution Methods  
In China, tax disputes can be resolved by an institutionalized or a non-
institutionalized method (Chan and Jiang 2002).  An institutionalized method refers 
to a mechanism or procedure that has been expressly recognized and authorized by 
national legislation to handle disputes between taxpayers and tax officials.  An 
administrative hearing, administrative reconsideration and administrative litigation 
are all institutionalized methods for handling tax disputes.  If taxpayers have 
objections on decisions of Chinese tax authorities, they can apply for administrative 
hearings in writing within three days of the notification of the decisions.  
Administrative reconsideration enables taxpayers to appeal to a superior tax body 
against a decision made by lower level officials.  Administrative reconsideration 
must be filed within 60 days of receiving the decision in question.  Taxpayers can 
also bring court lawsuits against tax authorities by the administrative litigation within 
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15 days of receiving the administrative reconsideration decision.  Taxpayers must 
file an administrative reconsideration before institutin g an administrative litigation 
proceeding for cases involving a tax collection decision, decision of assessing tax 
liability or imposing interest on late payment.  Non-institutionalized methods include 
negotiation with the tax authorities, an appeal to the tax official’s superior, and 
exposure or complaints through the mass media.   
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CHAPTER 4  
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING IN CHINA - FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF TAXPAYERS 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This Chapter empirically examines the direct association between management’s 
perception of the importance of environmental variables and management’s  choice of 
international transfer pricing methods.  I collected the data from field interviews with 
the management of large foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) in China.  These FIEs 
include mainly investors from the US, Japan and Europe.  The empirical evidence 
indicates that the more important the management perceives the interest of local 
partners and the maintenance of a good relationship with the host government, the 
more likely that the FIE will use a market-based transfer pricing method.  On the 
other hand, the more important the management perceives foreign exchange controls 
in transfer pricing decisions, the more likely the FIE will choose a cost-based 
method.    
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CHAPTER 4  
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING IN CHINA - FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF TAXPAYERS1 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the business environment in China provides 
mixed inducements for MNCs’ transfer pricing decisions.  Strategically selected 
transfer prices can maximize global tax savings, minimize operating risks and 
circumvent restrictions imposed by host governments.  Management needs to trade-
off among this set of contradicting objectives through their choice of transfer pricing 
methods.  While it is difficult to examine managers’ decisions of these trade -offs 
directly, the trade -offs are reflected in perceptions of the relative importance of 
environmental variables in managers’ choice of transfer pricing methods.  This 
chapter empirically investigates how managers’ perceptions of environmental 
variables influence their choice of international transfer pricing methods.   
Seven environmental variables important to operating businesses in 
developing countries are examined in the context of the business environment in 
China.  These variables are: (1) differences in income tax rates, (2) minimization of 
custom duties, (3) interests of local partners, (4) foreign exchange control and risks, 
(5) restrictions on profit repatriation, (6) risks of expropriation and nationalization, 
and (7) relationships with the host government.  While the first two variables are 
generally relevant to all countries, the other five variables are of special relevance to 
developing countries.   
________________________ 
1 Part of the materials of this chapter will be published in a forthcoming issue of The International 
Journal of Accounting. 
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Empirical studies reveal that MNCs rarely adopt transfer pricing methods 
Based on economic models such as marginal cost and opportunity cost methods, 
because these models are not comprehensive enough to model the global 
environment of MNCs (Wu and Sharp 1979; Yunker 1983; Tang 1979, 1981, 1993).  
In practice, market-based methods and methods based on accounting costs are most 
commonly used.   Market-based methods use comparable market prices or adjusted 
market prices which reflect the economy of internal transfers.  Advocates of these 
methods argue that market prices are less manipulative, and disputes between 
managers of affiliates can be minimized (Granick 1975; Anthony and Dearden 1980; 
Cook 1995).  They are also perceived to be relatively objective and fair, and are less 
likely to be challenged by tax authorities (Al-Eryani 1987).  Cost-based methods 
include actual full cost, standard full cost, actual variable cost and standard variable 
cost.  Mark-up may or may not be added to costs.  If the company’s policy is to tie 
the mark-up to prevailing market prices, the transfer pricing method will be 
classified as a market-based method.  If the policy is to determine mark-up based on 
a desired rate of return on investment or capital, the transfer pricing method will be 
classified as a cost-based method.  Cost-based methods are basically internally 
determined using available cost data.  It is conceded in the literature that these 
methods are subject to inherent arbitrariness in cost allocation and difficulties in 
determining a fair profit to add to cost (Thomas 1971; Merville and Petty 1978; 
MaAulay and Tomkins 1992).  Because of this arbitrariness, the se methods provide 
more room for MNCs to pursue their corporate objectives in maximizing after-tax 
profits and minimizing operational risks.  I will evaluate how management 
perceptions of the seven environmental variables affect their choice between the tw o 
transfer pricing methods in the following sections.   
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4.2 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
4.2.1   Difference in Corporate Income Tax Rates   
It is commonly recognized that differences in income tax rates among 
jurisdictions provides MNCs with incentives to use transfer pricing strategy to 
minimize global tax payments (Chan and Chow 1997b).  The greater the difference 
in income tax rates between two countries, the greater is the incentive for MNCs to 
use transfer pricing to shift income.    
As elaborated in Chapter 3, the income tax rate applicable to FIEs operating 
in China is 30 percent.   The government offers certain tax incentives for qualified 
foreign investors.   A preferential income tax rate of 15 percent is granted to FIEs 
located in special economic zones and in economic and technological development 
zones.  A preferential rate of 24 percent is offered to industrial FIEs located in open 
economic zones and cities.  For FIEs of a production nature scheduled to operate for 
a period not less than ten years, an exemption from taxation for the first two profit-
making years and a 50 percent tax reduction for the following three years are 
granted.  However, currently, many FIEs are either beyond their tax holiday period 
or do not qualify for such holidays. 
Although minimization of taxes is often cited as a transfer pricing objective, 
some argue that the significance of tax considerations should not be over-rated in 
developing countries because of the existence of nontax influences in these countries 
(Kim and Miller 1979; Plasschaert 1985).  However, in general, tax minimization 
remains an important issue in transfer pricing decisions.  The more important tax 
minimization is perceived to be, the greater the motivation for management to use 
transfer pricing strategy to reduce global tax payments, and the more likely 
management will adopt cost-based transfer pricing methods which facilitate the 
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pursuit of this corporate objective.  The reasoning is reflected in the following 
hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 1:  The more important the difference in corporate income tax 
rates is perceived by management of FIEs, the more likely that a cost-based transfer 
pricing method will be adopted.   
 
4.2.2   Minimization of Custom Duties  
Minimization of import duties provides an incentive for MNCs to under-
price goods transferred into a country.  Under-pricing of imports can also 
circumvent restrictions such as a value quota on imports imposed by a host 
government.  The Chinese government adopts a tariff escalation policy whereby 
nominal tariffs vary with the degree of domestic processing.  Tariffs are lower for 
raw materials and semi-processed materials than for final goods.  Like other 
developing countries, import duties in China are in general substantially higher than 
those in developed countries, although there is a downward trend since China has 
entered the World Trade Organization.  There is a prima facie inference that the 
relatively high ad valorem tariffs in most developing countries are likely to tempt 
MNCs to use transfer pricing to minimize tariff payments (Plasschaert 1985). 
However, under-pricing of imports from related companies to minimize tariff 
payments will result in higher reported profits by FIEs, and this is not compatible 
with the considerations of restrictions on profit repatriation and foreign exchange 
control as discussed later.  The impact of custom duties on FIEs’ transfer pricing 
decisions thus depends on the relative importance of this variable as perceived by 
management.  The more important the tariffs are perceived by management, the 
more likely that the management will adopt cost-based transfer pricing methods to 
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facilitate the minimization of tariff payments.  This argument provides the basis for 
the second research hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: The more important minimization of custom duties is 
perceived by FIEs’ management, the more likely that a cost-based transfer pricing 
method will be used.  
 
4.2.3   The Interest of Local Partners 
Like many developing countries, the Chinese government prefers foreign 
investors to operate in China in the form of a joint venture with a local partner. The 
existence of a local partner in a joint venture reduces the share of reported profits 
attributable to foreign investors, and hence provides an inducement for the foreign 
investors to use transfer pricing to shift profits outwards (Emmanuel and Mehafdi 
1994).  As more profits are shifted away from China, the local partner’s share of 
profit will be reduced.  To safeguard their legitimate interest, the local partners may 
actively get involved in transfer pricing decisions.   Thus, a local partner may play a 
monitoring role which restricts the latitude of transfer pricing strategies practiced by 
foreign investors (Lall 1973; Emmanuel and Mehafdi 1994).     
In some joint ventures in China , the parties may enter into a management 
contract, whereby full management responsibility is delegated to the foreign partners 
who control the production and financial functions of business operations.   In other 
cases, local partners participate actively in the business decisions.  It is hypothesized 
that the impact of local partners on transfer pricing decisions depends on the 
management role of local partners and the importance of the interest of local 
partners as perceived by corporate management.  The greater the importance of the 
interest of a local partner is perceived by corporate management, the more likely that 
management will attempt to minimize conflicts between partners over transfer 
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pricing by adopting a method that is relatively objective and fair to both parties and 
with less room for manipulation.  This leads to a greater likelihood of adopting a 
market-based transfer pricing method, as stated below. 
Hypothesis 3: The more important the interest of local partners is perceived 
by corporate management, the more likely that a market-based transfer pricing 
method will be adopted. 
 
4.2.4   Foreign Exchange Control and Risks 
Foreign exchange control imposed by developing countries is regarded as a 
strong inducement for MNCs to shift profits out of these countries.  Fewer facilities 
are available in these countries to hedge against exchange losses.  Transfer pricing 
can assist in managing foreign exchange risks by reducing liquid assets of 
subsidiaries in countries where foreign exchange control is imposed.  
As elaborated in Chapter 3, until the early 1990s China adopted a centrally 
managed foreign exchange control system which provided limited access to foreign 
exchange.  Foreign investment enterprises were allowed to retain foreign exchange 
earnings  and made payments of foreign exchange therefrom.   These enterprises 
were required to balance their foreign exchange revenues and expenditures, and 
were required to file with the government their annual budget of foreign exchange 
expenditures.  Since 1994, the government has gradually relaxed its foreign 
exchange control policy.  A system of limited convertibility of the local currency, 
the Renminbi, was introduced.  In 1996, the Renminbi became freely convertible for 
current account items including payments for trading, transportation and tourism 
activities.  However, capital account transactions including capital investment are 
still subject to foreign exchange control. 
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The limited-convertibility of the  Renminbi and the restrictions on access to 
foreign exchange increase the financial risks for business operations in China.  
Shortage of foreign exchange has been cited as one of the most serious problems 
facing FIEs, especially those aiming at the domestic market or those relying heavily 
on imports of raw materials and machinery (Frisbie 1988; Davis and Yi 1992).  The 
significance of the impact of foreign exchange control on an FIE depends on the 
nature of its business operations.  It is hypothesized that the more important foreign 
exchange control is perceived by management, the greater the inducement for 
management to use transfer pricing to circumvent such a control and to reduce 
associated risks.  This leads to the greater likelihood that management will adopt a 
cost-based transfer pricing method which pr ovides management more flexibility in 
pursuing this objective. 
Hypothesis 4:  The more important foreign exchange control and risks is 
perceived by management, the more likely that a cost-based transfer pricing method 
will be adopted.  
  
4.2.5   Restrictio ns on Profit Repatriation 
Restrictions on profit remittances including dividends, royalties and 
management fees, or high withholding tax on such remittances imposed by host 
countries provide an inducement for MNCs to shift funds through transfer pricing.  
As these restrictions are more likely to be imposed by governments in developing 
countries relative to developed countries, this variable is considered important to 
transfer pricing decisions in developing countries (Kim and Miller 1979; Plasschaert 
1985). 
While the Chinese government does not ban foreign investors from 
repatriating their legitimate share of profits or royalties, these remittances are subject 
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to the availability of sufficient foreign exchange that an FIE has for this purpose.   
Withholding taxes on payments of interest, rental charges and royalties to affiliated 
companies are levied at a general rate of 20 percent, or at a preferential rate as 
specified in tax treaties.  According to tax treaties entered into by the Chinese 
government with other countries, these taxes are allowed as credits against home 
countries’ corporate income tax. However, Chinese tax law disallows the 
repatriation of management fees to parent companie s, except for those incurred for 
specific and direct services provided by the parent companies such as training the 
local employees of the FIEs.  The impact of these regulations on transfer pricing 
decisions depends upon managers’ perception of their importance.  The more 
important the restrictions on profit remittances are perceived by management, the 
greater the motivation to circumvent these restrictions, and the more likely that cost-
based transfer pricing methods will be used as a mechanism to pursue this objective.  
Hypothesis 5: The more important the management perceives the 
restrictions on profit repatriation, the more likely that a cost-based transfer pricing 
method will be used.  
 
4.2.6   Risks of Expropriation and Nationalization    
The perceived political risks relating to foreign operations including 
expropriation and nationalization has been a concern for MNCs operating in 
developing countries.  A high perceived risk may motivate MNCs to seek an early 
return on investment through the transfer pricing mechanism.  Political risk has been 
a major concern to foreign investors in socialist countries.  To alleviate foreign 
investors’ concerns, the Chinese government has enacted laws to protect their legal 
rights and interests.  The government also signed bilateral investment treaties with 
more than forty countries, including the UK, Japan, Australia, Germany and France.  
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These guarantee either no expropriation or compensation in the event of 
expropriation.  However, China has not been able to conclude an investment treaty 
with the US While the possibility of expropriation of foreign-invested enterprises is 
small, the risk cannot be ruled out.  For example, in order to construct the famous 
Oriental Plaza in Beijing, McDonald’s was pushed off the site, although it had a 20-
year lease there.  The government retains the right to nationalize or expropriate 
enterprises under special circumstances.  The more important management perceives 
this risk, the greater disposition management will have to use transfer pricing to 
minimize it by diverting liquid funds outwards, and the more likely that cost-based 
transfer pricing methods will be used.  
Hypothesis 6:  The more important the management perceives the risks of 
expropriation and nationalization, the more likely that a cost-based transfer pricing 
method will be used.  
 
4.2.7   Good Relationship with the Host Government   
Empirical studies reveal that MNCs give consideration to maintaining good 
relations with host governments when formulating their transfer pricing policies 
(Tang 1979, 1981; Yunker 1983).  Al-Eryani (1987) find that this variable is more 
important for MNCs operating in developing countries than for their counterparts 
operating in developed countries.  In China, a good relationship with government 
authorities is helpful in smoothing business operations and in negotiating 
bureaucratic hurdles.   This is in part cultural and in part because the legal system in 
China is not as transparent as that in most developed countries (Chan and Jiang 
2002).  To maintain a good relationship with the government, FIEs try to avoid any 
disputes or conflicts with the tax authorities and the government departments.  Thus, 
it is hypothesized that FIEs will more likely use market-based methods that are 
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perceived to be more objective than cost-based methods in formulating their transfer 
pricing policies to avoid such disputes and conflicts. 
Hypothesis 7:  The more important management perceives maintenance of a 
good relationship with the Chinese government, the more likely that an FIE will use 
market-based transfer pricing methods. 
 
A summary of these hypotheses is shown in Table 4.1. 
[Insert Table 4.1 here] 
 
4.3   DATA COLLECTION 
I conducted a series of interviews with management of sample FIEs to 
collect the data for this study.  The interview questionnaire consists of three sections.  
Section 1 is related to the transfer pricing policies adopted by the sample firms 
(FIEs).  Interviewees were asked to elaborate on their dominant transfer pricing 
method (in terms of dollar value transferred) for trading with their overseas affiliates, 
and on the transfer pricing decision-making process.  Section 2 contains 
demographic information about the FIEs, including source and percentage of foreign 
investment, size of the firm, volume of trade with overseas affiliated companies, and 
income tax rates applicable to the company.  Section 3 consists of questions on the 
perceptions of management regarding the importance of the seven environmental 
variables when formulating transfer pricing policies.  Interviewees were asked to 
assess the importance of these variables when formulating their transfer pricing 
policies.  The importance of each variable was measured by using a five -point scale 
(1-Extremely important, 2-Very important, 3-Moderately important, 4-Not too 
important, and 5-Not important at all). 
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The interviews were conducted in the major cities of China, including 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xiamen, Shenzhen and the open cities of Pearl River 
Delta.  The sample FIEs for the interviews were selected from a directory of the top 
(largest 500) industrial FIEs in China as designated by the Chinese government in 
terms of annual sales.  FIEs located in these cities and having trade of goods or 
materials with their overseas affiliated companies were contacted for interview.  A 
total sample of sixty-four FIEs provides information for this study.    
Interview is considered an appropriate methodology for a study of this nature 
which examines a sensitive and complex issue.  Faculty members of local 
universities and partners of local CPA firms utilized their contacts in China to assist 
in arranging these interviews.  They also attended the interviews.  Because the 
interviewees know the local contacts, they have more confidence on the proper use 
of information.  I assured the interviewees that the information will be kept 
confidential and used for academic research purposes only.  Behavioral research 
confirms that an on-going personal relationship with the interviewees promotes 
truthful responses (Bazerman et al. 2002).  When arranging the interviews, the local 
contacts informed the interviewees about the nature of the interviews and were 
assured of the interviewees’ familiarity with the transfer pricing setting process in 
their firm before arranging the interviews.  I chose to interview the financial 
controllers of these FIEs who actively participate in the transfer pricing decisions 
because of their expertise.  With their first -hand knowledge of and experience in 
operating environments in China, they were particularly able to articulate the 
importance of the hypothesized environmental variables and their tradeoffs in 
achieving the transfer pricing objectives.  In some cases, interviewees brought along 
their assistants to the interview to make sure that they could answer my questions 
comprehensively.  All the interviewees were either expatriates sent from overseas 
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head offices who had extensive experience in China or local persons who received 
training from the head office.  They were clearly familiar with the transfer pricing 
processes in their enterprises.  At the beginning of the interviews, I explained the 
objective of the study and assured the confidentiality of the data they provided.  I 
also explained the various transfer pricing methods in order to assure common 
understanding of the terms and proper codification of the methods adopted by these 
FIEs.  When explaining the terms and asking the questions, I was careful not to give 
my own opinion which may influence the interviewees’ responses.  I also paid 
attention to the interviewees’ response to see whether there were any inconsistent 
answers during the interview.  After the interview, I searched the business 
directories to verify the demographic information provided by the interviewees.  I 
also conducted interviews with four partners in two large CPA firms in Hong Kong 
and talked to several CPA firm partners in China to confirm the reasonableness and 
logic of the data collected.  As the local contacts knew the interviewees, I was able 
to contact the interviewees after the interview when necessary for any follow-up 
clarifica tion of my interview notes.  These control measures taken together provide 
reasonable assurance that the data collected are valid and reliable.     
 
4.4 ANALYSIS OF DATA 
4.4.1   Profile of the Sample Firms 
The 64 sample firms are engaged in the business of  manufacturing different 
products, including chemicals, electronics, electrical appliances, pharmaceutical and 
medical equipment.  The foreign investment of these FIEs are mainly sourced from 
the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and European counties, including the 
UK, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway and France.  About 30 
percent of the sample firms are from the upper tier of the top 500 companies in terms 
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of sales.  The annual sales range from US$60 million to more than US$3,000 million.  
Foreign investors in all sample firms hold at least 25 percent of equity shares, 
including eleven wholly foreign-owned enterprises.  On average, foreign investors 
hold 63 percent of the equity shares of the FIE.  Most of these FIEs have a great 
volume of transactions with their overseas affiliated companies.  In 51 FIEs (80 
percent of the sample firms), inter-affiliate trade accounts for more than 75 percent 
of their total trade.   
 
4.4.2   Transfer Pricing Policies 
Thirty-eight FIEs (59 percent of the sample) adopted market-based transfer 
pricing methods, and most of them used adjusted market prices.  Adjusted market 
prices are the comparable market prices adjusted by an amount reflecting the 
economic difference between open market sales and internal transfers, for example, 
the marketing costs saved.  Usually, the adjustment can be easily determined and 
documented.  Of the 26 FIEs (41 percent of the sample) which adopted cost-based 
methods, more than half of them used standard full cost plus markups (Table 4.2A).  
Marginal cost, opportunity cost, mathematical programming, and profit-split methods 
were not used.  A great majority of the sample firms (75 percent) have the autonomy 
to purchase raw materials and components from unrelated companies (Table 4.2B).  
FIEs with more autonomy will have greater power when setting transfer prices with 
their affiliates.  In 41 FIEs (64 percent of the sample), parent companies of foreign 
partners were consulted in determining transfer pricing policies, and more than half 
of these were FIEs with the majority shareholdings by foreign investors (Table 
4.2C).  Fourteen FIEs (22 percent of the sample) determined their transfer pricing 
policies without direct influence from parent companies.  Nine FIEs (14 percent of 
the sample), all being US MNCs, adopted their parent company’s worldwide transfer 
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pricing policies.  Only 16 percent of the sample firms have had disputes with 
affiliates over transfer prices during the past two years (Table 4.2D).  Several 
approaches were adopted to resolve these disputes, including negotiation between 
FIEs and related companies, negotiation with interference from the parent 
companies, or negotiation with interference from the tax authorities.   
[Insert Table 4.2 here] 
 
4.4.3   Importance of Environmental Variables as Perceived by Management 
Table 4.3 shows the mean scores of the importance of the seven 
hypothesized environmental variables as perceived by the management of the 
sample firms (range is from 1 to 5 with 1 being most important).  For the overall  
sample, maintaining a good relationship with the Chinese government and 
differences in income tax rates are perceived as the two most important variables.  
Risk of expropriation and nationalization by host countries is perceived as least 
influential in the choice of transfer pricing methods.  A comparison is made between 
US FIEs and non-US FIEs in my sample to see whether these firms take the same 
environmental factors into account when choosing their transfer pricing methods, as 
revealed by Arpan (1972).  The Mann-Whitney tests do not reveal significant 
differences in the importance of these variables as perceived by US and by non-US 
FIEs.  The Kendall-tau test of the rank-order of the importance of these variables 
(correlation coefficient = 0.586; p=0.068) shows that there is moderate agreement 
between these two groups on the relative importance of the variables.       
[Insert Table 4.3 here] 
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Finally, a check of the correlations among the environmental variables shows 
that only differences in income tax rates (Variable 1) and minimization of custom 
duties (Variable 2) have a moderate correlation of slightly larger than 0.50.  As will 
be explained later, multi-collinearity and sensitivity tests show that this correlation 
has no impact on the analysis. 
      
4.4.4   Statistical Testing of Research Hypotheses 
Table 4.4 shows the mean scores of the importance of the seven 
hypothesized environmental variables as perceived by FIEs using market-based 
transfer pricing methods and those using cost-based transfer pricing methods.  The 
statistical tests of these mean scores reveal significant differences in the perceived 
importance of three variables between FIEs using different transfer pricing methods.  
These three variables are the interest of local pa rtners, foreign exchange control and 
risks (both significant at the 5 percent level), and good relationship with the Chinese 
government (significant at 10 percent level).  FIEs using market-based transfer 
pricing methods perceived the interest of local partners and a good relationship with 
the Chinese government as more important, while FIEs using cost-based transfer 
pricing methods perceived the foreign exchange control as more important.  Risk of 
expropriation and nationalization, which has been regarded in prior studies as 
important for business operations in developing socialist countries, is not perceived 
as important for FIEs using either  the cost-based or market-based transfer pricing 
method.  This suggests that with the endeavors to open up the economy and to 
attract foreign investment, the Chinese government has successfully eased foreign 
investors’ concern of political risks associated with their business operations.   
[Insert Table 4.4 here] 
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To further investigate the significance of management pe rceptions of the 
importance of these variables to the choice of transfer pricing method in a 
multivariate setting, a logistic regression analysis is performed (Simons 1987; 
Menon and Williams 1991; Norusis 1999; Balakrishnan and Soderstrom 2000).  The 
logistic regression function is as follows:  
)1(,VarTP i
i
i0 åa+a=
where: 
TP =  binary variable assuming the value of 0 if cost-based methods are used, and 1 
if market-based methods are used; 
Vari = the importance of variable i, where i = 1,2,… .,7, measured by a five-point 
scale with 1 being extremely important and 5 being not important at all.  
These variables are: 
Var1: Difference in income tax rates 
Var2: Minimization of custom duties 
Var3: Interest of local partners 
Var4: Foreign exchange control and risks  
Var5: Restrictions on profit repatriation 
Var6: Risks of expropriation and nationalization 
Var7: Good relationship with the Chinese government 
ai values are the regression coefficients. 
 
As the dependent variable is dichotomous, a logistic regression analysis is 
appropriate to examine the significance of the hypothesized environmental variables 
in discriminating between FIE’s choice of transfer pricing methods , i.e.  market-
based or cost-based methods (Norusis 1999).  The analysis predicts the probability 
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that a particular transfer pricing method will be used when the importance of the 
environmental variables changes.  The results show how the trade-off among the 
environmental variables affects the choice of transfer pricing methods. The results of 
the regression analysis are shown in Table 4.5.  Variance inflation factors are all less 
than 2, indicating that multi-collinearity is unlikely to affect the inferences.  White’s 
heteroskedasticity test suggests that the homogeneous variance assumption was not 
rejected at the 0.05 level.  
The analysis confirmed that Var 3 and Var 4, i.e. the interest of local partners 
and foreign exchange control and risks , are significant at 1 percent level and that 
Var 7, i.e. good relationship with the Chinese government, is significant at 5 percent  
level in discriminating FIEs’ choice of transfer pricing methods.   The model is 
significant at the 1 percent level.  Indicating a good fit of the model, 87 percent of 
FIEs using market-based methods and 65 percent of FIEs using cost-based methods 
are correctly classified.  The signs of the coefficients for these three variables are 
consistent with the hypotheses.  FIEs which regard the interest of local partners and 
a good relationship with the Chinese government as being important are  more likely 
to use market-based methods, and FIEs which perceive the foreign exchange control 
and risks as being important are more likely to use cost-based methods.   These 
results are consistent with my univariate analysis.  I do not find significant 
discriminating power in Var 1, Var 2, Var 5 and Var 6, i.e. difference in income tax 
rates, minimization of custom duties, restrictions on profit repatriation, and risks of 
expropriation and nationalization.  In other words, FIEs using cost-based methods 
and FIEs using market-based methods perceive a similar degree of importance for 
each of these variables.  The increasingly effective tax audits in China may reduce 
FIEs’ incentive to use cost-based methods to manipulate these variables.  However, 
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foreign exchange control remains the most important variable for FIEs using cost-
based methods (Table 4.5).   
[Insert Table 4.5 here] 
 
4.4.5  Sensitivity Tests 
I conducted additional tests to check the robustness of the regression results.  
First, I included a dummy variable signifying a majority and a minority foreign 
investor in my regression model.  As shown in Table 4.6, the coefficient of this new 
variable is not significant at 0.05 level and the results of the original and the new 
model are basically the same.  
[Insert Table 4.6 here] 
 
Second, I tried two other logit models by adding a “percentage of foreign 
ownership” variable and a “consultation” variable (i.e. a variable signifying whether 
the FIEs set their transfer pricing policies with consultation of parent companies or 
not).  The results are shown in Tables 4.7 and 4.8.  Both the percentage of foreign 
ownership variable and the consultation variable are not significant at 0.05 level.  
However, Variable 3 (Interest of local partners) becomes insignificant when 
percentage of foreign ownership variable is added.  This is due to the strong 
correlation between percentage of foreign ownership and Variable 3 (r = 0.719, 
significant at 0.01 level).  As the percentage of foreign ownership increases, the 
interest of local partners becomes less important.  As the main objective of my paper 
is to analyze the influence of management perceptions of environmental variables on 
the choice of transfer pricing methods, I chose to include the management 
perception variable (i.e. the perceived importance of the interest of local partners) 
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rather than the corporate attribute variable (i.e. percentage of foreign ownership) in 
my regression.  
[Insert Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 here] 
 
Third, I performed a sensitivity test by simultaneous ly adding the above two 
variables (percentage of foreign ownership and consultation) to the original 
regression model.  The results are basically the same as above.   
Fourth, I excluded the nine companies which adopted their parent’s 
worldwide transfer pricing policies from my regression model.  Var 3, Var 4 and 
Var 7 remain significant and all other variables remain insignificant.  Therefore, the 
nine cases which adopted worldwide policies do not affect the significance of my 
results.   
Fifth, I included a dummy variable representing US versus non-US foreign 
investors.  Sixth, I included interaction terms of (i) US with income tax variable 
(Variable 1), (ii) US with foreign exchange control (Variable 4), and (iii) US with 
risks of expropriation (Variable 6) respectively.  Seventh, I included a dummy 
variable representing Hong Kong or Taiwan sourced versus other sourced FIEs.  
Eighth, I included the size of the FIE (in terms of the logarithm of sales) in the 
model.  Ninth, I added a variable representing the FIE’s export as a percentage of 
total sales.  Tenth, I included the FIE’s proportion of inter-affiliate trade as a 
percentage of total trade in the model.  The results of these sensitivity tests show that 
the interest of local partners (Variable 3), foreign exchange controls (Variable 4), 
and good relationship with Chinese government (Variable 7) which are significant in 
the original model remain significant at the 0.01 to 0.05 level.  None of the newly 
added variables in the above tests is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Finally, I deleted minimization of custom duties (Variable 2) from the model 
to assess the effect of its moderate correlation with the income tax variable (Variable 
1).  The results of the reduced model are the same as the original model. 
 
4.5   CONCLUSION 
Despite expressed concerns about the significance of transfer pricing to the 
economy of developing countries, there is limited empirical research addressing the 
influence of environmental characteristics in these countries on MNCs’ choice of 
transfer pricing methods.  MNCs’ operations in developing countries are subject to 
more economic, political and social risks due to the unique business environment in 
these countries.  These factors  provide inducements for MNCs to use transfer 
pricing to maximize after-tax profits, to circumvent government restrictions, and to 
reduce financial risks. 
My study provides empirical evidence on how environmental variables 
influence MNCs’ transfer pricing decisions in the context of the business 
environment in China, a major developing economy.  The analysis reveals that 
management perceptions of nontax factors, namely, interest of local partners, 
foreign exchange control and risks, and good relationships w ith local government  
are important in discriminating the  choice of transfer pricing methods.  The greater 
the importance of the interest of local partners as perceived by management, the 
more likely that market-based transfer pricing methods will be used.  These market-
based methods are considered more objective and fairer to both parties of joint 
ventures as compared with cost-based methods.  This finding is generally consistent 
with previous studies that hold the view that a local partner in a joint venture plays a 
monitoring role which restricts the latitude of transfer pricing strategy practiced by 
foreign investors (Chan and Chow 1997b).  My study also reveals that the greater 
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the importance of foreign exchange control and risks as perceived by management, 
the more likely that cost-based transfer pricing methods will be used, as cost-based 
methods allow more flexibility for dealing with restrictive laws or regulations.  Also, 
the more important a good relationship with the local government as perceived by 
management, the more likely that market-based transfer pricing methods will be 
adopted to minimize disputes with government and tax authorities.  Certain variables 
such as restrictions on profit repatriation and risks of expropriation and 
nationalization were not found to be important because it appears that these 
problems have, to a certain extent, been solved by the Chinese government’s open 
door policy.  Other variables such as income tax rates and customs duties which are 
of general relevance to all countries were not found to be significant in 
discriminating between the choice of transfer pricing methods in China.   
The literature on international transfer pricing is largely consistent with the 
argument that MNCs exploit market imperfections in global markets emerging from 
international socio-economic factors.  This multinational transfer-pricing decision-
making environment makes an assessment of the effect of these factors difficult.  By 
examining the environmental characteristics pertaining to China, this study sheds 
empirical light on how the management perception of these characteristics 
influences their choice of transfer pricing method.  The findings of this study are of 
particular relevance to developing countries in enhancing their understanding of 
environmental influences on transfer pricing decisions, and thus contribute to the 
building of a more comprehensive theoretical framework of transfer pricing in 
developing economies.  A limitation of this study is that the data are based on a 
convenient sample of FIEs rather than a random sample, as FIEs in China would not 
normally grant interviews on sensitive issues like transfer pricing without prior 
personal contacts. 
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CHAPTER 5  
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING IN CHINA - FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF TAX AUTHORITIES 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
When deciding on transfer pr ices, firms need to consider both the tax and nontax 
costs involved.  Given a particular set of environmental characteristics, management 
would set transfer prices to achieve various conflicting objectives.  Based on an 
analysis of tax and nontax costs for firms with different characteristics, I hypothesize 
that wholly foreign-owned enterprises and cooperative joint ventures, export-oriented 
enterprises, and Hong Kong-Taiwan sourced foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) in 
China are more motivated to shift profits out from China through transfer pricing 
manipulation than equity joint ventures, domestic-market-oriented enterprises and 
FIEs from other countries, respectively.  Furthermore, the audit costs for wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises, cooperative joint ventures, export-oriented firms and 
Hong Kong-Taiwan sourced FIEs are either smaller or similar to their counterparts.  
Thus, they are more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits by Chinese tax 
authorities after controlling for the size of operations and the volume of inter-affiliate 
transfers.  To test my hypotheses, I examine the likelihood of transfer pricing audits 
for 305 FIEs in China.  Consistent with my prediction, I find that wholly foreign-
owned enterprises, cooperative joint ventures and export-oriented FIEs are more 
likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits in China.  However, I do not find that 
source of investment affects audit probability. 
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CHAPTER 5  
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING IN CHINA - FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF TAX AUTHORITIES 
 
5.1   INTRODUCTION 
Transfer pricing has long been a significant accounting, taxation and 
management issue around the world.  International transfer pricing is regarded as an 
important mechanism for multinational corporations (MNCs) to maneuver funds 
internationally and to choose the countries in which profits will be reported.  MNCs 
frequently use transfer pricing as a means of reducing global income tax payments.  
A survey conducted by Ernst & Young (2001) finds that transfer pricing is rated as 
the most important international tax issue by MNCs.   
Empirical studies on transfer pricing mainly focus on the US, Japan and 
other developed countries.  A few studies on developing countries provide empirical 
evidence on trading statistics to assess the extent of transfer pricing manipulation by 
MNCs (Natke 1985; Rahman and Scapens 1986; Chan and Chow 1997a).  Kim and 
Miller (1979), Plasschaert (1985), and Chan and Chow (2001) focus on examining 
transfer pricing policies and the importance of environmental variables for 
companies operating in developing countries.  They suggest that due to differences 
in the business environment, tax factors which are important in developed countries 
should not be over-rated in developing countries.  Some nontax factors suc h as 
foreign exchange controls and restrictions on profit repatriation which may not be 
perceived as important in developed countries are considered as important in 
developing countries. Empirical studies examining the trade -off between tax and 
nontax factors for transfer pricing decisions in the business environment of 
developing countries can enhance the understanding of MNC behavior in developing 
economies.    
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From the perspective of tax compliance studies, empirical research is limited.  
Mills (1996, 1998) provides empirical evidence that proposed tax audit adjustments 
by tax authorities increase when the difference between book income and taxable 
income widens.  Chan and Chow (1997b) provide the first empirical study on 
transfer pricing noncompliance by MNCs in China in the early 1990s.  However, 
they do not provide any multivariate analysis, nor do they specifically analyze the 
tax and nontax cost trade -off for the MNCs.  As explained later, they also do not 
study the effect of activity orientation, profitability and volume of transfer on 
transfer pricing noncompliance.  Chan and Mo (2000) examine corporate 
noncompliance during tax holidays.  Chan and Mo (2002) further decompose 
noncompliance into book-tax conforming and book-tax difference noncompliance, 
and examine the tax and nontax cost trade-off on these two types of noncompliance.  
However, they exclude transfer pricing noncompliance in their studies.  Hence, this 
is the first tax compliance study based on tax audits on MNCs, examining 
empirically how the tax and nontax cost tradeoff affects international transfer 
pricing.   
Specifically, this study investigates empirically via multivariate statistical 
analysis the relationship between firm characteristics and the probability of being 
selected for transfer pricing audits by the Chinese tax authorities.  I use the tax and 
nontax cost trade-off theory to explain why certain types of firm are more likely to 
manipulate transfer prices and be selected for transfer pricing audits in China.  
Based on the findings of Chapter 4, the major nontax factors affecting transfer 
pricing decisions in China include relationships with the host government, interests 
of local partners, and foreign exchange control and risks.  In this chapter, I analyze 
how these nontax factors are being considered against the tax factor and influence 
MNCs’ decisions on profit shifting through transfer pricing manipulation. 
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The sample firms of my study are foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) 
which include Sino-foreign joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises in 
China.  I hypothesize that equity joint ventures, as compared to wholly foreign-
owned enterprises and cooperative joint ventures, have comparable tax cost but 
higher nontax costs for shifting profits out of China due to the necessity of keeping a 
good relationship with government and the monitoring effect of local partners.  
Export-oriented FIEs, as compared to domestic-market-oriented enterprises, have 
lower tariff costs and lower nontax costs for shifting profits out of China due to an 
exemption from import tariffs for export production and less reliance on local 
government and distributors.  Export-oriented FIEs also have more opportunities for 
transfer pricing manipulation.  Hong Kong and Taiwan sourced FIEs, as compared 
to FIEs from other sources, have both lower tax and nontax costs for shifting profits 
out of China due to lower home countries’ tax rates and higher inside ownership 
concentration.  Therefore, I expect that wholly foreign-owned enterprises, 
cooperative joint ventures, export-oriented FIEs, and Hong Kong-Taiwan sourced 
enterprises should have a greater incentive to evade tax through transfer pricing.  As 
such, they would be more likely to be audited by Chinese tax authorities for transfer 
pricing transactions given that the audit cost is not significantly different for auditing 
different types of FIEs and after controlling for the size of operations and the 
possible tax amount that can be recovered.  Based on a sample of 305 FIEs that 
engaged in significant related-party transactions with overseas affiliates , I find that 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises, cooperative joint ventures and export-oriented 
FIEs are more likely to be audited by Chinese tax authorities for transfer pricing 
manipulation.  These findings are consistent with my hypotheses developed based 
on the tax and nontax cost trade-off theory.  
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My study should have significant implications for tax authorities as well as 
foreign investors operating in China and other developing economies. The results 
should assist tax authorities in tackling tax audit problems more effectively and in 
particular, setting tax audit guidelines on related-party transactions.  For example, 
given the low nontax costs of shifting profits out of China by export -oriented FIEs, 
the tax authorities can set an audit priority for investigating this type of FIE which is 
considered to be more likely to engage in transfer pricing manipulation.  My 
research results should also help foreign investors gain a better understanding of tax 
and nontax costs for transfer pricing manipulation in China.  As this is the first 
empirical study of tax and nontax cost trade-offs in an international transfer pricing 
context, the results should also provide researchers with an interesting perspective in 
studying the effect of nontax costs on transfer pricing manipulation.  Finally, 
although China is unique in terms of its size and history, it is in essence a 
developing economy according to IMF (2003).  Thus, my research results of how 
tax and nontax costs affect transfer pricing decisions and compliance should provide 
a useful reference for other developing countries.  For example, countries that have 
comparable forms of investment as China can make reference to this research on 
how different types of investment affect transfer pricing compliance. 
The next section describes transfer pricing legislation and tax audit 
development in China.  Section 5.3 discusses the tax and nontax cost trade -off 
theory.  Section 5.4 formulates the research hypotheses.  Section 5.5 explains the 
research design.  Section 5.6 provides the empirical results, and Section 5.7 
concludes the study.   
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5.2   INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
China has experienced rapid growth in GDP and foreign direct investment.  
The average GDP growth rate in China was 9.1 percent for 1993-2003 compared 
with 2.2 percent for the G-7 countries for the same period (IMF 2003).  The foreign 
direct investment inflow in China reached US$52.7 billion in 2002, a new record 
reinforcing its position as the largest recipient of FDI inflows in the developing 
world (UNCTC 2003).  FIEs in China play an increasingly important role in China’s 
foreign trade.  In 2002, total imports and exports by FIEs accounted for, respectively, 
54 percent and 52 percent of China’s total imports and exports (MOC 2003).  
Among these imports and exports, a large volume of transactions represented 
related-party transactions where the FIEs in China traded with their overseas 
affiliated companies.  Chan and Chow (1998) find that 88 percent of the export-
oriented FIEs in China purchase and sell goods to their affiliated companies for 70 
percent or more of their total imports and exports.  Therefore, international transfer 
pricing is an important issue in China for both the Chinese government and the 
MNCs invested therein.  As in other developing countries, tax evasion is also a 
serious problem in China (Mo 2003).  The Chinese tax authorities estimate that over 
80 percent of MNCs operating in China evade taxes.  This caused at least US$3.6 
billion tax revenue losses in 2002 (PRN 2003).  Transfer pricing manipulation is the 
most common method used by MNCs for tax evasions. 
 
5.2.1   Transfer Pricing Legislation in China 
Transfer pricing provisions were first introduced as national legislation in 
China under Article 13 of the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China 
for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises (Income Tax Law) 
in 1991 by the National People’s Congress.  Apart from the Income Tax Law, the 
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State Administration of Taxation (SAT) issued a number of rules and regulations to 
govern transfer pricing transactions in China including Guoshuifa (1992) No.237 
and Guoshuifa (1998) No. 59.  The principle of transfer pricing regulations in China 
is based on the recommendations of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD 1979).  The Income Tax Law stipulates that the payment or 
receipt of charges in business transactions between an FIE in China and its 
associated enterprises shall be made in the same manner as the payment or receipt of 
charges in business transactions between independent enterprises (i.e. the arm’s 
length principle).  Where the payment or receipt of charges is not made in the same 
manner as business transactions between independent enterprises and results in a 
reduction of taxable income, the tax authorities shall have the right to make 
reasonable adjustments.  Currently, the adjusting methods include comparable 
uncontrolled price method, resale price method, cost-plus method, and other 
appropria te methods (SAT 1998). China’s transfer pricing regulations in respect to 
the definition of an associated company and burden of proof are similar to those 
introduced by China’s major trading partners including the United States.   
  
5.2.2 Transfer Pricing Audits in China  
Since the early 1990s, transfer pricing audits have been considered one of the 
most important tasks of the Chinese tax authorities.  They find that a large number 
of FIEs use related-party transactions to shift their profits out of China.  According 
to their records, on average, more than 60 percent of FIEs in China reported losses 
during 1996 to 2002.  Despite this, direct foreign investment continues to increase 
rapidly in China.  The SAT believes that many of the loss reporting FIEs manipulate 
their transfer prices to reduce profits reported in China (Chinese Tax News 2002; 
PRN 2003).  To protect government revenues, the SAT puts anti-tax avoidance work 
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as their top priority.  Since China entered the World Trade Organisation in 2001, 
tariff rates have also been rapidly reduced.  The average tariff rate was reduced from 
36 percent in 1995 to 12 percent in 2002 and will be further reduced to 10 percent in 
2005.  As such, the government revenue from tariffs will be decreased.  The SAT is 
required to increase its efforts on transfer pricing audits to collect more tax in order 
to partly compensate for the loss of revenue from tariff reduction.  
In 2001, the Chinese tax authorities increased assessable profits of FIEs by 
US$49 million after transfer pricing audits, which is more than half of the total 
amount adjusted for the previous five years (Chinese Tax News 2002).  Regulations 
which govern information exchange with foreign tax authorities for tax audits were 
issued in 2001.  Under these regulations, Chinese tax officials can exchange data 
and information with other overseas tax authorities where the FIE’s associate 
companies are located.  Such arrangement helps the tax authorities collect audit 
evidence and determine arm’s length prices for transfer pricing audits.  In recent 
years, computerized databases were also set up in different provinces of China to 
facilitate tax auditing.     
How to select audit targets is one of the major concerns of tax authorities.  
Obviously , tax authorities want to collect more tax revenue by auditing the non-
compliant companies.  This study empirically examines how tax and nontax costs 
affect the motivation for transfer pricing manipulation and in turn the probability of 
being selected for transfer pricing audits, given that audit costs incurred by tax 
authorities for auditing different types of FIEs are similar. 
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5.3 TAX AND NONTAX COST TRADE-OFF THEORY 
A growing body of empirical tax research examines the coordination of tax 
and nontax factors in business decisions (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001).  Cloyd 
(1995), Cloyd et al. (1996), and Mills (1998) investigate how expected tax costs of a 
firm are influenced by the probability of being audited by tax authorities and the 
probability of successfully defending tax positions.  Mills and Newberry (2001) 
examine the effect of nontax financial-reporting costs on the book-tax-reporting 
choice.  Chan and Mo (2002) examine the tax and nontax cost trade -off for exporters 
and high-tech companies on book-tax conforming and book-tax difference 
noncompliance.  Hodder et al. (2003) examine how the tax and nontax cost trade -off 
influences commercial banks’ conversion from C-corporation to S-corporation.  
However, these empirical studies do not deal with issue of transfer pricing.  Smith 
(2002) provides an analytical study on transfer pricing dealing with the trade -off 
between tax minimization and managerial performance evaluation.  He finds that 
such trade-off is necessary even if a firm adopts a dual pricing system or uses a non-
profit based performance evaluation method.  My study is different from the 
previous studies mentioned above because I empirically examine transfer pricing 
behavior based on actual tax audit cases and the “tax and nontax cost trade-off” 
theory.  
 
5.3.1 Tax Incentives for Transfer Pricing  
Minimizing global tax liabilities is one of the most important goals of 
transfer pricing.  When there are large differentials in income tax rates among 
countries and a large volume of transfers, the incentive for MNCs to use transfer 
pricing to shift income will be significant (Jacob 1996).  For example, Klassen et al. 
(1993) find evidence of income shifting by MNCs in response to tax rate changes in 
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Canada, Europe and the United States.  They find that with increasing Canadian tax 
rates, MNCs shift income to the United States from Canada, whereas with 
decreasing rates in Europe, they shift income to Europe from the United States.  
Chan and Mo (2000) find that FIEs in a tax-exemption period are less likely to 
underreport taxable income than FIEs in post-holiday and tax-reduction periods, i.e. 
firms reduce their reported income when the tax rate increases.  Although they do 
not specifically investigate transfer pricing issues, their findings generally support 
the income reporting/shifting behavior for tax rate differentials.  In Chapter 4 of my 
thesis, I find that differences in income tax rates and minimization of custom duties 
are important factors affecting MNCs’ transfer pricing decisions in China. 
In China, the enterprise income tax rate is 30 percent with an additional 3 
percent local tax.  The Chinese government offers a basket of tax incentives and 
reductions to FIEs.   For example, a preferential income tax rate of 15 percent is 
granted to FIEs located in special economic zones and in economic and 
technological development zones. For FIEs of a production nature scheduled to 
operate for a period of not less than ten years, an exemption from taxation for the 
first two profit-making years and a 50 percent tax reduction for the following three 
years are granted. With the above generous tax incentives, China’s corporate income 
tax rates applicable to FIEs are lower than those imposed by most of its major 
trading and investing countries like the  United States and Japan (Chan and Chow 
1997b).   Given the low tax rates in China as compared to their home countries, most 
FIEs can shift their profits to China through transfer pricing in order to save global 
tax payments and cash outflows.  However, in practice, many FIEs shift their profits 
out of China due to nontax considerations.   
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5.3.2   Nontax Costs for Transfer Pricing  
Kim and Miller (1979) and Plasschaert (1985) argue that the tax variable 
should not be over-rated in transfer pricing policies in developing countries because 
of the existence of nontax influences in these countries.  Given a particular set of 
environmental characteristics, management needs to achieve various objectives 
through transfer pricing, including maximizing corporate profits, minimizing 
financial risks and taking care of other behavioral and political aspirations.  In 
Chapter 4 of my thesis, I find that important nontax factors affecting transfer pricing 
decisions of FIEs in China include interest of local partners, foreign exchange 
control and risk, and good relationship with host government.  Whether an FIE 
would shift profits out of China depends on its trade -off between tax and nontax 
costs affected by transfer pricing.   From the viewpoint of a developing country, the 
major concern is profits being illega lly shifted out of the country.  This is also a 
focus of my study. 
 
5.3.3 Probability of Tax Audit 
Tax compliance is often modeled as a game between taxpayers and tax 
authorities.  Tax authorities seek to maximize collections of tax revenue net of audit 
costs (Graetz et al. 1986; Reingaum and Wille 1986; Beck and Jung 1989; Sansing 
1993; Rhoades 1999).  Tax authorities first identify companies which are likely to 
evade tax and decide to audit those companies which can maximize the amount that 
can be recovered net of audit costs.  Mills and Sansing (2000) find that tax 
authorities are more likely to audit firms that have a positive book-tax difference 
than firms that have no book-tax differences since a book-tax difference is a cue for 
tax evasion.  Rhoades (1999) suggests that the tax authorities will base their audit 
decisions on the likelihood of misstatement of tax returns and the audit cost.  Tax 
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authorities observe the taxpayer’s reported income in the tax return, and based on 
the likelihood that this reported income misstates the true tax liabilities make a 
decision whether to audit the taxpayer’s report.  To summarize, the probability that a 
company will be selected for audit depends on the likelihood and the possible 
amount of tax evasion, as well as the audit costs.   
 
5.4   HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
5.4.1   Forms of Investment 
Joint ventures are a common form of investment in developing countries 
because it is easier for foreign companies to enter into a new market with the help of 
a local partner, and many developing countries restrict the establishment of wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises, particularly in certain sensitive industries.  There are two 
types of joint ventures in China: equity joint ventures and cooperative joint ventures.  
For equity joint ventures, foreign investors share profits and bear risks with local 
partners in proportion to their equity ownership.  The establishment of a cooperative 
joint venture is based on a contract between the venture partners.  Unlike equity 
joint ventures, Chinese and foreign investors are able to contractually specify their 
profit-sharing ratios, not necessarily according to their proportion of capital 
contributions.  Apart from joint ventures, another common form of business for FIEs 
in China is wholly foreign-owned enterprises. 
Under the Income Tax Law, all FIEs in China are subject to the same tax rate.  
Thus, other things being equal, the tax cost for shifting profits out of China through 
transfer pricing is similar for different forms of investment.  Whether a particular 
form of business in China is more likely to shift profits out would thus depend on 
the nontax cost consideration of transfer pricing manipulation.  
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Relationships with local partners is important for foreign investors of equity 
joint ventures.  Local partners can act as a bridge between the foreign investors and 
local government , and can help to establish effective contacts with the local 
distributors, suppliers, customers, and workers (Ambler and Witzel 2000) . Chinese 
partners are equipped with local market information and have a good relationship 
with the local government.  Up-to-date local market information can help the 
ventures penetrate into the local Chinese market.  Good relationships with the local 
government is helpful to smooth business operations and to negotiate bureaucratic 
hurdles.  This is in part cultural and in part because the legal system in China is not 
as transparent as that in most developed countries (Chan and Jiang 2002).  Chapter 4 
of my thesis finds that relationships with local partners is rated as one of the most 
important variables by management of FIEs for choosing transfer pricing methods.  
Chan and Chow (2001) suggest that transfer pricing manipulation increases the 
conflict between local and foreign partners.  The y find that in order to minimize 
conflicts with local partners over transfer pricing, FIEs having a local partner in 
management are more likely to use market-based transfer pricing methods and are 
less likely to undertake transfer pricing manipulation.   
On the other hand, some studies (Plasschaert 1985; Emmanuel and Mehafdi 
1994) suggest that the existence of a local partner in a joint venture provides an 
inducement for the foreign investors to use transfer pricing to shift profits out.  By 
shifting profits to parent companies, profits reported in China and in turn, the 
amount shared by the local partners of equity joint ventures, is reduced.  However, 
equity joint ventures incur a high political cost for shifting profits out of China 
because most of the local partners of the joint ventures are directly or indirectly 
linked to the central or local governments or their agencies (Chan and Chow 1997b).  
Therefore, manipulation of transfer prices by the foreign partners not only causes a 
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loss of tax revenue for the Chinese government, but also a loss of the government’s 
investment in the ventures.  The Chinese government thus monitors the operations 
of the ventures closely and puts serious effort into protecting their tax revenue and 
investment.  Executives of the local partners are also compensated and evaluated 
based on performance of the joint ventures.  Local executives thus tend to be 
actively involved in transfer pricing decisions to ensure the reasonableness of 
transfer prices such that more objectively determined profits are reported by the 
ventures.  Accordingly, equity joint ventures are less likely to manipulate their 
transfer prices and shift profits out from China due to the high political cost and 
performance evaluation incentives.   
For cooperative joint ventures, many of the local partners may enter into a 
management contract with foreign investors, whereby full management 
responsibility is delegated to the foreign partners who control the production and 
financial functions of business operations.  The local partners provide land and labor 
for the ventures and in turn receive a fixed amount of fees.  Thus, the monitoring 
costs and conflicts with local partners are minimal for cooperative joint ventures as 
long as the foreign partners pay the agreed fees according to the contract.  Some of 
the agreements of cooperative joint ventures also require the foreign partners to 
transfer all their ownership of fixed assets to the Chinese partners at the end of the 
agreement.  Such arrangements create a great inducement for transfer pricing 
manipulation by foreign investors for a quick recovery of their investment (Chan 
and Chow 1997b).  Due to lower monitoring costs and greater inducement for 
manipulating transfer prices, cooperative joint ventures are more likely to 
manipulate their transfer prices and shift their profits out from China than equity 
joint ventures.  Similarly, management of wholly foreign-owned enterprises has 
absolute control of the FIEs.  Compared with equity joint ventures, wholly foreign-
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owned enterprises are not monitored by the local partners.  Therefore, wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises have a higher degree of freedom to manipulate their 
transfer prices and shift their profits out of China to achieve their corporate strategic 
objectives (Emmanuel and Mehafdi 1994).  
In conclusion, equity joint ventures, compared with wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises and cooperative joint ventures, have comparable tax costs but higher 
nontax costs for shifting profits out of China through transfer pricing manipulation 
due to the need for maintaining a good relationship with local partners and 
government, and the monitoring effect of local partners.  Therefore, it is expected 
that wholly foreign-owned enterprises and cooperative joint ventures are more likely 
to shift profits out of China through transfer pricing manipulation.   
For reasons explained above and since local partners of equity joint ventures 
may have good relationships with local governments, tax authorities foresee a 
comparatively lower incentive and necessity to audit them.  Furthermore, the costs 
for auditing equity joint ventures may be higher because the local partners may have 
some political influence on the tax officials which will affect their audit work (Chan 
and Chow 1997b).  On the other hand, some may argue that due to good 
relationships, the local partners would be more willing to provide information to the 
tax authorities for audits which would in turn reduce the audit costs of the tax 
authorities.  However, in normal circumstances, whistle-blowing is unlikely as this 
will be against the economic interests of the local partners.  I believe that on the 
whole, the form of investment does not significantly affect the audit costs of 
investigating transfer pricing.  Therefore, wholly foreign-owned enterprises and 
cooperative joint ventures are more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits 
by the Chinese tax authorities than equity joint ventures because of the higher 
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probability of transfer pricing manipulation.  Accordingly, the following hypothesis 
is formulated. 
Hypothesis 1:  Ceteris paribus, wholly foreign-owned enterprises and 
cooperative joint ventures are more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits 
by the Chinese tax authorities than equity joint ventures. 
 
5.4.2   Activity Orientation 
Foreign investors that establish business operations in China have two 
typical marketing objectives.  One is to take advantage of cost savings in China and 
export goods at more competitive prices to other countries.  The other is to capitalize 
on savings of transportation costs and tariffs for local production in order to 
penetrate the domestic market (Chan and Mo 2002).  Maintaining a favorable  
balance of payments is one of the most important economic objectives for most 
developing count ries due to their need for foreign exchange.  In China, the 
government encourages export activities by FIEs and therefore provides numerous 
supports for export-oriented companies including reduced tax rates, tax refunds, 
simplified customs procedures, reduced land use fees, and other convenient services 
(China Daily 2002).  Raw materials, knock-down components, parts, accessories and 
packaging materials imported for producing exports are exempt from import tariffs 
in China.  In other words, export-oriented FIEs are exempted from import duties for 
materials or parts imported for producing exports.  Therefore, export-oriented FIEs 
can overprice imports to shift profits out from China without the trade -off of paying 
more import tariffs in China.  However, for domestic -market-oriented FIEs, if they 
overprice import materials or parts for production of domestic sales, they need to 
pay a higher amount of tariffs.  As such, the tariff costs of transfer pricing 
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manipulation by domestic-market-oriented FIEs are higher than export-oriented 
FIEs.   
In order to encourage exports, the Chinese government also provides tax 
incentives for  export-oriented FIEs.  For FIEs which export more than 70 percent of 
their total sales , they can enjoy a 50 percent tax reduction in the year they qualify, 
with a minimum tax rate of 10 percent.  However, export -oriented FIEs still have to 
pay the standard tax rate at the time of filing their tax return and receive tax refunds 
only after verification of their total sales and export-sales documents by the Bureau 
of Economic Development.  Chan and Mo (2000, 2002) suggest that the outcome of 
tax refunds is uncertain since many refund requests were rejected because of 
inadequate documentation and sales manipulation.  Therefore, FIEs do not know 
whether they can get the tax refund when they decide the transfer prices during the 
year.  Thus, corporate tax rate differences between export-oriented FIEs and 
domestic-market-oriented FIEs should not significantly affect transfer pricing 
decisions and prof it shifting activities. 
On the other hand, export-oriented FIEs face higher foreign exchange risks 
for keeping profits in China.  FIEs in China that undertake foreign trade are required 
to open a foreign exchange settlement account with a designated bank.  For foreign 
exchange received under the current account, FIEs may retain a certain amount of it 
within the limit prescribed by State Administration of Exchange Control (SAFE).  
Any excess portion must be sold to the designated banks.  When the FIEs need to 
make foreign currency payments, they can draw the required amount from the 
foreign exchange settlement account.  For export-oriented FIEs, as most of their 
products are sold overseas, they are more likely to have a positive balance in the 
foreign exchange settlement account and thus the amount exceeding the limit 
prescribed by the SAFE must be sold to designated banks.  This would then increase 
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the foreign exchange risks of the FIEs.  Therefore, export-oriented FIEs have a 
greater incentive to shift profits out of China by over-pricing imports or under-
pricing exports in order to reduce the balance of the foreign exchange settlement 
account and in turn, reduce the foreign exchange risks.   
Export-oriented FIEs have priority in obtaining loans from the Bank of 
China and other state-owned commercial banks in China (Barale 1988; USDOC 
1999).  Chan and Mo (2002) found that the role of financial statements in obtaining 
financing is reduced for export-oriented FIEs, and thus their nontax cost of 
underreporting book income and shifting profits out of China is lower. 
Compared with domestic -market-oriented FIEs, export-oriented FIEs have a 
more significant volume of inter-affiliate trade (Jacob 1996; Chan and Chow 1998), 
and thus export-oriented FIEs have greater opportunity to manipulate their transfer 
prices.  For domestic -market-oriented FIEs, they need to sell their products in China.  
Thus, they have a particularly important need to maintain good relationships with 
local government and distributors because they rely heavily on the local distribution 
network and local contacts to market their products.  To avoid conflict with local 
government and distributors in transfer pricing issues, domestic -market-oriented 
FIEs are more likely to use market-based transfer pric ing methods (Chan and Chow 
2001).  Therefore, domestic-market-oriented FIEs have less room for manipulating 
their transfer prices.   
In conclusion, export-oriented FIEs have a greater incentive to transfer 
profits out of China to reduce foreign exchange risks.  They also have lower tariff 
costs and nontax costs for reporting lower income in China than domestic -market-
oriented FIEs.  Thus, they are more motivated to evade tax through transfer pricing.  
In addition, export-oriented FIEs are required to submit sales documents to the 
Bureau of Economic Development to substantiate their export sales and total sales 
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(i.e. the 70 percent requirement) in order to claim the tax refund. Since those 
documents have already been verified by the Bureau of Economic Development, this 
reduces the audit costs for tax authorities.  Therefore, the audit cost for auditing 
export-oriented FIEs should be lower than auditing domestic -market-oriented FIEs.  
Hence, I anticipate that export-oriented FIEs have a higher probability of being 
selected for audit by tax authorities.  This expectation is reflected in the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2:  Ceteris paribus, export -oriented FIEs are more likely to be 
selected for transfer pricing audits by the Chinese tax authorities than domestic-
market-oriented FIEs. 
 
5.4.3 Sources of Investment 
The extent of global tax saving that can be obtained by MNCs through 
transfer pricing manipulation depends on the tax rate differentials between the host 
and the home countries.  The major sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
China are Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and the United States, totaling 60 percent of 
FDI in China in 2002 (SSB 2003).  The corporate tax rates of Hong Kong and 
Taiwan are respectively 17.5 percent and 25 percent, which are relatively lower than 
other countries like the United States and Japan (with marginal tax rates of 40 
percent and 42 percent respectively).  Therefore, Hong Kong and Taiwan FIEs 
would incur significantly lower tax costs for shifting profits out of China than other 
countries.  Some may argue that for companies that are subject to global tax with 
full tax credit available, they cannot reduce their global tax liability by shifting 
profits to home countries through transfer pricing.  However, the tax on foreign-
source income typically can be deferred until the income is repatriated to the home 
countries.  Therefore, in practice, the effective tax rate computed in a present value 
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sense for income first taxed in China is typically lower than if the income were first 
taxed in the home countries with higher income tax rates (Klassen et al. 1993).  As 
such, the tax cost for shifting profits out of Mainland China to Hong Kong and 
Taiwan are lower compared with shifting profits to Japan and United States.   
Performance evaluation is also an important consideration for setting transfer 
prices.  Management is less likely to manipulate transfer prices that would adversely 
affect their compensation and performance evaluation even if such decisions are 
beneficial to the companies.  Hong Kong and Taiwan FIEs are often closely held, 
owner-managed family businesses (Liu 1999).  Klassen (1997) finds that high inside 
ownership concentration reduces the need for accurate financial reporting.  
Therefore, Hong Kong and Taiwan FIEs have lower financial reporting costs for 
underreporting profits since they have higher inside ownership structure and can 
efficiently inform shareholders of the companies’ value through channels other than 
financial statements.  In addition, since Hong Kong and Taiwan FIEs are often 
owner-managed or managed by relatives of the owners, the agency problems 
between owners and management are minimal.  Companies’ information including 
the setting of transfer prices and their effect on FIEs’ profits can be efficiently 
communicated from the management to owners, with few information asymmetry 
problems.  Thus, performance evaluation problems and management compensation 
problems which would be caused by transfer pricing manipulation are reduced for 
Hong Kong and Taiwan FIEs.  Given the lower nontax costs, I expect that Hong 
Kong and Taiwan FIEs are more likely to shift profits out of China through transfer 
pricing manipulation.  
In conclusion, Hong Kong and Taiwan sourced FIEs have both lower tax and 
nontax costs for shifting profits out of China through transfer pricing.  In addition, 
auditing Hong Kong and Taiwan sourced FIEs may be easier than auditing other 
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sourced FIEs because of similar items in culture and language.  Audit costs 
including translation costs for auditing Hong Kong and Taiwan sourced FIEs would 
thus be lower.  Networking in Chinese communities should also facilitate 
information exchange.  Therefore, I expect that Hong Kong and Taiwan FIEs are 
more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits by the Chinese tax authorities 
than other FIEs.  The following hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 3:  Ceteris paribus, Hong Kong and Taiwan sourced FIEs are 
more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits than other FIEs. 
 
The comparative tax and nontax costs for shifting profit out of China by 
different types of FIEs are summarized in Table 5.1.  
[Insert Table 5.1 here] 
 
5.5  RESEARCH METHOD 
5.5.1   Data Collection 
I collected the data from tax authorities in coastal China cities where FIEs 
are concentrated.  First, I requested the tax authorities to randomly select FIEs which 
were audited for transfer pricing manipulation.  In total, 111 cases were provided by 
the tax authorities.  All of the firms are in a post-holiday period or do not qualify for 
tax holidays.  Information such as the basis for tax adjustments, form of investment, 
activity orientation, nationality of investors, amount of capital, sales and industry 
were provided by the tax authorities. 
Second, I requested the same tax authorities to randomly select FIEs that 
have been established for more than five years, and have significant related-party 
transactions (i.e. more than 50 percent of their total sales or purchases are sold to or 
purchased from related companies), but which have not been selected for transfer 
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pricing audits.  By selecting FIEs that have been established for more than five years, 
I exclude any FIEs that are newly established in my sample.  Tax authorities may 
have difficulties in targeting newly established FIEs for transfer pr icing audits as 
they do not have a history of the FIEs’ profits and losses for analysis.  In total, I 
collected 194 non-audited FIEs that meet the selection requirements. Similar to the 
audited sample, all of the firms are either in a post-holiday period or do not qualify 
for tax holidays.  Tax authorities provided information on the FIEs’ characteristics 
including form of investment, activity orientation, nationality of investors, amount 
of capital, sales, and industry.  
  
5.5.2 Statistical Model 
For testing my hypotheses, I used a logistic regression model as follows: 
AUDIT = ?0 +?1 FORM +?2 ACTIVITY +?3 SOURCE +?4 INDUSTRY  
+?5 SIZE +?6 ROC + ?7 RPT + ? 
where: 
Dependent Variables: 
Audit   = 1, if an FIE was selected for transfer pricing audit by Chinese tax 
authority, 0 otherwise; 
Policy Variables: 
Form  = 1, if an FIE is an equity joint venture, 0 otherwise; 
Activity  = 1, if an FIE is an export-oriented enterprise, 0 otherwise; 
SOURCE = 1, if an FIE is sourced from Hong Kong or Taiwan, 0 otherwise. 
Control Variables: 
INDUSTRY  = 1, if an FIE is in a industry that has a higher risk of transfer pricing 
manipulation, 0 otherwise; 
SIZE  = natural logarithm of FIE’s sales 
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ROC = return on capital (i.e. profit before tax over total capital of the FIEs) 
RPT = volume of related-party transactions over sales 
 
The dependent variable of the regression is a dichotomous variable to 
identify the FIEs which were selected for transfer pricing audit by the Chinese tax 
authorities 
 
5.5.3 Control Variables  
Prior studies on international transfer pricing in China have found that 
certain specific industrial sectors are more likely to undertake transfer pricing 
manipulation.  Chan and Chow (1997a) reveal that Chinese FIEs in industries of 
audio and video equipment, garment and textile, plastic products and chemicals tend 
to over-price their imports and under-price their exports and thus generally report 
lower profit.  I interviewed six partners or senior managers of the Big Four CPA 
firms who specialized in China tax and transfer pricing.  They also suggested that 
business engaged in certain types of industry like garments and textiles are more 
likely to be selected by the Chinese tax authorities for tax audits.  To control for the 
potential effect of industries on the selection of transfer pricing audits, I introduced 
“INDUSTRY” as a control variable for the regression.  The dummy variable equals 
1 if the FIEs are in the industries identified as having a high opportunity of transfer 
pricing manipulation, and 0 for other industries. 
Large firms usually have more complicated organizational structures than 
small firms, and thus their inter-affiliate transactions are more complicated.  Chan 
and Chow (1997b) suggest that an audit of large MNCs is very costly and requires a 
sophisticated audit unit.  Therefore, audit costs for auditing large firms should be 
significantly higher than for auditing small firms.  I include “SIZE” by taking the 
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natural logarithm of an FIE’s sales as a control variable to control for the potential 
effect of size of business on audit costs and the selection of transfer pricing audits by 
the Chinese tax authorities.   
I also include a control variable “ROC” to control for the effect of 
profitability of FIEs on the probability of being audited, as FIEs with persistent 
losses or low profitability are more likely to be selected for audit.  I use a variable 
“RPT”, which is the ratio of the volume of related-party transactions to sales to 
control for its effect on the probability of being audited.  Tax incentive for profit-
shifting depends on the volume of related-party transactions (Jacob 1996).  The 
higher the volume of related-party transactions, the higher the tax incentive and the 
higher the possible amount of tax evasion.  Although the audit costs for auditing 
firms with high proportion of inter -affiliate trades may be higher, I expect that FIEs 
with high proportion of related-party transactions are more likely to be audited.  This 
is because the amount can be recovered net of audit costs for FIEs with higher 
proportion of related-party transactions would be larger than those with low 
proportion of related-party transactions. 
 
5.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.2 provides descriptive statistics for the firm attributes of the 111 
FIEs which were selected for in -depth transfer pricing audits and 194 FIEs which 
were not selected for transfer pricing audits.  The table shows that 86.5 percent of 
the FIEs in the audited sample are wholly foreign-owned enterprises and cooperative 
joint ventures, 91.0 percent are export -oriented enterprises, and 82.9 percent are 
sourced from Hong Kong or Taiwan.  Table 5.2 also provides the results of 
univariate tests for the comparison of distributions and means between the audited 
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sample and non-audited sample.  I find that wholly foreign-owned enterprises, 
cooperative joint ventures, export-oriented FIEs and Hong Kong and Taiwan 
sourced FIEs are more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits.  The results 
are consistent with my hypotheses and are similar to Chan and Chow (1997b)’s 
findings which report that wholly foreign-owned enterprises, cooperative joint 
ventures and Hong Kong sourced FIEs are more likely to be audited, but they do not 
study activity orientation.  For the control variables, I find that FIEs in identified 
higher risk industries, firms with larger volume of sales, and firms have a higher 
proportion of related-party transactions to sales are more likely to be selected for 
transfer pricing audits. As related-party transactions include inter-affiliate purchases, 
sales, loans and management fees, the mean “RPT” for the audited sample is 1.34 
which is higher than sales.  
[Insert Table 5.2 here] 
 
5.6.2 Logistic Regression 
Table 5.3 reports logistic regression results for the likelihood that an FIE 
with different firm characteristics will be selected for transfer pricing audits by the 
Chinese tax authorities.  Overall, the model correctly predicts 87.2 percent of the 
selection for transfer pricing audits.  The results of logistic regression confirm that 
form of investment and activity orientation are significant corporate attributes 
affecting the probability of being selected for transfer pricing audits in China.  The 
signs of the coefficients are consistent with my hypotheses.  Specifically, 
cooperative joint ventures, wholly foreign owned FIEs, and export -oriented FIEs 
have lower nontax costs for shifting profits out of China and this contributes to a 
higher probability of being selected for transfer pricing audits by the Chinese tax 
authorities.  Smaller firms and firms with a larger proportion of related-party 
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transactions are also more likely to be selected for transfer pricing audits because of 
lower audit costs for auditing smaller firms, and greater incentives or more 
opportunities for transfer pricing manipulation for firms that have a higher 
proportion of related-party transactions.  However, my multivariate analysis did not 
find that the source of investment significantly affects the probability of being 
selected for transfer pricing audits. Variance inflation factors are all less than 2, 
meaning that multi-collinear ity is unlikely to affect my inferences.   
[Insert Table 5.3 here] 
 
I conducted additional tests to check the robustness of the regression results.  
First, I changed the variable “SOURCE” from signifying “Hong Kong and Taiwan 
source FIEs” to “Hong Kong FIEs” to see whether a different tax system would 
affect my results since Hong Kong charges corporate taxes only on local sourced 
income.  Second, I replaced the variable “ROC” by a variable “PROFIT” which is 
defined as net profit before tax over sales.  Third, I replaced the “ROC” variable by 
a dummy variable representing whether the FIEs report losses or profits in their 
accounts, and fourth, by a dummy variable representing whether the FIEs have 
consistent losses or low profitability.  Fifth, I replaced sales volume by registered 
capital for controlling the firm size.  Sixth, I changed the definition of “RPT” to the 
natural logarithm of the volume of related-party transactions.  Seventh, I included a 
dummy variable of the choice of transfer pricing method in the model.  Eighth, I 
included an interaction term of “EXPORT” and “RPT” in the model.  Ninth, I 
excluded six audited cases which involved in transfer of intangible in the regression.  
The results of the above sensitivity tests are similar to the results of the original 
model, except in (i) the second and forth tests where the significant level of the 
variable “FORM” changes from 5 percent to 10 percent, (ii) in the fifth test, where 
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the control variable “RPT” becomes insignificant and “ROC” becomes signif icant at 
the 5 percent level, and (iii) in the eighth test, the significant level of the variable 
“EXPORT” changes from 5 percent to 10 percent.   
 
5.7  CONCLUSION 
This study investigates empirically the relationship between firm 
characteristics of FIEs in C hina and the probability of being selected for transfer 
pricing audits based on a modified tax and nontax cost trade -off theory.  I found that 
equity joint ventures and domestic-market-oriented FIEs have higher nontax cost 
than their counterparts for shifting profits out of China through manipulating 
transfer prices mainly because of the need to keep a good relationship with local 
partners and government.  Export-oriented FIEs also have higher tax benefits for 
shifting profits out of China than domestic-market-oriented FIEs because of 
exemption of import tariffs for export goods.  Thus, wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises, cooperative joint ventures and export-oriented FIEs are more likely to 
manipulate their transfer prices and shift their profits out of China to achieve their 
strategic objectives.  My empirical results are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions.   
My study is useful for tax authorities in developing economies as it provides 
evidence on how firm characteristics affect tax and nontax costs of shifting profits 
out of a developing economy.  These findings should be useful for the tax authorities 
in these economies in designing tailor -made tax audit guidelines and in the selection 
of transfer pricing audit targets.  A study of tax and nontax costs involved in 
international transfer pricing manipulation allows us to understand more about the 
incentives and disincentives for MNCs to comply with transfer pricing regulations.  
Public policy makers should then design legislation to increase incentives for 
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compliance or reduce disincentives.  For example, policy makers should set policies 
which would reduce the foreign exchange risks and thus the incentive to shift profits 
out of China by export -oriented FIEs.  Management of MNCs can also gain a better 
understanding of how firm characteristics affect their transfer pricing decisions in 
China. 
Finally, for academic research, this study provides new insight on how the tax 
and nontax cost trade-off theory can explain the way management balances the often 
conflicting transfer pricing objectives and the probability of MNCs being audited on 
transfer pricing.  It helps researchers in assessing the suitability and robustness of 
the tax and nontax cost theory in explaining tax audits on international transfer 
pricing.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This thesis provides comprehensive analysis of international transfer pricing in 
China.  It extends prior studies by examining how management’s perception of the 
relative importance of environmental variables affects the ir choice of transfer 
pricing methods within a developing economy framework.  This thesis also provides 
the first tax compliance study based on tax audits on MNCs, examining empirically 
how the tax and nontax cost tradeoff affects international transfer pricing decisions. 
The results reveal that management perception of nontax factors, namely, 
interests of local partners, foreign exchange control and risks , and good relationships 
with local government, are important in discriminating between choices of transfer 
pricing methods.  I also find that wholly foreign-owned enterprises, cooperative 
joint ventures and export -oriented FIEs are more likely to manipulate their transfer 
prices and shift their profits out from China to achieve their strategic objectives.  
The empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions.  Future research 
can investigate the related-party transactions entered between the management and 
the companies themselves, which are very common in developed countries.  Studies 
on the transfer pricing issues between Chinese state-owned enterprises and their 
listed companies should also be contributory.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
Prior studies examined the transfer pricing methods commonly used by 
MNCs in developed countries and the role of certain important environmental 
variables in their transfer pricing considerations.  The perceived importance of 
environmental variables reflects management’s trade -off on a number of conflicting 
objectives of transfer pricing, and thus influences their decisions on choosing among 
transfer pricing methods.  My thesis extends prior studies by examining how 
management’s perception of the relative importance of various environmental 
variables affects their choice of transfer pricing methods in China under a 
developing economy framework.  The analysis of my data reveals that 
management’s perception of three environmental variables, namely, the interests of 
local partners, foreign exchange control, and the maintenance of a good relationship 
with the host government are significant to discriminate FIEs’ choice of transfer 
pricing methods.  The more important the management perceives the interest of 
local partners and the maintenance of a good relationship with the host government, 
the more likely that an FIE will use a market-based transfer pricing method.  The 
more important the management perceives foreign exchange controls, the more 
likely a cost-based transfer pricing method will be used.  Overall, there is a moderate 
agr eement between US and non-US FIEs on the relative importance of the 
environmental variables studied.    
In addition, my thesis provides the first tax compliance study based on tax 
audits of MNCs, examining empirically how the tax and nontax cost trade -off 
affects international transfer pricing.  The analysis of my data reveals that wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises, cooperative joint ventures and export-oriented FIEs are 
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more likely to manipulate their transfer prices and shift their profits out of China to 
achieve respective strategic objectives.  Equity joint ventures and domestic -market-
oriented FIEs have higher nontax costs than their counterparts for shifting profits out 
of China through manipulating transfer prices mainly because of the need to keep a 
good relationship with local partners and government.  Export-oriented FIEs also 
have higher tax benefits for shifting profits out of China than domestic -market-
oriented FIEs mainly because of the exemption of import tariffs for export goods.   
 
6.2 IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of this thesis are of particular relevance to developing countries 
in enhancing our understanding of environmental influences on transfer pricing 
decisions, and thus contribute to the building of a more comprehensive theoretical 
framework of transfer pricing in developing economies.  Results of this study should 
also have significant implications for tax authorities as well as foreign investors 
operating in China and other developing economies.  The results should help tax 
authorities to tackle the tax audit problems more effectively and in setting auditing 
guidelines on related-party transactions.  For example, given the low nontax costs of 
shifting profits out of China by export -oriented FIEs, tax authorities can set audit 
priority for investigating this type of FIEs.  In addition, my research results should 
help foreign investors to have a better understanding of the tax and nontax factors 
for transfer pricing decisions in China.  For example, management can consider the 
relative importance of these factors in setting or revising their transfer pricing 
policies.  This research should be of interest to academic researchers interested in 
international accounting as it contributes to building a more comprehensive theory 
of environmental influences on international transfer pricing.  This research is also 
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the first study to provide an empirical assessment based on tax audits of the tax and 
nontax cost trade-off theory as it applies to international transfer pricing.   
 
6.3 LIMITATIONS 
A limitation of this study is that the data as summarized in Chapter 4 was 
collected based on a convenience sample of FIEs rather than a random sample, as 
FIEs in China would not normally grant interviews on sensitive issues like transfer 
pricing without prior per sonal contacts.  In addition, as China is unique due to its 
rapid economic growth rate and large population, the findings of this research 
should not be generalized to other developing countries without considering the 
business environment of each country.   Having said that, China is essentially a 
developing country and is classified as such by the IMF (2003).  Therefore, the 
findings of this research should be considered as a useful reference tool for other 
developing economies in enhancing their understanding of MNC’s transfer pricing 
behaviors.  For example, countries that have similar forms of investment as China 
can make a reference on how different types of investment affect transfer pricing 
compliance.   
 
6.4 FUTURE EXTENSIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
My study mainly focuses on international transfer pricing for inter -company 
transactions (i.e. the transactions between parent companies and subsidiaries, and 
transactions among the subsidiaries).  Future research can investigate related-party 
transactions between companies and their management.  This type of related-party 
transaction is very common in developed countries.  For example, Apple Computer 
Inc. paid its chief executive Steven Jobs nearly US$1.2 million to reimburse him for 
costs he incurred using his personal jet on company business in 2001 and 2002.  
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Actually, many US companies have side deals involving private planes of their 
executives.  Ford Motor Co. paid two of its directors hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in consulting fees (Emshwiller 2003).  These are just a few examples of this 
type of related-party transaction.  Such transactions introduce conflicts of interest 
since management is acting on behalf of the shareholders, but at the same time, they 
are also involved in business transactions with the companies.  Management of the 
holding companies often have business deals with the company’s subsidiaries in 
other jurisdictions.  In many cases, these transactions cross national boundaries.  
Future research can analyze the extent of this type of related-party transaction in 
China and Hong Kong, how agency theory can be applied to explain this type of 
transaction, and how these transactions affect stock returns. 
Future research can also investigate transfer pricing issues in Chinese state-
owned enterpr ises (SOEs).  China implemented the SOE reforms in the 1990s.  
Many SOEs organized their operations into profit centers and introduced 
performance-based reward systems.  There are numerous transactions between these 
profit centers.  The centers that performed well were allowed to raise capital in the 
security markets.  Thus, policies of intra-firm transfers become a significant issue 
for China.  Future research can study how the management of SOEs decides on their 
transfer pricing methods, and analyze the factors which have a potential influence on 
their transfer pricing decisions.  Strictly speaking, this type of transaction mainly 
involves domestic transfer pricing.  However, SOEs often have overseas subsidiaries 
including those in Hong Kong and some are listed companies in China, Hong Kong 
and overseas.  Therefore, international transfer pricing can be an important variable 
in affecting capital market behaviors for Chinese listed companies. 
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Table 1.1 
Average Annual Percentage Growth of Real GDP 
 
Countries/ 
Region  
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Projection 
Average 
1993-2002 
World 2.2 3.7 3.7 4.1 4.3 2.8 3.6 4.7 2.3 3.0 3.2 3.4 
G-7 countries 1.3 3.1 2.4 2.0 2.7 2.5 2.7 3.5 1.2 1.4 1.5 2.3 
US 2.7 4.0 2.7 3.6 4.4 4.3 4.1 3.8 0.3 2.4 2.2 3.2 
Germany -1.1 2.3 1.7 0.8 1.4 2.0 2.0 2.9 0.6 0.2 0.5 1.3 
Japan 0.5 1.0 1.8 3.5 1.9 -1.1 0.2 2.8 0.4 0.3 0.8 1.1 
China 13.5 12.6 10.5 9.6 8.8 7.8 7.1 8.0 7.3 8.0 7.5 9.3 
 
Source: IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2001, 2003. World Economic Outlook. Washington D.C.: IMF.  
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Table 1.2  
Value and Annual Growth of China’s Foreign Trade 
 
 Total Trade Export  Import  
 Value 
(US$bn) 
Growth (%) Ranking in 
the world  
Value 
(US$bn) 
Growth (%) Value 
(US$bn) 
Growth (%) 
1993  195.70 18.2 11 91.74 8.0 103.96 29.0 
1994  236.62 20.9 11 121.01 31.9 115.61 11.2 
1995  280.85 18.7 11 148.77 22.9 132.08 14.2 
1996  289.90 3.2 11 151.07 1.5 138.83 5.1 
1997  325.16 12.2 11 182.79 21.0 142.37 2.5 
1998  324.05 -0.3 11 183.81 0.6 140.24 -1.5 
1999  360.63 11.3 9 194.93 6.0 165.70 18.2 
2000  474.29 31.5 7 249.20 27.8 225.09 35.8 
2001  509.76 7.5 6 266.15 6.8 243.61 8.2 
2002  620.77 21.8 4 325.60 22.3 295.17 21.2 
2003  851.21 37.1 5 438.37 34.6 412.84 39.9 
 
Source: SSB (State Statistical Bureau). 2003. China Statistical Yearbook 2003. Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House.  
United nations. 2000, 2003. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (Nov 2000, Oct 2003). New York: United Nations.  
2003 data from www.mofcom.gov.cn 
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Table 1.3 
The Top Ten Largest Recipients of Direct Foreign Investment in the World 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Ranking Countries US$M  Countries US$M Countries US$M Countries US$M Countries US$M  Countries US$M 
1 US 103 398 US 174 434 US 283 376 US 300 912 US 124 435 Luxembourg* 125,660 
2 China 44 237 UK 74 324 Belgium and 
Luxembourg 
133 059 Belgium and 
Luxembourg 
245 561 UK 53 799 China 52,700 
3 UK 33 229 China 43 751 UK 87 973 Germany 195 122 France 52 623 France 51,505 
4 France 23 174 Netherlands 36 964 Sweden 60 850 UK 116 552 Belgium and 
Luxembourg 
50 996 Germany 38,033 
5 Brazil 18 993 France  30 984 Germany  54 754 Canada 66 617 Netherlands 50 471 US 30,030 
6 Mexico 14 044 Brazil 28 856 France 47 070 Hong Kong 61 938 China 46 846 Netherlands 29,182 
7 Germany 12 244 Germany 24 593 Netherlands 47 289 Netherlands 52 453 Germany  31 833 UK 24,945 
8 Belgium and 
Luxembourg 
11 998 Canada 22 809 China 40 319 China 40 772 Mexico 24 731 Spain 21,193 
9 Canada 11 527 Belgium and 
Luxembourg 
22 691 Brazil 28 578 Spain 37 523 Hong Kong 22 834 Canada 20,595 
10 Hong Kong 11 368 Sweden 19 564 Canada 24 435 Brazil 32 779 Brazil 22 457 Ireland 19,033 
 
Source: UNCTC (United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporation). 2002, 2003. World Investment Report. New York: United Nations 
Note: It is estimated that about 80% of the FDI inflow in Luxembourg in 2003 is transshipped investment which have little economic impact in the country.
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Table 1.4  
Import and Export by Foreign Investment Enterprises in China 
 
 Total Trade  Export Import 
 Value 
(US$bn) 
Growth 
(%) 
Value 
(US$bn) 
% of 
China’s total 
export  
Growth 
(%) 
Value 
(US$bn) 
% of 
China’s total 
import 
Growth 
(%) 
1993 67.07 53.4 25.24 27.5 45.4 41.83 40.2 58.6 
1994 87.64 30.7 34.71 28.7 37.5 52.93 45.8 26.5 
1995 109.82 25.3 46.88 31.5 35.1 62.94 47.7 18.9 
1996 137.11 24.8 61.51 40.7 31.2 75.6 54.5 20.1 
1997 152.62 11.3  74.90 41.0 21.8   77.72 54.6 2.8 
1998 157.68 3.3   80.96 44.0 8.1      76.72 54.7 -1.3 
1999 174.51 10.7   88.63 45.5 9.5   85.88 51.8 11.9 
2000 236.71 35.6 119.44 47.9 34.8 117.27 52.1 36.6 
2001 259.10 9.5 133.24 50.1 11.6 125.86 51.7 7.3 
2002 330.23 27.5 169.99 52.2 27.6 160.25 54.3 27.3 
2003 472.25 43.0 240.34 54.8 41.4 231.91 56.2 44.7 
 
Source: SSB (State Statistical Bureau). 1997, 2000, 2003. China Statistical Yearbook. Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House. 
2003 data from www.mofcom.gov.cn  
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Table 2.1  
Prior Empirical Research on International Transfer Pricing in Developed Economies 
 
Article Methodology Sample Objective of Study  Major Results 
Tang and Chan 
(1979) 
Questionnaire 
survey 
76 US companies in 
the Fortune 500 and 
Fortune Second 500; 
and 50 Japanese 
companies in the 
President Directory 
Rate the importance of 
different environmental 
variables on transfer pricing 
decisions. 
Five environmental variables rated as most important by US firms are 
overall profit to the company, restrictions on repatriation of profits, 
competitive position of foreign subsidiaries, differentials in income tax 
rates and income tax legislation among countries, and performance 
evaluation of foreign subsidiaries. Five environmental variables rated as 
most important by Japanese firms are overall profit to the company, 
competitive position of foreign subsidiaries, devaluation and revaluation 
in countries where the company has operations, restrictions on 
repatriation of profits imposed by foreign countries, and performance 
evaluation of foreign subsidiaries.  Variables most able to discriminate 
between US and Japan are interest of local partners, devaluation and 
revaluation of foreign currencies, antidumping legislation, import 
restrictions imposed by foreign countries, and differentials in income tax 
rates and income tax legislation among countries.  
 
Burns (1980) Questionnaire 
survey 
62 US-based MNCs 
in Fortune 500 
Examine the importance of 
various environmental 
variables on transfer pricing 
by asking the financial 
executives to rate the 
variables. 
Market conditions in foreign countries, competition in foreign countries, 
reasonable profit for foreign affiliates, US federal income taxes, and 
economic conditions in foreign countries are rated as most important 
environmental variables among the others.   
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Table 2.1 (cont.) 
Prior Empirical Research on International Transfer Pricing in Developed Economies  
 
Article Methodology Sample Objective of Study  Major Results 
Tang (1981) Questionnaire 
survey and 
interviews 
145 US MNCs, 102 
Japanese MNCs, 192 
Canadian MNCs, and 
80 UK MNCs 
Rate the importance of 
different environmental 
variables and test whether 
there is significant difference 
on the importance of these 
variables for different 
nations. 
Overall profits to the company and the competitive position of 
subsidiaries in foreign countries are considered the most important 
variables by all four national groups.  The interests of local partners in 
foreign subsidiaries is ranked substantially higher by UK and Japanese 
firms than by Canadian and US companies.  Compared with the other 
national groups, Japanese companies place significantly greater 
importance on the devaluation and revaluation of foreign currencies. 
 
Mostafa et al. 
(1984) 
Questionnaire 
survey 
46 UK companies  Examine whether there is 
significant difference in the 
importance of environmental 
variables for the firms using 
different transfer pricing 
methods. 
The perceived importance of the 20 environmental variables selected 
including overall profit of the company, divisional autonomy, and 
compliance with foreign tax and tariff regulations are significantly 
relates to the international transfer pricing methods used.  
 
Borkowski 
(1992) 
Questionnaire 
survey 
247 US MNCs in the 
Fortune 500 or the 
Business Week 1000 
Examine whether 
organizational characteristics 
and environmental factors 
affect the choice of transfer 
pricing methods.  
The choice of a transfer pricing method is affected by specific 
organizational and environmental characteristics, but not upon the 
nature of the transfer.  Stability and favorableness of the parent 
company’s economic circumstances are significant environmental 
factors which would affect transfer pricing decisions. 
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Table 2.1 (cont.) 
Prior Empirical Research on International Transfer Pricing in Developed Economies 
 
Article Methodology Sample Objective of Study  Major Results 
Klassen et al 
(1993) 
Financial 
statement 
data from 
annual reports 
191 US MNCs Evaluate changes in the 
reporting of taxable income 
by US MNCs in response to 
the changes in income tax 
rates. 
 
With increasing Canadian tax rates, MNCs shift income to the United 
States from Canada, whereas with decreasing rates in Europe, they shift 
income to Europe from the United States. 
Tang (1993) Questionnaire 
survey 
78 US companies in 
Fortune 500 
Rate the importance of 
different environmental 
variables on transfer pricing 
decisions. 
 
Overall profit to the company is the most important environmental 
variables for US MNCs’ transfer pricing decisions.  Compared with 
Tang (1979), management ranked differentials in income tax rates and 
income tax legislation among countries, maintaining good relationship 
with host governments, the need of subsidiaries in foreign countries to 
seek local funds, and antitrust leg islation of foreign countries as more 
important on transfer pricing decisions. 
 
Cravens and 
Shearon (1996) 
Questionnaire 
survey 
82 US MNCs Examine how transfer pricing 
policies affect financial 
results. 
Number of countries of operations and the dollar value of transfers are 
significant factors to explain the total tax burden of MNCs.  Value of 
transfers and the foreign sales percentage have an effect on the financial 
outcomes of the firm as measured by return of assets. 
 
Jacob (1996) Financial 
statement 
data from 
annual reports 
260 US firms for the 
period of 1982-1984 
and 289 US firms for 
the period of 1988-
1990 
 
Investigate the relationships 
between the volume of 
intrafirm sales, differential of 
tax rates and tax payments. 
Firms with substantial intrafirm transfers paid lower global taxes, lower 
US taxes in the period of 1982-1984 (i.e. when foreign tax rates were 
lower than US tax rates) and higher US taxes in the period of 1988-1990 
(i.e. when US tax rates were lower than foreign tax rates). 
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Table 2.1 (cont.) 
Prior Empirical Research on International Transfer Pricing in Developed Economies 
 
Article Methodology Sample Objective of Study  Major Results 
Borkowski 
(1997a) 
Questionnaire 
survey 
39 Japanese MNCs 
and 28 US MNCs 
Examine whether 
organization factors, 
environmental factors and 
financial factors would affect 
the choice of transfer pricing 
methods. 
 
The choice of transfer pricing methods is affected by differences in 
environmental and financial factors, but not by organization factors.  
Environmental variables including the risk of audits by tax authorities 
and the market conditions in subsidiary countries have significant 
impact on the choice of transfer pricing methods. 
 
Borkowski 
(1997b) 
Questionnaire 
survey 
28 Canadian MNCs 
with US subsidiaries 
and 62 US MNCS 
with Canadian 
subsidiaries 
 
Examine the importance of 
different environmental 
variables on transfer pricing 
decisions. 
Canadian and US MNCs have similar views on the importance of 
different environmental variables on transfer pricing decisio ns. 
Economic conditions of Canadian and risk of audits by US tax 
authorities are significant factors affecting the choice of transfer pricing 
methods. 
Oyelere and 
Emmanuel 
(1998) 
Financial 
statement 
data from 
annual reports 
36 foreign-controlled 
enterprises operating 
in the UK and 36 
UK-controlled 
enterprises 
Examine the possible use of 
international transfer pricing 
as an income shifting 
mechanism by foreign-
controlled enterprises 
operating in the UK.  
 
Foreign-controlled enterprises have lower profitability and higher 
dividend distribution than UK-controlled enterprises.  This provides 
evidence that foreign-controlled enterprises in UK shift income through 
international transfer pricing. 
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Table 2.1 (cont.) 
Prior Empirical Research on International Transfer Pricing in Developed Economies 
 
Article Methodology Sample Objective of Study  Major Results 
Conover and 
Nichols (2000) 
Financial 
statement 
data from 
annual reports 
490 US firms for the 
period of 1982-1984 
and 657 US firms for 
the period of 1988-
1990 
Evaluate the effect of firm 
size on income shifting 
between tax jurisdictions 
through the use of transfer 
prices both before and after 
the passage of the US Tax 
Reform Act of 1986. 
 
Smaller and financially distressed firms are less likely to shift income 
through transfer pricing than larger firms. 
Kachelmeier 
and Towry 
(2002) 
Experimental 
study 
48 MBA students Examine whether the 
expectations of fairness-
based price concessions 
extend to the actual prices 
that result from real-cash 
negotiation by using an 
experimental study.  
. 
Expectations of fairness-based price concessions do not survive actual 
negotiations when participants negotiate over a computer network with 
no communication other than bids, asks, and acceptances.  Conversely, 
both expectations and ac tual negotiated outcomes reflect fairness-based 
price concessions when participants negotiate in a face-to-face setting 
with unrestricted communication. 
Tang (2002) Questionnaire 
survey 
95 US MNCs in 
Fortune 1000 
Rate the importance of 
different environmental 
variables on transfer pricing 
decisions. 
 
Transfer pricing regulations and other tax rules in the United States is 
the most important variable for ranking transfer pricing decisions, 
followed by overall profit to the company. 
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Table 2.2   
Prior International Transfer Pricing Research in Developing Economies  
 
Article Methodology Sample Objective of Study  Major Results 
Lall (1973) Empirical 
study 
Import data of 14 
foreign firms in 
Colombia 
Provide evidence on the use 
of transfer pricing in 
Colombia. 
MNCs in Colombia over -priced their imports by 33 percent to 300 
percent in the pharmaceutical sector, and by 24 percent to 81 percent in 
the rubber and electrical industries. 
 
Kim and Miller 
(1979) 
Empirical 
study 
Questionnaire survey 
of 30 US parent firms 
with at least one 
subsidiary in two of 
the eight specified 
countries (i.e. Korea, 
Malaysia, 
Philippines, Taiwan, 
Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru) 
 
Investigate the effect of 
environmental variables on 
transfer pricing decisions of 
MNCs in developing 
countries. 
Profit repatriation restrictions and exchange control within the foreign 
subsidiary country are most important for transfer pricing decisions in 
these developing countries.  The tax variables, that is, income tax 
liability within the host country and within the US only rank the fifth 
and the sixth.  
Natke (1985) Empirical 
study 
Import data of 141 
manufacturing firms 
operating in Brazil 
Investigate whether MNCs 
pay higher import prices than 
Brazillian firms due to 
transfer pricing manipulation. 
 
MNCs pay higher prices on imports than local firms and the prices of 
MNCs’ imports also exhibit greater variability. 
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Table 2.2 (cont.)  
Prior International Transfer Pricing Research in Developing Economies  
 
Article Methodology Sample Objective of Study  Majo r Results 
Plasschaert 
(1985) 
Analytical 
study 
N/A Explore whether policies and 
regulations in less developed 
countries are such that the 
temptations for the MNCs to 
practice transfer pricing 
manipulation are stronger 
than is the case in more 
developed countries. 
Less developed countries typically impose more restrictions on the 
MNCs than is the case in more developed countries.  Import duties and 
exchange controls are also important environmental variables to induce 
transfer pricing manipulation in less developed countries.  Moreover, 
less developed countries generally have fewer measures to uncover and 
to redress transfer pricing manipulation since they are less well 
equipped for the task.  Therefore, inducements for MNCs to resort to 
transfer pricing manipulation in developing countries are stronger than 
in developed countries.   
 
Rahman and 
Scapens (1986) 
Empirical 
study 
Import data of 20 
MNCs in Bangladesh 
Determine whether MNCs in 
Bangladesh price imports 
from related sources at higher 
prices. 
 
MNCs over-priced imports from affiliates by between 78 percent and 
600 percent. 
Chan and Chow 
(1997a) 
Empirical 
study 
238 imported 
commodities and 
1,062 exported 
commodities  
Provide evidence that foreign 
investors shift profits out of 
China by the transfer pricing 
mechanism. 
MNCs in China over-priced imports and under -priced exports in the 
audit/video equipment, garment, plastic and chemicals industries. 
 
 126 
Table 2.3  
Prior Research on Tax Compliance  
 
Article Methodology Sample Objective of Study Major Results Rationale for the results Significance and 
Implication 
Mills (1998) Empirical 
study 
1500 manufacturing 
firms in 
Coordinated 
Examination 
Program of US IRS 
Examine whether firms 
can manage tax and 
financial accounting 
income separately (i.e. no 
trade-off betw een tax and 
financial reporting). 
IRS proposed audit 
adjustments increase as the 
excess of book income 
over taxable income 
increases. 
GAAP tend to be conservative.  But 
the primary role of tax legislation is 
revenue-raising.  Certain provisions 
of the tax law are designed to 
increase revenues and decrease 
deductions.  Thus, the more book 
income exceeds taxable income, the 
stronger the evidence the IRS may 
have that the firm has been aggressive 
in its tax reporting. 
 
Firms cannot manage tax 
and financial accounting 
income separately and 
cannot have unlimited 
level of book-tax 
differences. 
Chan and 
Chow (1997b) 
Empirical 
study 
81 FIEs being 
audited by Chinese 
tax authorities on 
related-party 
transactions in early 
1990s 
Examine whether certain 
FIEs are more li kely to be 
selected for transfer 
pricing audits by tax 
authorities using univariate 
analysis 
Higher proportion of 
wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises, cooperative 
joint ventures and Hong 
Kong sourced FIEs are 
selected for transfer 
pricing audits. 
 
Wholly foreign-owned enterprises 
and cooperative joint ventures have 
more freedom on transfer pricing 
decisions due to the lack of local 
partners in the management. 
Firm characteristics affect 
the probability of being 
selected for transfer 
pricing audits. 
Chan and Mo 
(2000) 
Empirical 
study 
585 FIEs being 
audited by Chinese 
tax authorities, but 
excludes transfer 
pricing audits 
Examine how the tax-
holiday position affects 
noncompliance in China. 
Companies are least 
compliant before entering 
a tax holiday, and most 
compliant while in tax-
exemption period 
FIEs have incentives to exaggerate 
losses during the pre-holiday period 
to delay the start of tax holiday and 
thus they are lest compliant.  FIEs are 
most ompliant while in tax-exemption 
period because FIEs do not have an 
incentive to evade tax since they are 
exempted from tax. 
 
Tax rates and tax 
incentives affect firms’ 
tax noncompliance 
behavior. 
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Table 2.3 (cont.) 
Prior Research on Tax Compliance  
 
Article Methodology Sample Objective of Study Major Results Rationale for the results Significance and 
Implication 
Chan and Mo 
(2002) 
Empirical 
study 
256 tax audits in 
China, excluding 
transfer pricing 
audits 
Examine the tax and 
nontax cost trade-off for 
exporters and high-tech 
companies when they 
under-report both book 
and taxable incomes. 
Export -oriented and high -
tech firms have larger 
book-tax-conforming tax 
audit adjustments than 
domestic-market-oriented 
and non-high -tech firms.  
Domestic-market-oriented 
and non-high -tech firms 
have larger book-tax 
difference adjustments. 
Export-oriented FIEs have special tax 
incentives and priority in obtaining 
loans.  Thus, they have greater tax 
benefits and lower nontax costs of 
underreporting book and tax incomes.  
High-tech FIEs have less reliance on 
reported profits for performance 
evaluation and obtaining loans.  Thus, 
they have lower nontax costs of 
underreporting book and tax incomes. 
Firm characteristics affect 
firms’ tax noncompliance 
behavior. 
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Table 2.4  
Prior Research on Tax and Nontax Cost Trade -off Theory 
 
Article Methodology Sample Objective of Study Major Results Rationale for the results Significance and 
Implication 
Cloyd (1995)  Experimental 
study  
72 experienced tax 
professionals in US 
Examine the effects of tax 
and financial accounting 
conformity on the tax 
preparers’ 
recommendations of tax 
treatment. 
Book-tax conformity 
increases tax preparers’ 
subjective probabilities of 
successfully defending 
aggressive tax positions 
and thus more of them 
would recommend 
aggressive tax treatment. 
Taxpayers need to disclose 
inconsistencies between financial and 
tax accounting treatments.  IRS audit 
guidelines instruct examiners to 
reconcile taxable income from book 
income.  Thus, preparers may believe 
that large book-tax difference will 
alert the IRS.  Besides, financial 
accounting choice should reflect the 
facts and circumstances.  Therefore, it 
is more difficult to defend for book-
tax different treatments.  
Book-tax conformity 
reduces tax audit costs 
predicted by tax 
preparers. 
Cloyd et al. 
(1996) 
Empirical 
study 
Questionnaire 
survey from 600 
financial executives 
of public and 
private firms in US 
Examine whether 
management is more likely 
to choose conformity when 
expected tax savings 
increase and less likely to 
choose conformity for 
public firms. 
Conformity is more likely 
if the probabilities of 
successfully defending the 
aggressive tax position can 
be increased.  Public-firm 
managers are less likely to 
choose book-tax 
conformity than private-
firm managers. 
Conformity increases expected tax 
saving by increasing the probabilities 
of successfully defending tax 
positions.  However, conformity 
results in lower reported profits and 
this would increase nontax costs (eg. 
debt covenant violations, reduced 
compensation, perceived negative 
capital market consequences).  The 
expected tax savings must be 
balanced against the nontax costs.  
Public firms face higher levels of 
nontax costs and thus they are less 
likely to choose conformity.   
Book-tax conformity 
reduces tax audit costs 
because it decreases the 
risk of being audited and 
the difficult y of 
defending tax positions, 
but conformity increases 
costs for financial 
reporting purposes 
because decrease tax 
income would also 
decrease financial 
reported income. 
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Table 2.4 (cont.) 
Prior Research on Tax and Nontax Cost Trade -off Theory  
 
Article Methodology Sample Objective of Study Major Results Rationale for the results Significance and 
Implication 
Guenther et al. 
(1997)  
Empirical 
study 
66 listed firms in US 
plus 66 control firms 
Examine the impact of 
book-tax conformity on 
firm’s financial reporting 
and tax planning 
strategies 
Required use of accrual 
method for tax purposes 
causes firms to defer 
income for financial 
statement purposes. 
Firms can maximize book earnings 
without increasing tax payments if 
they use cash method for tax 
reporting.  Due to the change of 
using accrual method for tax 
purposes, firms have less incentive to 
accelerate revenue and defer 
expenses in the post change periods 
than in the pre-change periods 
because this would accelerate tax 
payments. 
 
Increasing book-tax 
conformity causes firms 
to defer income to 
deferring tax payment 
even if this would result 
in lower income for 
financial reporting 
purpose.  
Klassen 
(1997)  
Empirical 
study 
327 divestitures from 
285 firms listed in 
US 
Examine the influences of 
inside ownership 
concentration on the 
trade-off between 
financial reporting and 
tax reporting incentives. 
Firms with lower levels of 
inside ownership 
concentration realize larger 
financial reporting gains or 
smaller financial reporting 
losses than firms with 
higher levels of 
concentration. 
Lower inside ownership 
concentration will lead to increased 
emphasis on financial reporting, and 
thus result in larger realized gains or 
smaller realized losses.  
 
Lower inside ownership 
increases the capital 
market pressure and thus 
increases the financial 
reporting costs which in 
turn reduces the 
incentives for 
underreporting income 
for tax saving. 
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Table 2.4 (cont.) 
Prior Research on Tax and Nontax Cost Trade -off Theory 
 
Article Methodology Sample Objective of Study Major Results Rationale for the results Significance and 
Implication 
Mills (1998)  Please refer to Table 2.3. 
 
Mills and 
Newberry 
(2001)  
Empirical 
study 
5,776 firm-year 
observations for 
private and public 
firms in US 
Examine whether 
financial-reporting costs 
influence book-tax 
conformity. 
Public firms and firms with 
higher debt levels are less 
likely to have book-tax 
conformity due to the 
higher costs for reporting 
low income. 
Public firms have higher nontax 
financial-reporting costs than private 
firms because the diffuse ownership 
results in greater reliance on 
compensation plans that use reported 
book income. Public firm managers 
are more likely to believe that 
reported income determines the 
market values of their firms.  
Besides, accounting theory posits 
that firms subject to greater 
monitoring by lenders are more 
likely to use income-increasing 
accounting procedures.  
 
Managers would choose 
book-tax conforming or 
book-tax different 
reporting based on the 
level of nontax costs 
incurred for 
underreporting profits. 
Chan and Mo 
(2002) 
 
Please refer to Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.4 (cont.) 
Prior Research on Tax and Nontax Cost Trade -off Theory 
 
Article Methodology Sample Objective of Study Major Results Rationale for the results Significance and 
Implication 
Smith (2002)  Analytical 
study 
N/A  Analyze the trade-off 
between tax minimization 
and managerial 
performance evaluation. 
The trade-off between tax 
and performance evaluation 
still exists for making 
transfer pricing decisions by 
multinational firms even if 
the firms can (i) set separate 
transfer prices for tax and 
performance evaluation or 
(ii) use a performance 
measure other than profit 
because of the audit risks. 
Possibility of discovery of a second 
price by tax authorities may lead to 
penalties and additional tax audits 
which would thus limit the value of 
using separate prices for transfer 
pricing.  Besides, sophisticated 
regulators could correctly infer that 
income shifting motivates a firm’s 
choice of an idiosyncratic, non-
profit-based compensation scheme 
and thus decide to audit the firm 
more closely.   
 
Using separate transfer 
prices for tax and 
performance evaluation, 
or using a performance 
measure other than profit 
cannot eliminate the tax-
incentive trade-off 
because this would 
increase the risks of being 
audited by IRS and thus 
increase the expected tax 
costs. 
Hodder et al. 
(2003)  
Empirical 
study 
6,622 private 
commercial banks in 
US 
Examine tax and nontax 
factors that influence 
commercial banks’ 
decision on conversion 
from C-corporations to S-
corporations. 
Banks are more likely to 
convert to S-corporations 
when conversion saves 
dividend taxes, avoids 
alternative minimum taxes, 
and minimizes state income 
taxes.  Banks are less likely 
to convert when conversion 
costs increase (i.e. when 
banks have high demand of 
capital but conversion 
causes restricted access to 
equity capital).  
Given the tax benefits of being an S-
corporation (i.e. no corporate tax), 
one might expect that many banks 
would convert from C-corporation to 
S-corporation.  However, there are 
other tax costs (e.g. no losses 
carryforwards, penalty taxes) and 
nontax costs (e.g. limitation on 
raising capital) which may also 
affect the decisions.    
Tax benefits, tax costs, 
and nontax costs are 
associated with banks’ 
choice of organizational 
form.   
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Table 3.1  
Sources of Foreign Direct Investment in China 
 
Country 1979-1999 2000 2001 2002 1979 - 2002 
 Value 
(US$bn) 
% of China’s 
total FDI 
Value 
(US$bn)
% of China’s 
total FDI 
Value 
(US$bn)
% of China’s 
total FDI 
Value 
(US$bn)
% of China’s 
total FDI 
Value 
(US$bn) 
% of China’s 
total FDI 
Hong Kong 154.8 50.3 15.5 38.1 16.71 35.6 17.86 33.9 204.88 45.7 
US 25.65 8.3 4.38 10.8 4.43 9.5 5.42 10.3 39.89 8.9 
Japan 24.89 8.1 2.92 7.2 4.35 9.3 4.19 7.9 36.34 8.1 
Taiwan 23.86 7.8 2.30 5.6 2.98 6.4 3.97 7.5 33.11 7.4 
Virgin Inlands 9.40 3.1 3.83 9.4 5.04 10.8 6.12 11.6 24.39 5.4 
Singapore 14.82 4.8 2.17 5.3 2.14 4.6 2.34 4.4 21.47 4.8 
Korea 8.84 2.9 1.49 3.7 2.15 4.6 2.72 5.2 15.20 3.4 
UK 7.58 2.5 1.16 2.8 1.05 2.2 0.90 1.7 10.70 2.4 
  
Source: SSB (State Statistical Bureau). 2002, 2003. China Statistical Yearbook. Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House. 
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Table 3.2 
Distribution of Forms of Foreign Investment in China 
 
 1979-1999 2000 2001 2002 1979 - 2002 
 % of China’s total FDI % of China’s total FDI  % of China’s total FDI % of China’s total FDI % of China’s total FDI 
 By value By number of 
firms 
By value By number of 
firms 
By value By number of 
firms 
By value By number 
of firms 
By value By number 
of firms 
Wholly-foreign 
owned FIEs  
29.53 27.87 47.31 54.58 62.14 59.84 60.15 64.89 36.97 34.22 
Equity Joint 
Ventures 
47.33 
 
58.03 35.23 37.49 25.34 34.02 28.42 30.38 42.91 53.25 
Cooperative 
Joint Venture  
21.12 14.06 16.20 7.86 12.00 6.08 9.59 4.67 18.48 12.49 
Others 2.02 0.05 1.26 0.07 0.52 0.06 1.84 0.07 1.64 0.04 
  
Source: SSB (State Statistical Bureau). 2002, 2003. China Statistical Yearbook . Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House.  
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Table 3.3   
Annual Average of Renminbi Exchange Rates (US dollar to Renminbi) 
 
Year 1994 1995  1996 1997 1998  1999 2000  2001 2002 2003  
Spot 
Exchange 
Rates 
8.6187 8.3510 8.3142 8.2898 8.2791 8.2783 8.2784 8.2770 8.2770 8.2809 
 
Source: SSB (State Statistical Bureau). 2003. China Statistical Yearbook . Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House. 
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Table 4.1  
Summary of Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis Environmental Variables Choice of Transfer Pricing Method 
1 Difference in income tax rates The more important this variable is perceived by 
management, the more likely a cost-based method 
will be used 
2 Minimization of custom duties The more important this variable is perceived by 
management, the more likely a cost-based method 
will be used 
3 Interest of local partners The more important this variable is perceived by 
management, the more likely a market-based 
method will be used 
4 Foreign exchange control and risks The more important this variable is perceived by 
management, the more likely a cost-based method 
will be used 
5 Restrictions on profit repatriation The more important this variable is perceived by 
management, the more likely a cost-based method 
will be used 
6 Risks of expropriation and nationalization The more important this variable is perceived by 
management, the more likely a cost-based method 
will be used 
7 Good relationship with the Chinese 
government 
The more important this variable is perceived by 
management, the more likely a market-based 
method will be used 
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Table 4.2   
Transfer Pricing Policies 
 
Panel A: Transfer pricing methods 
 
 Market-based mehods Cost-based methods 
 Market 
 prices 
Adjusted 
market prices
Actual full 
cost plus 
Standard full  
cost plus 
Standard variable 
cost plus 
No. of FIEs 10 28 9 16 1 
% of total 
FIEs 
 
16% 
 
44% 
 
14% 
 
25% 
 
1% 
 
 
Panel B: Autonomy in external sourcing of materials or components 
 
 Having  autonomy Not having autonomy 
No. of FIE 48 16 
% of total FIEs 75% 25% 
 
 
Panel C: Transfer pricing decisions and foreign equity share 
 
                                     Foreign equity share 
 
 
Transfer pricing decisions 
 
Over 50% 
 
Not exceeding 50% 
 
Total 
Decided by FIEs with consultation of foreign 
partner’s parent company 
 
26 
 
15 
 
41 (64%)
Decided by FIEs without direct influence from 
foreign partner’s parent company 
 8 6  14 (22%)
Adopted the worldwide policies of the foreign 
partner’s parent company  
9 0 9 (14%) 
  43  21 64 (100%)
 
 
Panel D: Disputes over transfer prices 
 
 Having disputes Not having disputes 
No. of FIEs 10 54 
% of total FIEs 16% 84% 
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Table 4.3   
The Importance of Environmental Variables Affecting International Transfer Pricing 
 
  All Sample FIEs US FIEs in Sample Non-US FIEs in Sample
 Variables Mean Ranking Mean Ranking Mean Ranking
1 Difference in income tax rates 2.70 2 2.91 3 2.59 1 
2 Minimization of custom duties 3.03 5 3.09 4/5 3.00 4 
3 Interest of local partners 2.98 3 3.09 4/5 2.93 3 
4 Foreign exchange control and 
risks 
3.02 4 2.68 2 3.19 5 
5 Restrictions on profit 
repatriation 
3.75 6 3.55 6 3.86 6 
6 Risks of expropriation and 
nationalization 
4.31 7 4.32 7 4.30 7 
7 Good relationship with the 
Chinese government 
2.64 1 2.59 1 2.67 2 
  
 Note: The importance of variables is measured by a five-point scale as follows: 1 - 
extremely important; 2 - very important; 3 - moderately important; 4 - not so 
important; 5 - not important at all. 
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Table 4.4   
The Importance of Environmental Variables Perceived by Sample Firms Using 
Different Transfer Pricing Methods  
 
  
  
 
Environmental variables 
FIEs Using 
Market-based 
Methods 
FIEs Using 
Cost-based 
Methods 
Test of Significance of 
Difference in Mean 
Scores 
  Mean score Mean score Mann -Whitney 
U (Z value) 
Var 1 Difference in income tax rates 2.66 2.77 0.11   
Var 2 Minimization of custom duties  2.89 3.23 0.98 
Var 3 Interest of local partners 2.45 3.77     3.34** 
Var 4 Foreign exchange control  and risks 3.39 2.46     2.53** 
Var 5 Restrictions on profit repatriation 3.71 3.80 0.55 
Var 6 Risk s of expropriation and 
nationalization 
4.39 4.19 0.43 
Var 7 Good relationship with the 
Chinese government 
2.39 3.00   1.68* 
** Significant at 5% level;  * Significant at 10% level. 
 
Note: The importance of variables is measured by a five-point scale as follows: 1 - 
extremely important; 2 - very important; 3 - moderately important; 4 - not so 
important; 5 - not important at all. 
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Table 4.5 
Multivariate Analysis of Significance of Management Perception of the Importance of Environmental Variables 
to the Choice of Transfer Pricing Methods  
  
Independent Variables in logistic regression function Predicted 
Sign 
Logistic regression analysis 
    Coefficient Chi -square p-value 
                
 Model 
   
28.063 
 
    0.001*** 
Var 1   Difference in income tax rates +  0.276 0.816 0.366 
Var 2   Minimization of custom duties + -0.175 0.268 0.605 
Var 3   Interest of local partners - -0.860 7.102     0.008*** 
Var 4   Foreign exchange control and risks +  0.871 7.915     0.005*** 
Var 5   Restrictions on profit repatriation +  0.024 0.007 0.935 
Var 6   Risks of expropriation and nationalization + -0.044 0.018 0.892 
Var 7   Good relationship with the Chinese government - -0.675 4.216     0.040** 
***Significant at 1% level;  **Significant at 5% level 
 
Note 1: The logit function is as follows: 
 å+=
i
iiVarbbZ 0  
where:  Z is the model score of logistic distribution (0 = cost-based, 1 = market-based), 
            bi is the model coefficient for the independent variables ( i.e. the seven environmental variables). 
 
Note 2: Based on  the logit function,  65.38% of FIEs using cost-based methods and 86.84% of FIEs using  
market-based methods are correctly classified. 
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 Table 4.6  
Sensitivity Test 1 – By Adding a Dummy Variable Signifying a Majority or Minority 
Foreign Shareholding 
 
 Original model New model 
 
Regression 
Coefficient p-value 
Regression 
Coefficient p-value 
Var 1. Difference in income tax rates 0.276 0.366   0.290 0.347   
Var 2. Minimization of custom duties -0.175 0.605   -0.179 0.596   
Var 3. Interest of local partners -0.860 0.008*  -0.909 0.008* 
Var 4. Foreign exchange control and risks  0.871 0.005* 0.872 0.005* 
Var 5. Restrictions on profit repatriation 0.024 0.935   0.041 0.892   
Var 6. Risks of expropriation and nationalization -0.044 0.892   -0.010 0.975   
Var 7. Good relationship with the Chinese 
government -0.675 0.040* -0.698 0.038* 
   
Newly added variable:    
Majority or minority foreign shareholding  0.370 0.647   
* Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 4.7  
Sensitivity Test 2 – By Adding Percentage of Foreign Ownership as Variable 
 
 Original model New model 
 
Regression 
Coefficient p-value 
Regression 
Coefficient p-value 
Var 1. Difference in income tax rates 0.276 0.366   0.115 0.721   
Var 2. Minimization of custom duties -0.175 0.605   -0.230 0.519   
Var 3. Interest of local partners -0.860 0.008* -0.332 0.430   
Var 4. Foreign exchange control and risks  0.871 0.005* 1.050 0.004* 
Var 5. Restrictions on profit repatriation 0.024 0.935   0.038 0.903   
Var 6. Risks of expropriation and nationalization -0.044 0.892   -0.205 0.556   
Var 7. Good relationship with the Chinese 
government -0.675 0.040* -0.871 0.021* 
     
Newly added variable:     
Percentage of foreign ownership   -5.340 0.067   
* Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 4.8  
Sensitivity Test 3 - By Adding a Variable Signifying Whether the FIEs Set Their 
Transfer Pricing Policies with Consultation of Parent Companies 
 
 Original model New model 
 
Regression 
Coefficient p-value 
Regression 
Coefficient p-value
Var 1. Difference in income tax rates 0.276 0.366   0.265 0.387  
Var 2. Minimization of custom duties -0.175 0.605    -0.199 0.562  
Var 3. Interest of local partners -0.860 0.008* -0.879 0.007*
Var 4. Foreign exchange control and risks 0.871 0.005* 0.872 0.005*
Var 5. Restrictions on profit repatriation 0.024 0.935   0.039 0.896  
Var 6. Risks of expropriation and nationalization -0.044 0.892   -0.008 0.980  
Var 7. Good relationship with the Chinese 
government -0.675 0.040* -0.691 0.037*
     
Newly added variable:     
Consultation   0.487 0.572  
* Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 5.1 
Comparative Tax and Nontax Costs of Shifting Profits out of China through International Transfer Pricing 
 
  
Tax Cost 
  
Nontax Costs 
 Incentive to 
Evade  
  
Audit Costs 
 Probability of 
Being 
Audited 
Form of Investment          
Wholly foreign-owned FIEs and 
cooperative joint ventures (compared 
with equity joint ventures)  
 
Similar 
  
Lower 
  
More motivated to 
evade 
  
Similar 
  
Higher 
          
Activity Orientation           
Export-oriented FIEs (compared 
with domestic-market-oriented 
enterprise) 
Lower  Lower  More motivated to 
evade 
 Lower/ Similar   Higher 
          
Nationality          
Hong Kong or Taiwan sourced FIEs 
(compared with other-sourced FIEs) 
Lower  Lower  More motivated to 
evade 
 Lower/ Similar   Higher 
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Table 5.2 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests for Sample FIEs  
 
         
      Audited Sample 
(n = 111) 
 Non-audited Sample 
(n = 194) 
 Univariate Tests 
 
Variables 
  
Category 
   No. of 
Firms 
  Percentage 
of the Sample 
 No. of 
Firms 
  Percentage 
of the Sample 
 Chi-
square test 
 t-test 
                 
Policy variables:                 
FORM  Wholly foreign-owned enterprise and 
cooperative joint venture 
    
96 
  
86.5% 
  
117 
  
60.3% 
    
  Equity joint venture    15  13.5%  77  39.7%     
              22.967 ***    
ACTIVITY  Export -oriented enterprise    101  91.0%  67  34.5%     
  Domestic-market-oriented enterprise    10  9.0%  127  65.5%     
              90.949 ***   
SOURCE  Hong Kong or Taiwan sourced FIEs    92  82.9%  124  63.9%     
  Others    19  17.1%  70  36.1%     
              12.289 ***   
Control variables:                 
INDUSTRY  Identified industries    38  34.2%  35  18.0%     
  Others    73  65.8%  159  82.0%     
              10.169 ***   
              Mean            Mean     
SIZE   Sales in US$million     111  25.4. .           194  50.4 ..        
                7.659 *** 
ROC   Return on capital (i.e. net profit before 
tax over capital)   
    
111 
  
11.2% 
  
194 
  
22.9% 
    
                1.367  
RPT  Volume of related-party transaction 
over sales  
    
111 
  
1.34.  
  
194 
  
0.91 
    
                -4.569 *** 
Chi-square test and t-test compare the sample distribution and means between audited sample and non-audited sample. 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 5.3 
Regression Results on the Impact of Firm Characteristics on Transfer Pricing Compliance 
 
Regression equation: 
AUDIT  = ?0 +?1 FORM +?2 ACTIVITY +?3 SOURCE +?4 INDUSTRY +?5 SIZE +?6 ROC  
+?7  RPT+ ? 
        
Variable 
 
 Predicted Sign  Regression 
Coefficient 
Wald  
?2 
Significance 
(p-value) 
 
        
Intercept    7.015    
FORM  -  -0.856 3.267 0.036 **  
ACTIVITY  +  2.607 30.990 0.000 ***  
SOURCE  +  -0.353 0.664 0.208   
INDUSTRY  +  0.082 0.039 0.422   
SIZE  -  -1.066 41.892 0.000 ***  
ROC  -  0.211 0.901 0.172   
RPT  +  1.103 8.878 0.002 ***  
        
Chi-square for Model  200.795***        
Percentage Correctly Classified   87.2            
        
 
***, ** indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Definitions of variables: 
AUDIT   = 1, if an FIE was audited by the Chinese tax authorities due to transfer pricing 
manipulation, 0 otherwise; 
FORM  = 1, if an FIE is a equity joint venture, 0 otherwise; 
ACTIVITY = 1, if an FIE is an export -oriented enterprise, 0 otherwise; 
SOURCE  = 1, if an FIE is sourced from Hong Kong or Taiwan, 0 otherwise. 
INDUSTRY  = 1, if an FIE is in identified higher risk industries, 0 otherwise; 
SIZE  = natural logarithm of sales 
ROC = return on capital of FIE (i.e. profit before tax over capital) 
RPT = volume of related-party transactions over sales 
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